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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about dialetheism and the problem of revenge. More broadly, it is 
about truth and what the logical paradoxes tell us about the logical behaviour of 
truth. One of the driving forces behind the contemporary study of truth and 
paradox is the problem of revenge: that many, perhaps all, available theories of 
truth, give rise to further paradoxes, invoking central notions of those theories, 
which demonstrate that the theory cannot express those notions. This sort of 
expressive limitation, especially if it involves the very notion invoked to 
diagnose what goes wrong in paradoxical sentences, would normally be thought 
a decisive point against a given theory of the paradoxes, were it not for the fact 
that the problem is so pervasive that every currently available theory has, at 
some point, been argued to suffer from it. 
Dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are true, has often been thought 
to be the only view which has a reasonable chance of avoiding the problem. 
Indeed, the surge of interest in the view since the first publication of Priest’s In 
Contradiction, in 1987, defending dialetheism, is probably due in large part to 
the seeming immunity to the revenge problem that Priest’s view possesses. Its 
virtue, in respect of revenge, is that its ability to accept, without collapse into 
incoherence, contradictions, allows it to accept any further revenge paradoxes 
as merely giving more sound arguments for dialetheia (true contradictions). 
This thesis argues that this appearance of revenge-immunity is mistaken. 
Dialetheism, too, has its revenge problems. The seeming virtue of dialetheism, 
that it can accept the contradictions generated by revenge paradoxes without 
incoherence, also has its drawbacks. This is because dialetheists are not only 
able, but compelled to accept the contradictions arising from the semantic 
paradoxes. This means that contradictions can arise in certain areas where they 
are undesirable. In particular, there are notions which seem to require 
consistency in order to be expressible. If we can demonstrate, using revenge 
paradoxes, that, on dialetheism, predicates putatively representing these 
notions would have to behave inconsistently, then we can demonstrate that 
dialetheists cannot express the notions. 
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There are many ways one might wish to carve up the different varieties of 
dialetheism available. I have separated the view into two broad kinds: 
metatheoretically paraconsistent dialetheism, on the one hand, and 
metatheoretically consistent dialetheism, on the other. This distinction decides 
to which variety of revenge problem the version of dialetheism in question is 
subject. I take each in turn, and argue that they are each subject to expressive 
limitations brought about by revenge paradox. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Revenge: Dialetheism and its Expressive Limitations 
Contents 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................................. 3 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ 7 
Declaration of Originality Form – Research Degrees ........................................................................ 9 
Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................................... 11 
Chapter 2: What is Revenge? ........................................................................................................... 13 
2.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 13 
2.1 The Phenomenon of Revenge ..................................................................................................... 15 
2.2 Too Easy Revenge ....................................................................................................................... 18 
2.3 Recipes for Revenge .................................................................................................................... 24 
2.4 Varieties of Revenge ................................................................................................................... 40 
2.5 Chapter Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 40 
Chapter 3: Metatheoretically Paraconsistent Dialetheism ............................................................ 42 
3.0 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 42 
3.1 Priest’s Metatheoretically Paraconsistent Dialetheism .............................................................. 43 
3.2 The Semantic Paradoxes ............................................................................................................. 44 
3.2.1 Paracompletism ....................................................................................................................... 47 
3.2.2 Rejecting the T-Scheme ........................................................................................................... 50 
3.2.3 Hierarchical Approaches .......................................................................................................... 54 
3.3 Set-Theoretic Paradoxes ............................................................................................................. 58 
3.3.1 The Inconsistency of Naïve Set Theory .................................................................................... 58 
3.3.2 Priest Against Set-Theoretic Orthodoxy .................................................................................. 62 
3.3.2.1 Lack of Motivation for the Cumulative Hierarchy ................................................................. 62 
3.3.2.2 Category Theory .................................................................................................................... 66 
3.3.2.3 Logic ...................................................................................................................................... 69 
3.3 Paradoxes of Inclosure ................................................................................................................ 70 
3.4 Summary of Priest’s Case for Dialetheism .................................................................................. 73 
3.5 Priest’s Dialetheism ..................................................................................................................... 76 
3.5.1 The Teleological Account of Truth ........................................................................................... 79 
3.5.1.1 Falsity .................................................................................................................................... 81 
3.5.1.2 Untruth.................................................................................................................................. 83 
3.5.2 Formal Semantics for Priest’s Dialetheism .............................................................................. 86 
3.5.2.1 Extensional Connectives ....................................................................................................... 86 
6 
 
3.5.2.2 Priest’s Conditional ............................................................................................................... 88 
3.5.3 Paraconsistent Set Theory ....................................................................................................... 94 
3.5.4 Paraconsistent Metatheory ..................................................................................................... 99 
3.6 Chapter Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 103 
Chapter 4: Getting Revenge on Metatheoretically Paraconsistent Dialetheism ......................... 104 
4.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 104 
4.1 Revenge, Just False and Non-Dialetheia ................................................................................... 106 
4.2 Inconsistent Validity and Revenge ............................................................................................ 117 
4.2.1 Inconsistent Validity with Transparent Truth ........................................................................ 119 
4.2.2 Invalidity with a Non-Contraposable T-scheme .................................................................... 124 
4.2.3 Revenge and the Inexpressibility of Invalidity ....................................................................... 131 
4.2.3.1 Invalidity Revenge and Just False Revenge ........................................................................ 133 
4.3 Avenues of Response ................................................................................................................ 134 
4.3.1 Invalidity Revenge on the Model-Theoretic Strategy ............................................................ 138 
4.4 Chapter Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 140 
Chapter 5: Metatheoretically Consistent Dialetheism ................................................................. 142 
5.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 142 
5.1 Spandrels of Truth .................................................................................................................... 143 
5.2  Basic Formal Picture ................................................................................................................ 149 
5.3  Merely Semantic Dialetheism .................................................................................................. 153 
5.4 Beall’s Conditional .................................................................................................................... 161 
5.5 Accounts of Validity .................................................................................................................. 166 
5.6 Some General Considerations about Metatheoretically Consistent Dialetheism .................... 168 
5.7 Chapter Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 172 
Chapter 6: Getting Revenge on Metatheoretically Consistent Dialetheism ................................ 173 
6.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 173 
6.1 Formal Revenge for Metatheoretically Consistent Dialetheism .............................................. 173 
6.2 Informal Revenge for Metatheoretically Consistent Dialetheism ............................................ 179 
6.2.1 Shrieking Just False ................................................................................................................ 187 
6.2.1 Priest on Just False and Exclusion .......................................................................................... 193 
6.2.2 Shrieking, Just False and Exclusion ........................................................................................ 195 
6.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 201 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 202 
 
 
7 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would firstly like to sincerely thank my supervisors, Dr Adam Rieger and 
Professor Alan Weir. I am now approaching the end of the eleventh year of my 
time at the University of Glasgow, and have known Adam and Alan as friends and 
philosophical mentors for most of that time. I received a great deal of help and 
encouragement from both, to the great benefit of this thesis, and my 
philosophical development more generally. 
All the members of the Department of Philosophy at Glasgow, staff and graduate 
students, have, at some point during my time here, and probably at some point 
during the last four years of my PhD, helped me in some way or other: either 
with helpful comments on my thesis, encouraging and critical questions in 
response to talks I have given, advice on my philosophical career, or general 
philosophical (or non-philosophical) discussion over pints of real ale. So I would 
like to express my gratitude to the staff at Glasgow, Dr David Bain, Professor 
Michael Brady, Dr Campbell Brown, Dr Ben Colburn, Dr Jennifer Corns, Dr Robert 
Cowan, Dr Victoria Harrison, Dr Gary Kemp, Dr Hugh Lazenby, Dr Stephan 
Leuenberger, Dr Chris Lindsay, Professor Fraser Macbride, Professor Fiona 
Macpherson and Dr Martin Smith. Also to the graduate students with whom I have 
studied, Carole Baillie, Umut Baysan, Stuart Crutchfield, John Donaldson, 
Suzanne Harvey, James Humphries, Dr Frederique Janssen-Lauret, Patrick 
Kaczmarek, Andrew MacGregor, Sheena McAnulla, Neil McDonnell, Stephanie 
Rennick, Catherine Robb and Abraham Sapien-Cordoba. 
My family have been a source of unwavering support and encouragement, 
without which my philosophical studies would have been much more difficult, in 
numerous ways. I would like to thank, especially, my parents, John and 
Elizabeth. Special thanks are also due to my sister, Lisa Brown, whose fault it is, 
since it was her suggestion, that I changed my degree subject, from Computer 
Science and Mathematics, to Philosophy (which was, at the time, merely a 
fascinating side subject). 
Thanks, also, are due to Graham Priest, whose brilliant philosophical work on 
dialetheism was the main inspiration for this thesis. In addition to inspiring much 
of my philosophical thinking over the last four years, his ingenious defence of 
8 
 
what, to many philosophers, is a quite outrageous view, has taught me that 
arguments, not incredulous stares, are required if we are to be justified in 
rejecting even the most counter-intuitive theories. He has also been very 
generous with his time, discussing various issues dialetheic in emails and in 
conversation, in a helpful and constructive way, despite my spending much of 
my thesis arguing against some of the central conclusions of his work. I would 
like to thank JC Beall, to whose work, Spandrels of Truth, I also devote a lot of 
discussion, which was helped by his generous comments by email and in 
conversation. I would also like to thank Franz Berto, who invited me to speak at 
the Northern Institute of Philosophy, and whose helpful discussion of my paper 
has clarified my thinking on issues of exclusion and revenge. 
I would like to extend my deepest thanks to my partner, Julie McHugh, whose 
constant support and love has done much to make this thesis possible. 
Philosophers can be a difficult bunch, and she has tolerated me with great 
fortitude. Last, but definitely not least, I would like to thank Basil Carbonara 
McHugh, my miniature dachshund, who has provided constant amusement and 
companionship. If Basil could speak, I’m sure he would be a very wise 
philosopher, though we could not understand him. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
  
 
Declaration of Originality Form – Research Degrees 
This form must be completed and signed and submitted with your thesis. 
Please complete the information below (using BLOCK CAPITALS). 
Name ..............................................................................................  
Student Number .................................................................................  
Title of degree ...................................................................................  
Title of thesis  ...................................................................................  
The University's degrees and other academic awards are given in recognition of a 
student's personal achievement. All work submitted for assessment is accepted 
on the understanding that it is the student's own effort. Plagiarism is defined as 
the submission or presentation of work, in any form, which is not one's own, 
without acknowledgement of the sources. For further information on what may 
be considered ‘plagiarism’, please read carefully the University’s Statement on 
Plagiarism as contained in the University Calendar. 
 
I confirm that this thesis is my own work and that I have: 
Read and understood the University of Glasgow Statement on Plagiarism  
Clearly referenced, in both the text and the bibliography or references, all 
sources used in the work  
 
Fully referenced (including page numbers) and used inverted commas for all 
text quoted from books, journals, web etc.  
 
Provided the sources for all tables, figures, data etc. that are not my own 
work 
 
Not made use of the work of any other student(s) past or present without 
acknowledgement.  This includes any of my own work, that has been 
previously, or concurrently, submitted for assessment, either at this or any 
other educational institution. 
 
Not sought or used the services of any professional agencies to produce this 
work 
 
In addition, I understand that any false claim in respect of this work will 
result in disciplinary action in accordance with University regulations 
 
10 
 
  
DECLARATION: 
I am aware of and understand the University’s policy on plagiarism and I certify 
that this thesis is my own work, except where indicated by referencing, and that 
I have followed the good academic practices noted above 
 
Signed .............................................................................................  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis argues that dialetheism, the view that dialetheia (true 
contradictions) exist, suffers from the problem of revenge. It discusses, 
primarily, the work of two philosophers: Graham Priest and JC Beall. Priest’s 
work represents the most thoroughly-developed version of dialetheism currently 
available. It is also of a very thoroughgoing kind and, in particular, his 
dialetheism is described in dialetheic terms; which is to say, his dialetheism has 
a paraconsistent metatheory. Beall has developed a more moderate version of 
dialetheism which is described classically; that is, his dialetheism takes classical 
ZF as its metatheory. This difference in metatheory makes a great difference to 
the prospects each theory has for avoiding revenge. Beall’s classical metatheory 
would appear to allow the construction of notions, in its metatheory, which, 
were they expressible in his object theory, would entail triviality (the truth of 
every sentence). This, at least prima facie, means that this view faces the 
revenge problem. Priest’s view, with its paraconsistent metatheory, is different, 
since (assuming his theory is non-trivial), no such notions can be constructed. So 
Priest’s metatheoretically paraconsistent dialetheism would seem to have better 
prospects for revenge-freedom than Beall’s. In fact, as I argue, both theories 
face revenge problems. 
Chapter 2 gives a characterisation of the problem in terms of two ‘recipes’ for 
formulating revenge: one for what I call ‘formal revenge’ and one for ‘informal 
revenge’. What, exactly, the problem of revenge should be taken to be has been 
a matter of some controversy, so it is likely that the recipes I give will also be 
somewhat controversial, and may well need refinement if they are to offer a 
fully precise account of revenge. Nonetheless, my purpose in this chapter is only 
to give enough of an account of the problem, as I see it, to serve the main 
purpose of the thesis, which is to argue that dialetheism suffers from a revenge 
problem. The recipes should be enough for this. I also, in Chapter 2, discuss 
which sorts of problems should be understood as genuine revenge problems. In 
particular, I disagree with JC Beall that certain forms of revenge are ‘too easy’. 
I spend more time discussing metatheoretically paraconsistent dialetheism than 
the alternative. There are a few reasons for this. The first is that Priest has 
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written a lot more on the former than has been written on the latter, so there is 
more material to be engaged with. The second is that my revenge problem for 
Priest depends more on the precise details of his view than do my arguments 
against metatheoretically consistent dialetheism. Finally, though the views take 
different metatheories, they still share much in common, so devoting the same 
amount of space to both theories would have involved a lot of unnecessary 
repetition. 
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss metatheoretically paraconsistent dialetheism. The first 
lays out the view and its motivations, drawing largely on Priest’s articulation of 
it. The second argues that it suffers from revenge. I present a novel revenge 
problem concerning the notion of invalidity, arguing that metatheoretically 
paraconsistent dialetheism must treat validity inconsistently to such an extent 
that ‘invalid’ and ‘just invalid’ cease to be expressible. 
Chapters 5 and 6 discuss metatheoretically consistent dialetheism. Again, the 
first lays out the view, paying special attention to the version defended by JC 
Beall as the clearest articulation of it. The second argues that it suffers from 
revenge. I don’t present a new revenge problem here, instead arguing, contra 
Beall, that the view suffers from well-known revenge problems of both the 
formal and informal kind. 
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Chapter 2: What is Revenge? 
2.0 Introduction 
 
The problem of revenge is one of the central, driving forces behind the 
philosophical analysis of truth and its relationship with the paradoxes. This 
chapter discusses the problem of revenge and how it should best be understood. 
I follow the Beall’s presentation of the issues in his Prolegomenon to Future 
Revenge (2007) fairly closely for a couple of reasons: firstly, he gives a very 
perspicuous treatment of the problems and my own characterisation of revenge 
will, in effect, be a refinement of his and, secondly, I wish to disagree with him 
on the important issue of which putative revenge problems should be taken to 
be genuine revenge problems. Beall argues that certain, standard formulations 
of revenge are, in fact, ‘too easy revenge’ and so may be dismissed as pseudo-
problems. If Beall were correct, then a number of theories often thought to face 
revenge problems, in fact, would not, or at least the standard means by which it 
would normally be thought they face revenge would fail. One such theory is the 
metatheoretically consistent dialetheism defended by Beall in a number of 
places, but especially in his (2009). This theory is a particular focus of Chapter 4 
of this thesis, and so whether common strategies for revenge are ruled out, for 
this theory, from the outset by a proper characterisation of revenge is of some 
importance. 
First, I give a rough characterisation of how the problem of revenge arises, 
particularly in the context of classifying liar sentences. I then critically discuss 
Beall’s ‘too easy’ objection to certain formulations of the revenge problem. 
Beall claims that the fact that the notion rendered inexpressible by revenge is 
classical means that we should expect it to trivialise in non-classical settings 
and, so, it is not a ‘target’ notion of our theory. Establishing the relevance of 
the inexpressibility result, he thinks, relies on the assumption, which may be 
rejected, that the semantics of our artificial language (which, we hope, models 
some relevant features of natural language) are intended to model the 
semantics of our natural language. Against Beall I argue that, firstly, it is not 
clear how one could make sense of the notion ‘classically constructed’ such that 
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it validates his claim that these notions should be expected to trivialise in non-
classical languages; indeed, there are good reasons to think this is not the case. 
Secondly I argue that this is irrelevant anyway, since it doesn’t matter whether a 
notion is a ‘target’ of the theory or not: what matters is that the model 
language avoids triviality differently from natural language i.e. via expressive 
limitations. Finally, I argue that, even if we accepted that the notion being 
‘target’ is important, the way Beall suggests avoiding the relevance of the 
inexpressibility result doesn’t help: he merely gives a promissory note for some 
further theory which we have good reason to suppose will be subject to a 
revenge problem that Beall has already granted is problematic rather than ‘too 
easy’. 
I then discuss Beall’s characterisation of revenge via three recipes for revenge 
he provides. I suggest some modifications to these which seem to me to improve 
on them, most importantly in characterising revenge for the metatheoretically 
inconsistent dialetheism which is the focus of Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis. 
There is some further critical discussion here of Beall’s views on which recipes 
generate real revenge problems. I conclude the discussion by giving my own 
account of revenge in terms of two recipes: one for what I call ‘formal revenge’ 
and the other for what I call ‘informal revenge’. Finally, I say a very few things 
about extending the treatment to forms of revenge arising from paradoxes other 
than the liar. 
A caveat concerning the following account of revenge is this: my aim is to 
characterise, in a rough way, the problem of revenge as it is currently 
understood, and as best fits the rest of the discussion of revenge in this thesis. It 
is not my intention to give a historical account of the ‘genealogy of revenge’, 
though such a project would undoubtedly be interesting. What, exactly, revenge 
is supposed to be has been a controversial matter among philosophers. It is 
likely, then, that my own characterisation of the problem will prove somewhat 
controversial. It is also, as I have said, not utterly precise: I don’t give a precise, 
formal account of what I take a liar paradox to be, for example, and I do not 
specify, exactly, what the relationship ought to be between the notions σ and λ 
(used in the recipes below), in the cases where it is not identity. Nonetheless, I 
hope, and think, that leaving the understanding of these notions at a more-or-
less intuitive level will not detract from the purpose of this chapter, which is 
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simply to give enough of an understanding of the problem of revenge to follow 
the rest of the thesis. 
A final caveat is that Beall, in his discussion, uses the term ‘language’ in a more 
substantial sense than is, perhaps, usual, seemingly intending it to refer to what 
might, more usually, be called a ‘theory’ (a language, in the purely syntactic 
sense, with the addition of a class of models interpreting it). I follow him in this 
usage throughout the thesis.  
 
2.1 The Phenomenon of Revenge 
A proper account of the paradoxes is central to our understanding of truth. One 
principle that truth clearly seems to obey and, in fact, which is plausibly 
constitutive of the very notion of truth is the T-scheme: T<α> ↔ α. But 
combining this principle, along will some seemingly obvious truths about logic 
delivers inconsistency and, then, triviality. Consider the sentence L, equivalent 
to ¬T<L>, and argue as follows: 
(1) T<L>   (suppose for reductio) 
(2) L   (1, T-scheme) 
(3) ¬T<L>  (2, substituting equivalents) 
(4) ¬T<L>  (1, 3, reductio) 
(5) L   (4, substituting equivalents) 
(6) T<L>   (5, T-scheme) 
(7) T<L> ∧ ¬T<L> (4, 6, ∧-introduction) 
Informally, we suppose that L is true and, since it says its untrue, conclude that 
it must be untrue. But since it’s untrue, and says so, we conclude that it’s true 
after all and, hence, both true and untrue. Since, classically, the principle of 
explosion, A ∧ ¬A ⊨ B, is valid, the contradiction in (7) trivially entails 
everything1. Assuming we wish to reject the absurd result that everything is 
                                                          
1
 There are a number of versions of the reductio rule available, each of which, I think, would be equally 
suitable here. For example, Priest endorses a fairly weak reductio rule α → ¬α ⊨ ¬α in his (2006, p.87). It 
will do no harm to assume that, throughout the thesis, this is the reductio rule employed. 
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true, something in this argument must be rejected. It is normally thought 
(though not, of course, but dialetheists) that since the argument from the 
existence of L to (7) concludes with a contradiction that there is something 
wrong with this argument, so something must be given up and some diagnosis 
given for what it defective about L. 
Since L cannot consistently be either true or false, many philosophers have 
found attractive the idea that L must then be neither true nor false. But, 
supposing the behaviour of ‘neither true nor false’ is as it seems, this raises a 
difficulty. If something is neither true nor false, then it seems obviously to 
follow that it is, a fortiori, not true. But if we claim that the liar is neither true 
nor false and are thereby committed to L being untrue, then no progress has 
been made, since we are back with contradiction. 
The problem is general: we want to diagnose what is defective about the liar 
sentence L and so we place it in some category of defective sentences, say, to 
use Beall’s terminology (2007, p.3), bugger. Whatever other principles we 
include in our account of buggerhood, we had better not have the principle Bug. 
(Bug) bugger<α> → ¬T<α> 
If it follows from the fact that a sentence falls under the category bugger that 
the sentence is untrue, then we can construct a sentence (normally by 
techniques of diagonalisation), σ, equivalent to bugger<σ> ∨ ¬T<σ> and derive a 
contradiction in much the same way as with L. On the other hand, the whole 
point of introducing the notion bugger was to characterise liar sentences as 
defective in some way and so, presumably, as things we ought to reject. That all 
sentences of which bugger holds be untrue, therefore, seems essential. 
The upshot of this is that any theory classifying liar sentences as buggers cannot 
have bugger as a notion expressible in the object language, since this would 
allow the construction of sentences like σ, which deliver inconsistency and then, 
by explosion, triviality. So the theory cannot express the notion bugger. But this 
is a disastrous expressive limitation, since the whole point of the theory is to 
classify liar sentences as buggers. This is the revenge problem for the theory 
which wishes to classify liar sentences as buggers: once the notion of bugger is 
introduced, the very liar reasoning the notion was introduced to diagnose 
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reappears and demonstrates that a crucial notion of the theory, viz. bugger, 
cannot be expressed in the theory. Revenge, in other words, is expressive 
limitation brought about by liar reasoning on the very machinery introduced to 
solve the paradoxes. 
There are various objections that philosophers defending theories which classify 
liar sentences as defective might raise to the points made above, but my 
purpose is not to give the final word on the prospects for revenge-free versions 
of these theories, but to illustrate the shape of revenge problems and how they 
generally arise. 
What we are interested in, when we construct theories of truth with an eye on 
the paradoxes, is building models (in the informal sense, though often formal 
model-theory is used) of natural language explaining how it is that the paradoxes 
do not deliver the triviality of natural language, despite seemingly sound 
arguments for that conclusion. So we construct a formal language, containing a 
truth predicate and various other salient features we think might hold of natural 
language (such as the inference principles we take to be valid and, perhaps, the 
T-scheme) and characterise the features of truth in this language. We hope, in 
so doing, to have given a picture of some of the features of natural language 
which explain how it is that liar reasoning does not collapse it into triviality. 
To put the revenge problem in these terms, what revenge threatens to 
demonstrate is that we have given an inadequate model of natural language. Our 
model language cannot express (at least) one of its crucial notions, for example, 
bugger. If it could express this notion, triviality would follow; so the model 
language avoids triviality by making the notion inexpressible. Natural language, 
however, can express bugger (I have already expressed the notion in natural 
language several times). The model language is therefore a bad model of natural 
language. The model language achieves non-triviality by making a crucial notion 
like bugger inexpressible, but since natural language does not, the model sheds 
no light on how natural language achieves this feat. 
The above sketch of the revenge problem has put it solely in terms of the 
revenge of the liar paradox. The restriction of discussion of revenge to the liar’s 
revenge is almost universal in the literature, though this is probably due to the 
fact that the liar in general receives vastly more discussion in the literature than 
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the other paradoxes. There is no reason that similar revenge problems might not 
be developed from other paradoxes and, indeed, Stewart Shapiro (2007) has 
argued that the Burali-Forti paradox gives rise to revenge issues. As is standard, I 
focus my discussion of revenge on the liar’s revenge, though I say a little 
towards the end of the chapter (section 2.4) about how one might easily 
accommodate other types of revenge arising from paradoxes other than the liar. 
2.2 Too Easy Revenge 
 
Following Beall’s terminology, we let ℒM be our artificial model language and ℒ 
be our natural language (in the present case, English) which ℒM is supposed to 
model. We abbreviate ‘the behaviour of ℒM’s truth predicate’ by ‘ℒM-truth’ and 
the ‘the behaviour of ℒ’s truth predicate’ by ‘ℒ-truth’. So a revenge problem for 
ℒM is the charge that ℒM-truth is a bad model of ℒ-truth, since ℒM avoids triviality 
by lacking expressive powers present in ℒ. Since they avoid triviality in different 
ways, ℒM does not tell us how ℒ is non-trivial. 
We can illustrate with a specific example given by Beall of a Kripkean partial-
language approach (a nice account of which can be found in the appendix to 
Beall’s paper (2007, pp.19-29)) where ℒM is the fixed-point language of a Strong-
Kleene construction. The metatheory of ℒM is classical ZF set theory, in which we 
can construct notions like true-in-ℒM and not-true-in-ℒM to characterise ℒM-truth 
and for which it can be demonstrated that α is true-in-ℒM if and only if T<α> is 
true-in-ℒM. We can then construct a sentence λ, equivalent to not-true-in-ℒM 
<λ>. We can prove in the metalanguage that λ is true-in-ℒM if and only if it is 
not-true-in-ℒM. Because the metatheory is classical, and so the law of excluded 
middle is a logical truth in it, we also have that λ is either true-in-ℒM or not-
true-in-ℒM, and hence that λ is both true-in-ℒM and not-true-in-ℒM, which is a 
contradiction and, in the present context, delivers triviality. So, in order to 
prevent the construction of revenge paradoxes involving sentences like λ, true-
in-ℒM cannot be expressible in ℒM. 
But the notion true-in-ℒM is expressible in ℒM’s metatheory, as we have said, and 
this metatheory is contained in our natural language, ℒ. So true-in-ℒM is 
expressible in ℒ. So, the revenge objection goes, ℒM-truth is a bad model of ℒ-
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truth, since ℒM avoids triviality by the inexpressibility of a notion expressible in 
ℒ. So, since they avoid triviality differently, ℒM’s non-triviality sheds no light on 
ℒ’s non-triviality. 
Beall thinks, at least in this form, that the preceding, putative revenge problem 
is ‘too easy revenge’, and so not really a revenge problem at all (2007, p.10). 
What requires to be established to make it a genuine revenge problem is not 
merely the result that there are notions expressible in ℒ which are inexpressible 
in ℒM, but also what is the relevance of this result. 
A point against its relevance, according to Beall, is that truth-in-ℒM is a 
classically constructed, model-dependent notion and so not one of the target 
notions we are aiming to model with ℒM. It is “hardly surprising”, Beall thinks 
(2007, p.12), that such classically constructed notions trivialise is non-classical 
languages and so no surprise that the non-classical languages in question, such as 
ℒM, cannot express them.  
One thing that would establish the relevance of the inexpressibility result, in 
Beall’s view, is the assumption that the semantics of ℒM are intended to model 
the semantics of ℒ. Since the semantics given for ℒM involve, essentially, truth-
in-ℒM, the semantics for our natural language, ℒ, must involve something similar. 
But since, as we have established, truth-in-ℒM is not, on pain of triviality, 
expressible in ℒM, ℒM is an inadequate model of the natural language ℒ, since ℒ 
can express its own semantic notions, whereas ℒM cannot. 
Whilst this would, he thinks, turn ‘too easy revenge’ into a genuine revenge 
problem, it turns, crucially, on the assumption that the semantics of ℒM are 
intended to be a model for the semantics of the natural language, ℒ. This 
assumption, according to Beall, may well be rejected. For example, suppose one 
thought that a proper account of the semantics of natural language is not to be 
given in terms of truth-conditions, but something else. Let’s suppose, for 
definiteness, one thought semantics ought to be done in terms of use-conditions 
(see, for example, Field (2001) or Horwich (2005)). One would still, says Beall, 
face questions about the paradoxes and what, in light of them, we should take 
to be the logical behaviour of the truth predicate. 
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It would be quite reasonable, Beall thinks, to respond by giving truth conditional 
semantics, employing model theory, for a language ℒM, with the intention that 
the logical behaviour of the truth predicate in ℒM model the logical behaviour of 
the truth predicate in ℒ, thus explaining how the paradoxes are to be avoided 
(or, perhaps, accommodated). In this case, according to Beall, the semantics for 
our language ℒM are not intended to be a model for the semantics for ℒ, though 
ℒM-truth is intended to  be a model for ℒ-truth. It would be no objection to this 
view, Beall thinks, that truth-in-ℒM is inexpressible in ℒM since that notion is 
employed in a merely instrumental fashion, in describing the semantics of the 
language ℒM, with the real goal being the modelling of ℒ-truth by ℒM-truth. 
There are a number of problems here. Firstly, it is unclear what Beall might 
mean by ‘classically constructed’ which would support the claim that it is 
unsurprising that such notions trivialise in non-classical contexts. This objection 
is raised by Kevin Scharp in his (2013, pp.90-91). The obvious way of 
characterising a notion as classical is as some n-place predicate of which all the 
classical principles governing such predicates hold. To take Scharp’s example, a 
classical notion of redness would be a one-place predicate such that everything 
is either red or not red, nothing is both red and not red etc. But there is nothing 
problematic, in general, with such notions existing in, and being defined for, 
non-classical languages. Indeed, as Scharp points out, since the theorems and 
inference principles of non-classical logics are generally proper subsets of those 
holding in classical logic, if one can’t prove a contradiction from a notion 
classically, a fortiori, one can’t prove a contradiction from the notion non-
classically. 
On the other hand, to use one of Scharp’s examples again (2013, p.91), smooth 
infinitesimal analysis is a theory of infinitesimals consistent in intuitionistic 
logic, but inconsistent in classical logic. So the notion of infinitesimal implicitly 
defined in the theory is a non-classical notion which is inconsistent (and 
therefore trivial) in classical logic. So, though Beall says it is unsurprising that 
classical notions trivialise in non-classical contexts, this isn’t right, at least on 
the present understanding of classical notion, things are the other way around: 
it is non-classical notions which trivialise on classical logic. 
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It may be that there is some other understanding available which would support 
Beall’s claim, but it’s not obvious what it would be. Here is one reason to think 
there can’t be such a notion (or, at least, why Beall should hope there isn’t). If 
one takes a non-classical model language, ℒM, to be an accurate model of our 
natural language, ℒ, then the correct logic for ℒ is the non-classical logic which 
holds in ℒM; for example (see Chapter 5 for discussion), Beall endorses the logic 
BXTT, and so this ought to be the logic both of ℒM and of ℒ. If there is an account 
of ‘classical notion’ such that it becomes obvious that these notions collapse 
into triviality whenever they are expressible in a non-classical context, then 
those notions had better not be expressible in ℒ, otherwise our natural language 
trivialises (because it has the same logic as ℒM). But, since ℒ contains the 
(classical) metatheory of ℒM, any notion expressible in this classical metatheory 
is expressible in ℒ. Hence, if there are these classical notions which trivialise in 
non-classical settings like ℒM, it would seem to follow straightforwardly from 
their expressibility in ℒ that natural language is trivial. 
So Beall’s claim that classical notions trivialise is non-classical settings, at the 
least, requires further development if it is to go towards supporting the claim 
that the inexpressible notion, true-in-ℒM, is not a target notion of the model. 
A second problem is that it does not matter whether the notion is ‘target’ or 
not. We have a model language, ℒM, which has a certain logic, contains a truth-
predicate, and so on. The defender of ℒM as a model of ℒ hopes that these are 
features ℒM shares with our natural language, ℒ. We have a classical metatheory 
for ℒM, in which the notion true-in-ℒM is expressible. We can demonstrate via liar 
reasoning and the properties of the metatheory that, if ℒM can express true-in-
ℒM, then triviality follows. So the expressibility of true-in-ℒM in our object 
language, the non-classical logic of the object language and the classical 
principles of the metatheory are an explosive mix: they deliver triviality. This is 
avoided in the case of ℒM by true-in-ℒM being inexpressible. The model language, 
ℒM, is therefore non-trivial only because true-in-ℒM is not expressible in it. How 
does our natural language, ℒ, achieve this? That is, how does it avoid 
succumbing to triviality through revenge paradox? We are none the wiser, 
because true-in-ℒM is expressible in ℒ. Whether the notion whose inexpressibility 
allows the model language to be non-trivial is ‘target’ or not does not matter. 
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What is important is that it is the inexpressibility of this notion which prevents 
liar reasoning from trivialising ℒM; since ℒ can express the notion, the model 
language, ℒM, has not shown us how ℒ is not trivialised by liar reasoning. Hence, 
ℒM is an inadequate model of ℒ. 
A final problem for Beall’s ‘too easy revenge’ objection concerns the 
instrumentalism he suggests as a way of avoiding the relevance of the 
inexpressibility result. He says that, were the semantics of ℒM intended to model 
those of ℒ, the objection would be a genuine revenge problem. But, he thinks, 
we may well give up this assumption. In the example considered above, this 
might be done by someone who thought that semantics was a matter of giving, 
not truth-conditions, but use-conditions (for example, someone who wished to 
endorse the sort of use-theoretic semantics defended by Field (2001) or Horwich 
(2005)). One who thought this would still have to say something about the 
paradoxes and give an account of the logic of the truth predicate. What they 
might do, Beall suggests, is give, in an instrumental way, a truth-conditional 
semantics (using truth-in-a-model) for the object language ℒM, intending the 
account of ℒM-truth this provides to be a model for ℒ-truth, but not of the 
semantics of ℒ more generally. 
The first thing to point out about such a view is that it is very incomplete. The 
use-theoretic semantics which are intended to genuinely reflect the semantics of 
ℒ haven’t yet been given. We still need some model language, say ℒU, whose 
semantics are given use-theoretically and which, plausibly, provides a model of 
the semantics of ℒ. Moreover, these semantics, presumably, are not completely 
independent of truth and of logic. For one, it ought to be the case that ℒU be 
developed such that the logic which holds in ℒU and that holding of ℒM be the 
same and, further, ℒU ought to be able to contain a truth-predicate with the 
properties ascribed to the truth-predicate of ℒM (it ought to obey the T-scheme, 
and so on). If this could not be done, the semantics modelled in ℒU and the 
logical behaviour of the truth predicate modelled in ℒM would be incompatible 
and so could not jointly hold of our target, natural language, ℒ, making at least 
one of them incorrect as an account of the latter. Supposing this could be done, 
I see no reason to suppose that our revenge objection could not simply be rerun 
in this new context. In particular, though this might depend on the details of the 
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theory, it seems extremely likely that there will be notions, such as true-in-ℒU, 
perhaps, which by reasoning parallel to the ℒM case, we could demonstrate to be 
expressible in ℒU’s metatheory, but inexpressible, on pain of triviality, in ℒU. If it 
could be shown that there are no such notions for ℒU, it would be an extremely 
surprising and significant result, representing a great leap in the attempt to 
develop revenge-free accounts of truth and the paradoxes. On the other hand, it 
doesn’t seem like the mere fact that the semantics of ℒU is given use-
theoretically is likely to deliver this result on its own. It may be that there are 
no notions constructible in the metatheory of ℒU but inexpressible in ℒU, but 
given the resilience of liar reasoning, it seems sensible to withhold belief until 
we are actually presented with the theory.  
If there are such notions, then the revenge problem generated would be 
genuine, and not too easy, since the semantics of the object language, in this 
case, would be intended to model the semantics of natural language. As Beall 
says of the case where this is granted of ℒM (2007, p.10), we should conclude 
that ℒU is an inadequate model of our real language, ℒ, since the latter can 
express its own semantic notions and the former cannot. 
So, against one standard way of getting revenge on a theory of truth, Beall has 
accepted the inexpressibility result, but questioned its relevance, since the 
notion doesn’t seem to be a target one. In response to Beall, I have argued that 
his invocation of the inexpressible notion’s classicality does not help decrease 
the relevance of the result. I argued that his suggestion that, the semantics are 
treated instrumentally, as a tool for specifying the logic of the truth predicate, 
rather than a model for the semantics of natural language, faces the problem 
that, firstly, it renders the view unsatisfactorily incomplete and, secondly, that, 
assuming the view could be completed, exactly the same revenge problem would 
seem to recur. I also argued that, in any case, whether the notion rendered 
inexpressible in the object language is target or not is immaterial from the point 
of view of revenge. The revenge problem is that our model language achieves its 
features, especially non-triviality, via expressive limitations, whereas natural 
language does not. Whether these expressive limitations involve a ‘target’ 
notion does not matter. 
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2.3 Recipes for Revenge 
In his (2007), Beall gives an account of the problem of revenge by giving three 
recipes by which revenge problems can be constructed. In this section, I discuss 
and refine Beall’s recipes, finally offering two of my own, characterising the two 
main varieties of revenge problem: what I call ‘formal revenge’, on the one 
hand, and ‘informal revenge’, on the other. I also critically discuss, along the 
way, some remarks by Beall about which recipes are liable to generate genuine 
revenge problems. 
Beall’s recipes for revenge are as follows (2007, pp.11-12): 
Rv1. Revenge Recipe 1. 
We find some semantic notion, x, constructed in (and, hence, expressible in) 
the metalanguage of ℒM, which is used to classify sentences of ℒM. We 
demonstrate that, on pain of triviality, x is not expressible in ℒM. We conclude 
that ℒM is an inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has its 
target features. 
Rv2. Revenge Recipe 2. 
We find some semantic notion, x, which, irrespective of whether it is explicitly 
used to classify sentences of ℒM, is constructed in (and, hence, expressible in) 
the metalanguage of ℒM. We demonstrate that, on pain of triviality, x is not 
expressible in ℒM. We conclude that ℒM is an inadequate model of ℒ, since it 
fails to explain how ℒ has its target features, especially non-triviality. 
Rv3. Revenge Recipe 3. 
We find some semantic notion, x, which is expressible in ℒ. We demonstrate 
that, on pain of triviality, x is not expressible in ℒM. We conclude that ℒM is an 
inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has its target features. 
The only difference between Rv1 and Rv2 is in the constraints on what the 
semantic notion, x, is used for in ℒM’s metalanguage. In Rv1, the notion must be 
used in classifying the sentences of ℒM, whereas, in Rv2, this stipulation is 
absent. The point of this differentiation, presumably, though Beall does not say 
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so explicitly, is to ensure that revenge problems conforming to recipe Rv1 
involve paradoxical constructions. Roughly speaking, liar paradoxes arise from 
notions classifying sentences by semantic values like ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘untrue’, 
and perhaps other notions like ‘neither’, ‘meaningless’, ‘indeterminate’ and so 
on. Given some classification of sentences under such notions, we construct 
sentences which try to classify themselves as falling under one of the categories 
other than truth, e.g. if the semantic values are true, false and neither, the 
relevant liar sentence would be α, equivalent to ‘α is either false or neither’. 
The sort of revenge problem one might try to generate from such a liar paradox 
fits Rv1, since the notions ‘false’ and ‘neither’ are notions of semantic 
classification. 
Since it is not part of Rv2 that the notion, x, must be used for the classification 
of sentences of ℒM, it is not required that revenge problems fitting this second 
recipe involve paradoxical constructions like the liar. However, since what Beall 
says of x in his specification of Rv2 is “irrespective of whether it is explicitly 
used to classify ℒM-sentences [,it is expressible in ℒM’s metatheory]” (2007, 
p.11), neither is it precluded that x be used to classify ℒM-sentences and, thus, it 
is not precluded that paradoxical constructions count as fitting Rv2. The effect 
of this is that any putative revenge problem fitting recipe Rv1, a fortiori, is also 
an instance of Rv2. 
When we try to get revenge on a theory of truth, we wish to find some notion 
expressible in our natural language, ℒ, but inexpressible in the object language, 
ℒM, of the theory and to argue, on this basis, that the object language is an 
inadequate model of natural language. The difference between Rv1 and Rv2, on 
the one hand, and Rv3, on the other, is that in the former two cases, our 
strategy for constructing the inexpressible notion goes via the metatheory of ℒM, 
whereas in Rv3, we are permitted to construct the notion directly in ℒ. Though 
we are permitted, on Beall’s characterisation of Rv3, to construct x directly in 
ℒ, we need not, since all that is stipulated is that x be expressible in ℒ. But, 
since ℒ contains both ℒM and its metatheory, anything expressible in either of 
the latter is also expressible in ℒ. For this reason, any problem counting as an 
instance of recipe Rv1 or Rv2 will, a fortiori, count as an instance of Rv3. So, in 
fact, the set of Rv1 revenge problems is a subset of the set of Rv2 problems, 
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which is a subset of the set of Rv3 problems. Since part of what we want to do is 
distinguish different recipes for revenge, it will be useful to modify Rv1-Rv3 
slightly to block this, so that each gives a distinct set of revenge problems. 
A further point is that, although Beall aims to explicitly separate, via Rv1 and 
Rv2, revenge problems proceeding via the metatheory into those where the 
notion, x, is used to classify sentences of ℒM and those where x need not be used 
for this purpose, he does not draw this distinction in the other type of revenge 
problem he wishes to capture in Rv3. With recipes of this sort, we can establish 
the expressibility of x directly in ℒ, without first constructing the notion in the 
metatheory of ℒM. But Beall does not distinguish between the cases in which x’s 
of this sort are used to classify sentences of ℒM and the cases in which they are 
not used for this purpose. To demonstrate the parallels between the two 
strategies then, it will be useful to split Rv3 into two distinct recipes, along the 
lines of Rv1 and Rv2. 
We can refine, slightly, Beall’s recipes, with these two considerations in mind: 
that the recipes Rv1-Rv3 should not be such that (letting, for a moment, the 
name of each recipe be the name of the set of problems falling under that 
recipe) Rv1 ⊆ Rv2 ⊆ Rv3, and that a similar distinction to that drawn between 
Rv1 and Rv2 should be drawn between the parallel cases falling under Rv3. The 
revised recipes are as followed (with Rv1 omitted, since it is unchanged): 
Rv2*. Revenge Recipe 2*. 
We find some semantic notion, x, constructed in (and, hence, expressible in) 
the metalanguage of ℒM, but which is not used to classify sentences of ℒM. We 
demonstrate that, on pain of triviality, x is not expressible in ℒM. We conclude 
that ℒM is an inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has its 
target features. 
Rv3*. Revenge Recipe 3*. 
We find some semantic notion, x, which is not constructed in the metatheory of 
ℒM, but which is expressible in ℒ and is used to classify sentences of ℒM. We 
demonstrate that, on pain of triviality, x is not expressible in ℒM. We conclude 
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that ℒM is an inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has its 
target features. 
Rv4. Revenge Recipe 4. 
We find some semantics notion, x, which is not constructed in the metatheory 
of ℒM, but which is expressible in ℒ and is not used to classify sentences of ℒM. 
We demonstrate that, on pain of triviality, x is not expressible in ℒM. We 
conclude that ℒM is an inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has 
its target features. 
To distinguish those recipes falling under Rv1 from those falling under Rv2*, I 
have made explicit the restriction that, whilst the notion, x, in Rv1 is used to 
classify sentences of ℒM, x is precluded from doing this under Rv2*. To 
distinguish the first two, Rv1 and Rv2*, from the second two, Rv3* and Rv4, I 
have stipulated that the notion, x, appearing in recipes of the kind Rv3* and Rv4 
are not to be constructed in the metatheory of ℒM, though it should be 
expressible in ℒ. I have also separated Beall’s Rv3 into two distinct recipes, Rv3* 
and Rv4, along the lines of the distinction drawn between Rv1 and Rv2, such that 
the semantic notion, x, occurring in those problems falling under Rv3* must be 
used to classify sentences of ℒM, whereas x must not be used for this purpose if 
the recipe is of kind specified in Rv4. 
As I have said, though Beall is not explicit about it, we should take the 
conditions involving the usage of x to classify sentences as being aimed at 
capturing the fact that such x’s are involved in the construction of liar 
paradoxes. That x be a notion used to classify sentences is specified only in 
recipes Rv1 and Rv3*, and so these are the only recipes aimed directly at 
capturing revenge problems involving liar-paradoxical reasoning. So arguments 
which are instances of Rv2 or Rv4 do not involve paradoxical reasoning at all: x is 
just some semantic notion, not involved in classifying sentences, which is 
expressible in ℒ (in the case of Rv2, via its expressibility in the metalanguage of 
ℒM),but not in ℒM. But as I have sketched the problem above, and as it is 
understood in the literature, paradoxical reasoning, especially liar-paradoxical 
reasoning is essential to the problem of revenge: after all, the ‘revenge’ in 
question is supposed to be ‘revenge of the liar paradox’. 
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For this reason, it seems to me, problems falling under recipes Rv2 and Rv4 are 
not revenge problems at all, but something else. This is not to say that the 
inexpressibility in ℒM of some non-classifying semantic notion x, despite its 
expressibility in ℒ, would be unproblematic. It may be that such an expressive 
limitation would be just as problematic for a theory as a revenge problem, 
though this might depend on what, exactly, the notion turned out to be. But the 
fact that the inexpressibility does not seem to have any strong connection to the 
liar, or to paradoxical reasoning in general, precludes it, in my view, from being 
counted as a revenge problem proper. 
On a similar note, we might wonder whether the requirement that x be a notion 
which classifies sentences of ℒM really gets a tight enough grip on the fact that 
revenge problems involve liar reasoning. It doesn’t seem essential to the fact 
that a notion is used to classify sentences that liar paradoxes are constructible 
from the notion. It also doesn’t seem like a classificatory notion, expressible in 
ℒ, which doesn’t generate liar paradoxes, is thereby guaranteed to be 
expressible in ℒM. Perhaps there are some such notions which are not. This being 
so, there may be problems fitting Rv1 and Rv3* which don’t directly involve any 
liar-paradoxical reasoning. If this were so, there would be problems counting as 
revenge under recipes Rv1 and Rv3*, but which would not count as revenge, 
properly understood. We might fix this by adding explicitly the requirement that 
the semantic notion, x, be one from which liar sentences are constructible. 
So, with Rv2 and Rv4 rejected as sources of genuine revenge problems, we can 
modify Rv1 and Rv3* to explicitly invoke liar reasoning as follows: 
Rv1*. Revenge Recipe 1*. 
We find some semantic notion, λ, constructed in (and, hence, expressible in) 
the metatheory of ℒM and demonstrate that, were λ expressible in ℒM, we could 
construct a sentence, β, equivalent to λ<β> ∨ ¬T<β>, from which we can derive 
the contradiction λ<β> ∧ ¬λ<β>, from which follows triviality. We conclude that 
λ is inexpressible in ℒM and, therefore, that ℒM is an inadequate model of ℒ, 
since it fails to explain how ℒ has its target features. 
Rv3** Revenge Recipe 3** 
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We find some semantic notion, λ, which is not constructed in the metatheory of 
ℒM, but which is expressible in ℒ and demonstrate that, were λ expressible in 
ℒM, we could construct a sentence, β, equivalent to λ<β> ∨ ¬T<β>, from which 
we can derive the contradiction λ<β> ∧ ¬λ<β>, from which follows triviality. 
We conclude that λ is not expressible in ℒM and, therefore, that ℒM is an 
inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has its target features. 
These formulations have the advantage that it is explicit that the inexpressibility 
of the relevant semantic notion is a consequence of liar reasoning. These recipes 
capture the form of a good many revenge problems, perhaps most of them. But 
they still do not have universal application. In particular, they do not seem to 
fare well capturing the revenge problems which have been alleged to afflict 
metatheoretically inconsistent dialetheism, which is the focus of Chapters 3 and 
4 of this thesis. The problems are, in essence, as follows. Firstly, it is not always 
the notion directly used in the construction of the crucial liar sentence which 
ends up being inexpressible: sometimes the notion is one either constructed 
from, or crucially dependent on some feature (especially the consistency) of the 
notion invoked in the liar sentence. Secondly, the role of triviality in these 
revenge problems is less clear. I explain each of these connected points in turn. 
For theories which aim at complete consistency (in both object and 
metatheory), revenge problems generally aim at demonstrating that some notion 
expressible in our natural language, ℒ, if expressible in our object language ℒM, 
leads to contradiction. Since the logic of both object and metatheory is likely to 
validate the principle of explosion, this contradiction would immediately 
trivialise the theory and so the notion giving rise to it must be inexpressible in 
ℒM. 
For (dialetheist) theories which allow inconsistency in the object language, but 
have a classical metatheory, the situation is similar. Against such theories, 
revenge problems normally (though not always) aim at demonstrating that some 
notion expressible in our natural language, ℒ, if expressible in our object 
language, leads to contradiction not just in the object language, but in the 
metalanguage. Though the object language is, presumably, paraconsistent, the 
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metalanguage is not, and so, again, triviality follows, and so the notion must be 
inexpressible in ℒM. 
For thoroughgoing dialetheist theories, which are inconsistent at the levels both 
of object language and metalanguage, things are slightly different. Because 
there is little prospect of demonstrating triviality from (almost) any 
contradiction (since they may be absorbed without triviality by both object and 
metatheory), a slightly different approach is used. A full development of 
revenge problems for such theories is carried out in Chapter 4 of this thesis, but 
the situation is, very roughly, this. We try to construct some notion, expressible 
in ℒ, which seems to have consistency built-in to the meaning of the notion 
itself, and demonstrate that the characterisation of the notion on this 
dialetheist view must lead to its inconsistency, if it is expressible in ℒM. Since, if 
the notion is to have the required meaning, it must be consistent, this 
demonstrates that the notion is inexpressible in ℒM. The notions invoked in such 
putative revenge problems are numerous, and include consistency, 
disagreement, non-dialetheia, just true and just false (See Chapter 4 for an 
account of the problems arising from non-dialetheia and just false, and Shapiro 
(2004) for the rest). 
Sometimes, with these notions, the attempt at getting revenge is similar to the 
cases above, and fits one of the recipes Rv1* or Rv3**. For example, in the case 
of the notion ‘just false’, we construct a liar sentence L, equivalent to ‘L is just 
false’. From L, we can reason in the usual way and demonstrate that L is both 
just false and true (and so also not just false). Since, we are supposing, it is part 
of the meaning of ‘just false’ that it behave consistently, i.e. that sentences 
which are just false can’t also be true, the notion is thereby inexpressible in our 
object language, ℒM. So the liar sentence, L, is constructed using the notion 
which we wish to demonstrate is inexpressible. 
But this is not always the case. Consider the potential revenge problem for 
dialetheism that it cannot express disagreement (see Shapiro (2004) for a 
characterisation of this problem). This arises from the fact that, for dialetheists, 
sentences are inconsistent, but not incompatible, with their negations. For 
example, if someone says to a dialetheist ‘α’, and a dialetheist replies ‘¬α’, 
they have said something inconsistent, but not incompatible, with α, for the 
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dialetheist who thinks ¬α is true may yet think α it true as well. In general, for 
any acceptable form of negation we might introduce into a dialetheist theory, 
say, NOT, it seems reasonable to think we can always construct a sentence φ, 
equivalent to NOT-T<φ>, from which we can deduce both T<φ> and NOT-T<φ>. 
Since, for any sort of negation a dialetheist might introduce, we can construct a 
liar sentence with it and demonstrate that it leads to inconsistency, dialetheists 
have no negation such that a sentence is genuinely incompatible with its 
negation. This being the case, so the objection goes, dialetheists cannot express 
disagreement, since disagreement essentially requires the ability to say 
something with which the thing you wish to disagree is incompatible. 
The objection, then, is that we can express disagreement in our natural 
language, ℒ, but, since no negation operator is an incompatibility operator in 
ℒM, disagreement cannot be expressed in ℒM, and so ℒM is not a good model of ℒ. 
The important difference, here, between the ‘just false’ problem and the 
disagreement one just sketched is that, with the ‘just false’ problem, the notion 
we use to construct the liar sentence is the one we wish to demonstrate 
inexpressible. With the disagreement problem, the notion of disagreement does 
not occur in the liar sentence itself: instead we construct a standard liar 
sentence, for a given negation, and this demonstrates that sentences are 
compatible with their negation. The reason this (if the argument is correct) 
makes disagreement inexpressible is that disagreement essentially depends on 
the behaviour, in particular, the consistency, of negation. 
So, in the case of disagreement, it is not the notion involved directly in the 
construction of the liar sentence which is shown to be inexpressible. Rather it is 
some notion which essentially depends on the behaviour of this notion for its 
expressibility2. Since the recipes above require that the inexpressible notion be 
such as to allow a liar sentence to be constructive using that very notion, the 
recipes don’t capture this particular revenge problem. For another example, I 
try to show, in this thesis, that dialetheists cannot express the notion 
                                                          
2
 One might respond that it is an essential feature of negation that it expresses incompatibility and so the 
above argument does establish the inexpressibility of one of the notions in the liar sentence: namely, 
negation. In the present context, however, this would be question-begging. The central thesis of 
dialetheism is that some sentences can be such as to be true and have a true negation. So insisting that 
negation must always express incompatibility is just to insist that dialetheism is false. This doesn’t mean it’s 
question-begging to insist on some way of expressing incompatibility sometimes. 
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‘invalidity’, and that this is a revenge problem. Chapter 4 has the details on 
exactly how this is supposed to be achieved, but the liar sentence I construct 
simply says of itself that it is untrue in a certain model, M, and so does not 
contain the notion of invalidity which it is supposed to demonstrate 
inexpressible. 
Similar points apply to other potential revenge problems for dialetheism, for 
example those involving the notions ‘non-dialetheia’ and ‘consistency’. 
Nonetheless, since the problems involve allegedly problematic expressive 
limitations arising from liar reasoning, they are clearly still revenge problems, 
and so our account should capture them. 
To pre-empt an objection, one might imagine a dialetheist responding to this 
situation by insisting that, unless it is the very notion from which the relevant 
liar sentence is constructed which is inexpressible, the problem doesn’t count as 
genuine revenge. My response to this is twofold: firstly, it is very unclear what 
the motivation would be for such a stipulation, beyond the unsatisfactorily ad 
hoc attempt to avoid ones expressive limitations being classified as revenge 
problems. The central, basic feature of revenge is that attempted solutions to 
the liar paradox fall victim to expressive limitations forced on the theory by liar 
reasoning, which is exactly what happens in the case, for example, of the 
problem of disagreement. Secondly, this is a merely terminological quibble: 
nothing turns on whether we use the word ‘revenge’ for the problems in 
question. If a dialetheist was insistent on using the restriction under 
consideration, they could read instances of ‘revenge’ as ‘revenge-like’, if they 
wished, and the philosophically important points I make in the thesis would be 
essentially unchanged. 
So, a revision to the revenge recipes such that the notion demonstrated to be 
inexpressible by liar reasoning is not required to be the very notion employed in 
the construction of the liar sentence itself, is required. The second difficulty 
which would seem to prevent Rv1* and Rv3** capturing the revenge problems 
supposed to afflict metatheoretically inconsistent dialetheism is the stipulation 
in those recipes that the semantic notion, x, be inexpressible on pain of 
triviality. 
33 
 
This point is related to the previous. Views on which at least some part of the 
theory, either the metatheory or both the object and metatheory, is consistent 
(with a logic validating explosion) lead to triviality straightforwardly, on the 
assumption that certain notions are expressible in the object theory. Not so for 
dialetheism with an inconsistent metatheory. On this view, since neither the 
object theory nor the metatheory supports explosion, almost no contradictions 
lead to triviality (the exceptions being ones involving sentences like ‘Everything 
is true’), wherever they are expressible. So, if such theories suffer revenge 
problems, as I argue they do, they are not captured by recipes Rv1* and Rv3**, 
since those recipes stipulate that the contradiction delivered by the 
expressibility of the notion, x, lead to triviality. 
Consider, as an example, the notion ‘just false’, which metatheoretically 
inconsistent dialetheists are alleged to be unable to express. The notion, it is 
argued, must behave consistently, if it is to mean what is required (since, 
otherwise, some sentences which are just false are also true). But, for a 
dialetheist, a predicate aimed at representing the notion must behave 
inconsistently; because of the liar sentence which says of itself that it is ‘just 
false’. Grant that this problem is genuine, and the notion really is inexpressible. 
It does not seem to be the case that, were the notion expressible, triviality 
would follow. The notion is simply inexpressible, since, once we introduce a 
predicate meeting an intuitive definition of ‘just false’ (presumably, ‘false and 
not true’), this notion can immediately be shown to be inconsistent, and so not 
to mean ‘just false’, even though triviality does not seem to follow from it. 
Shapiro’s way of putting the objection is that the dialetheist cannot express the 
notion “unless the meta-theory is (completely) consistent” (2004, p.338). But 
this doesn’t seem quite right. Replacing the dialetheists inconsistent metatheory 
with a consistent (presumably classical) one would not help the inconsistency of 
the notion defined by ‘false and not true’ in the object language, since the 
relevant liar argument would still go through in that context. Certainly, we 
could construct a consistent notion of ‘just false’ in the classical metatheory, 
but this would, were it expressible in the object theory, deliver triviality and so 
would simply be another revenge problem and ‘just false’ would still be 
inexpressible. 
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It seems to me that the correct way to revise the recipes is simply to drop the 
requirement that the notion be inexpressible in the object theory because 
otherwise triviality would follow, and simply require that the notion be 
inexpressible. After all, it is the inexpressibility of the notion, not the fact that 
it would entail triviality, which is important. The fact that a notion would entail 
triviality were it expressible in the object language is simply one way of 
establishing that the notion is inexpressible, but it is not, or need not, be the 
only way. If one can give good arguments that a notion has consistently as part 
of its meaning, then the fact that one can demonstrate its inconsistency on 
dialetheist theories is enough to establish its inexpressibility, whether it goes on 
to trivialise or not. 
One might be concerned, here, that by removing the stipulation that the notion 
would entail triviality, were it expressible, undermines what was said in this 
chapter about revenge problems demonstrating that an object language, ℒM, is a 
bad model of a natural language, ℒ, because they avoid triviality differently – 
the former by expressive limitation, the latter not. But a little thought should 
assuage this worry. 
With the original liar paradox, we have a simple argument, outlined in Section 
2.1, from a liar sentence to triviality. We presume that our natural language is 
not trivial, and so, somehow, this argument to triviality fails in natural language. 
The job of our theories of truth is to provide model languages in which this 
argument fails which, we hope, show how natural language achieves this. If it is 
an essential part of our model language that it be unable to express notions 
which are expressible in our natural language, then we do not have a good 
model of how natural language avoids the argument to triviality from the liar. 
The fact that, on metatheoretically inconsistent versions of dialetheism, 
triviality does not follow when we add a notion defined by ‘false and not true’ to 
the language does not matter. The important thing is that, if the revenge 
objection is right, and consistency is part of the meaning of ‘just false’, then the 
model language cannot express the notion, and so is crucially different to 
natural language. It’s an essential feature of the account of how the model 
language avoids the argument to triviality from the liar that liar reasoning 
demonstrates it to be unable to express crucial semantic notions which are 
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expressible in natural language. The model language, therefore, sheds no light 
on how the trivial conclusion of the argument is avoided in natural language. 
One final issue to mention, before giving the final versions of each recipe for 
revenge is which of the notions involved must be semantic. In recipes Rv1* and 
Rv3**, the revenge problem is supposed to arise from a single notion, λ, which is 
stipulated to be semantic (since it is meant to be involved in the construction of 
a semantic paradox). We are now allowing that there may be two distinct 
notions involved in revenge: one from which we construct a liar sentence and 
one, dependent upon the first, which is rendered inexpressible by liar reasoning. 
The first, it seems clear, ought to be a semantic notion, as in the previous 
recipes. It doesn’t seem to me that we ought to require this of the second 
notion, though, of course, it should be permitted to be semantic. For an 
example which suggests this, consider again the disagreement problem. 
Arguably, disagreement is not a semantic notion; it may, instead, be an 
attitude, or an action, which we wish to use the language to express. Someone 
who thought this may still, quite reasonably, think of the fact (if, indeed, it is a 
fact) that dialetheists cannot express disagreement as a revenge problem. This 
being so, we should require that the notion employed in the construction of the 
crucial liar sentence be semantic, but relax this restriction for the second notion 
and allow that it need not be semantic. These considerations, finally, give the 
following two recipes for revenge: 
RvF. Recipe for Formal Revenge. 
We find some semantic notion, λ, constructed in (and, hence, expressible in) 
the metatheory of ℒM and demonstrate that, were λ expressible in ℒM, we could 
construct a sentence, β, equivalent to λ<β> ∨ ¬T<β>, from which we can derive 
the contradiction λ<β> ∧ ¬λ<β>. We demonstrate that this establishes the 
inexpressibility in ℒM of some notion, σ, which is expressible in ℒ, where it is 
permitted (indeed, it is common) that λ = σ. We conclude that ℒM is an 
inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has its target features. 
RvI. Recipe for Informal Revenge. 
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We find some semantic notion, λ, which is not constructed in the metatheory of 
ℒM, but which is expressible in ℒ and demonstrate that, were λ expressible in 
ℒM, we could construct a sentence, β, equivalent to λ<β> ∨ ¬T<β>, from which 
we can derive the contradiction λ<β> ∧ ¬λ<β>. We demonstrate that this 
establishes the inexpressibility in ℒM of some notion, σ, which is expressible in 
ℒ, where it is permitted (indeed, it is common) that λ = σ. We conclude ℒM is an 
inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has its target features. 
These recipes compare favourably with Beall’s. Firstly, we have jettisoned the 
recipes not involving paradoxical constructions and focused on the two that do 
as providing real revenge problems. Secondly, the importance of the liar paradox 
as the source of inexpressibility has been made explicit. The stipulated in RvI 
that λ not be constructed in the metatheory of ℒM also means that instances of 
RvF are not trivially instances of RvI. Finally, allowing for the separation of the 
inexpressible notion from the one directly involved in the construction of the liar 
sentence, as well as the relaxation of the requirement that expressibility of the 
relevant notions must lead to triviality, has allowed the recipes to capture 
putative revenge problems for (metatheoretically inconsistent) dialetheism, 
which might otherwise have been missed. 
I now discuss some of Beall’s general remarks (2007, pp.12-14) about which 
recipes may be expected to generate real revenge problems. He says of his own 
Rv1 and Rv2 (corresponding roughly to my own RvF) that how one ought to 
respond to the charge of revenge will depend on the notion x (on his own 
recipes, but λ and σ, on mine), which seems fair enough. In general, however, 
he thinks the charge of inadequacy difficult to substantiate in these cases, even 
when we have established the inexpressibility result. 
The reason he gives is that classical logic, normally, will be an extension of the 
logic of the model language, ℒM (assuming, of course, that the logic of ℒM, as in 
the examples above, is not itself classical). This being the case, he thinks, it is 
perfectly acceptable that ℒM be constructed in a classical metalanguage. In this 
context, it is entirely unsurprising that classically-constructed notions trivialise 
in the non-classical context of ℒM. According to Beall, this point is “often 
sufficient to blunt, if not undermine, a revenger’s charge” (2007, p.12), if the 
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problem is constructed as in Rv1 or Rv2 (or RvF). What must be done to 
construct a genuine revenge problem is to establish, not just the unsurprising 
result that there are notions inexpressible in ℒM, but also the relevance of this 
result. 
This is the objection already discussed, and my response is the same. Firstly, 
that a notion is classical does not make it unsurprising that it trivialises in non-
classical languages; things are the other way around. Secondly, it does not 
matter whether a notion is a target of the theory or not. What matters is that 
the model language avoids the paradoxes by being expressively limited in ways 
natural language is not. The extent to which such a result is to be expected is 
not relevant either, since it is not part of any account of revenge that the 
expressive limitation established be surprising. A serious problem is no less 
serious for being obvious. 
Beall then discusses attempts at revenge conforming to his Rv3, corresponding to 
my own RvI. Here, Beall says that he is assuming that the semantic notion, x, is 
used “neither explicitly not implicitly…for purposes of classifying sentences”.  
This is not, strictly speaking, in keeping with the exact letter of Rv3, which does 
not stipulate that x not be used in this way. So it appears that Beall understands 
Rv3 along the lines of my own Rv4, rather than in the way it is actually phrased. 
The task of demonstrating that a problem fitting Rv4 is really a revenge problem 
is, he says, “formidable” (2007, p.13), since it must be shown that x is really an 
intelligible notion of ℒ. Another reason the task is formidable, as should be clear 
now from my own discussion, is that problems fitting Rv4 are not really revenge 
problems, since they don’t involve the liar paradox. 
He refers the reader to his discussion of ‘incoherent operators’ (2007, pp.5-6) 
where he argues that there cannot be languages containing operators meeting 
all of a set of conditions. The conditions he gives are: 
F1. The language contains a truth predicate, T<x>, which obeys, unrestrictedly, 
the T-scheme (at least in its rule form) 
F2. Reasoning by cases is valid 
E1. ⊨ α ∨ φα  
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E2. α, φα ⊨ ⊥   
If F1 and F2 hold, then the language cannot contain an operator, φ, satisfying E1 
and E2 (at least, it can’t contain an operator if the language is non-trivial). This 
isn’t quite right, since the arguments from these conditions to triviality require 
certain standard structural rules to hold in the logic in question. Some 
philosophers and logicians have thought defended the idea that at least some of 
these structural rules must be rejected; for example, Weir (2013) has suggested 
that the transitivity of entailment be given up, Zardini (2014)  that we give up 
structural contraction and Ripley (2013) that we give up structural cut. So, if we 
discover, of some putative operator, satisfying each of the above principles, it 
does not immediately follow that there is, in fact, no such operator in the 
language: it may be that the language is trivial or, less radically, that some 
structural rule of the logic, despite appearances, fails. 
Beall calls an operator, φ, satisfying each of E1 and E2, an EE device. What the 
paradoxes teach us, according to defenders of paraconsistent or paracomplete 
theories, is that language cannot contain an EE device. If a revenge objection 
presents such theorists with a semantic notion, which is an EE device, and 
argues that, if expressible in ℒM, triviality follows, this may, Beall thinks, be 
question-begging. The views in question think that the lesson of the liar paradox 
is that languages cannot contain EE devices, and so a semantic notion, x, which 
is such a device, must, on these views, be incoherent. They may then simply 
insist that the claim that English, for example, contains such a device is 
question-begging. It may be, he thinks, that some argument could be given that 
the expressibility of the notion is important for some theoretical purpose. If so, 
this might settle things. But he is pessimistic about the possibilities of finding 
such arguments. 
Beall is quite right that there are special difficulties with the sort of revenge 
problem which does not construct the semantic notion directly in ℒM’s 
metatheory. If we try to get revenge on a theory by constructing a notion in its 
metatheory, as in Beall’s Rv1 or my RvF, then the properties of that notion are 
not in question, since the notion has been precisely and formally defined. If, 
however, the notion is one taken directly from our natural language, ℒ, then its 
exact properties may be a matter of reasonable dispute. For example Shapiro, 
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who charges that dialetheists cannot express the notion ‘just false’ (2004), 
insists that the notion must behave consistently. Priest, who responds on behalf 
of dialetheism, thinks otherwise. This makes establishing the inexpressibility of 
‘just false’, more difficult, since whether it is expressible will likely depend, in 
part, on whether consistency is essentially part of the meaning of the notion. 
But perhaps one source of Beall’s pessimism about finding notions which one can 
reasonably claim a theory ought to be able to express, and so may not simply 
dismiss as incoherent, is his reading of Rv3 as Rv4 i.e. on his assumption that the 
semantic notion in question not be one which classifies sentences of ℒM. The vast 
majority of any theorist’s pronouncements about their object language, ℒM, are 
not made in the formal metalanguage of ℒM, but in natural language. There are, 
therefore, in any philosopher’s characterisation of truth, a multitude of natural 
language sentences classifying sentences of ℒM using notions from natural 
language. It is to these claims that we ought to look to find revenge problems 
fitting RvI. As Shapiro says in his attack on Priest’s metatheoretically 
inconsistent dialetheism (2004), the prospects of constructing notions in his 
formal theory, and showing that they deliver triviality, are not good, so 
“[p]erhaps the opponent can attack the dialetheist's informal remarks… to 
show…that the dialetheist is subject to a criticism much like one that Priest 
levels against consistent theories of truth: there are certain notions and 
concepts that the dialetheist invokes (informally), but which she cannot 
adequately express.” 
This is the reason recipe RvI is a recipe for ‘Informal Revenge’, as opposed to 
the ‘Formal Revenge’ of RvF. The best way to get revenge of this kind it to look 
to a given theorists informal remarks in ℒ about their object language, ℒM, with 
the goal of finding notions in ℒ which cannot be expressed in ℒM. Since the 
notion in question has been explicitly invoked by the theorist, this makes it 
much more difficult for them to simply reject the notion as incoherent. The 
more pervasive the notion’s use, the more difficult this becomes. This is exactly 
Shapiro’s strategy in his (2004): all dialetheists regularly discuss consistent 
theories, as opposed to inconsistent ones, as well as the ‘normal’ sentences, like 
those which are false only, true only or non-dialetheia. Shapiro argues that the 
dialetheist cannot express these notions. But since the dialetheist is committed, 
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via their informal remarks, to the legitimacy of these notions, they cannot 
respond by simply dismissing those notions as unintelligible. The fact that we 
can appeal to notions employed by theorists informally gives reason to be much 
more optimistic about the prospects for generating revenge problems, as in RvI, 
by direct appeal to a notion’s expressibility in ℒ (rather than via ℒM’s 
metatheory) than Beall allows. 
2.4 Varieties of Revenge 
One final issue I wish to mention is the centrality of the liar paradox to the 
account of revenge given in this chapter. Though the liar paradox receives the 
lion’s share of the discussion in the paradox literature, and is almost the sole 
focus of the literature on revenge, it may well be that revenge-like problems 
arise from other paradoxes. Stewart Shapiro, for example, has argued that the 
Burali-Forti paradox “has its own annoying revenge issues” (2007, p.321). If we 
wish to accept these as genuine revenge problems, it seems to me that the best 
way to respond to this different variety of revenge is to classify revenge 
problems by the paradox giving rise to them. So the above recipes, RvF and RvI 
characterise the revenge of the liar paradox, and two separate conditions 
describing formal and informal recipes for Burali-Forti revenge could also be 
given. The changes being that we drop the requirement that the notion λ be 
semantic (because the paradox is not a semantic one) and stipulate that the 
reasoning leading to the contradiction be of the same kind which appears in the 
Burali-Forti paradox, however that is best described. I see no reason that a 
similar treatment could not be extended to the revenge of other paradoxes, 
should such problems arise. 
2.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have critically discussed some remarks by Beall on revenge. I 
have settled on two ‘recipes’ for revenge as describing the revenge problem’s 
essential characteristics, given by RvF and RvI. These may well not be definitive, 
but they should give us enough of a grip on the problem for the purposes of the 
revenge arguments given in this thesis. I have characterised revenge as coming 
in, essentially, two forms: Formal Revenge and Informal Revenge. With the 
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former, formal sort of revenge problem, a notion is constructed in the formal 
metatheory of an object language ℒM, and it is argued that this notion, because 
of liar-paradoxes, is inexpressible in ℒM and that, thereby, ℒM is a bad model of 
natural language. With the latter, informal, sort of revenge, a notion is found in 
natural language (generally in the informal remarks of the theorist on whose 
view we wish to get revenge) and argued, again via liar reasoning, to be 
inexpressible in ℒM and that, thereby, ℒM is a bad model of natural language. 
JC Beall gave some reasons to think both such strategies problematic. In the 
formal case, the inexpressible notion constructed in the metatheory, due to its 
being ‘classically constructed’ may, pending argument, be thought ‘too easy’ 
and, therefore, irrelevant. I have argued that this is not so; the problems, 
irrespective of the ease with which inexpressibility is established, are genuine 
revenge problems. In the informal case, Beall has said that it is likely that such 
natural language notions will simply be dismissed as incoherent, and the 
insistence that they give rise to revenge, question-begging. In response to this 
claim, I have suggested that the place to look for revenge notions in natural 
language is the informal claims of the theorist on whose view we want revenge. 
If we can construct revenge problems from notions appearing in these claims 
then, especially if the notion occurs pervasively, it is very difficult for the 
theorist to dismiss the notion as incoherent. This strategy looks more hopeful 
than Beall suggests. 
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Chapter 3: Metatheoretically Paraconsistent Dialetheism 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the dialetheism of Graham Priest. His view is notable for 
a number of reasons. Priest’s In Contradiction (2006), first published in 1987, is 
the first rigorously-logical book-length treatment of dialetheism. His first 
publication on the topic was his (1979) paper Logic of Paradox. So Priest’s work 
is of historical importance as the first to take the view seriously as a solution to 
a number of puzzles, the most important of which being the semantic and set-
theoretic paradoxes. 
Priest has published extensively on the topic in the intervening years, refining 
his view in a second edition of In Contradiction (2006), four further monographs 
(Beyond the Limits of Thought (2002), Towards Non-Being: the Semantics and 
Metaphysics of Intentionality (2005), Doubt Truth to be a Liar (2006) and, most 
recently, One (2014)) and dozens of published articles. This makes Priest’s 
dialetheism the best developed version of the view currently available. 
A further notable feature of Priest’s view is particularly relevant for our 
purposes: his dialetheism is extremely thoroughgoing.  Another prominent 
dialetheist, JC Beall, defends the view that dialetheia occur only in semantic 
contexts (essentially, the only dialetheia there are contain the truth predicate). 
They do not, for Beall, occur ‘in the world’, in mathematics and, crucially, they 
do not occur in Beall’s metatheory. Priest, on the other hand, defends 
dialetheist accounts of change, vagueness, certain puzzles in jurisprudence, the 
set-theoretic paradoxes and several other problems.  Most importantly, from the 
point of view concerned with revenge, Priest’s metatheory is paraconsistent. 
This allows Priest to treat his metatheory as contained in the object theory and 
gives it, perhaps, the best claim to revenge immunity of any current version of 
dialetheism. 
A theory is subject to the problem of revenge if there is some notion expressible 
in natural language which we can use liar reasoning to show is not expressible in 
the theory’s object language. Perhaps the most common strategy for 
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demonstrating that a theory has a revenge problem is to construct some notion 
in the theory’s metalanguage which would generate triviality were it expressible 
in the object language. Since the metalanguage is part of natural language, the 
notion is expressible in natural language and the theory has a revenge problem. 
Since, on Priest’s view, the metalanguage is contained in the object language, 
there can be no notion expressible in the former which is not expressible in the 
latter. So, on the assumption that Priest’s theory is not trivial, there is no notion 
expressible in the metalanguage which would trivialise, were it expressible in 
the object language. This makes life more difficult for someone who wishes to 
argue that his view suffers from revenge, since it blocks the main strategy 
normally used. 
3.1 Priest’s Metatheoretically Paraconsistent Dialetheism 
 
Dialetheism is the view that there are dialetheia: that is, true contradictions. A 
true contradiction is here understood, following Priest (2006, p.4) to be ‘any 
true statement of the form: α and it is not the case that α’. Since it’s generally 
accepted that falsity is truth of negation, one might equivalently say that a true 
contradiction is a statement which is both true and false.  
This section presents Priest’s view and the motivations he gives for it, primarily 
in the second edition of In Contradiction (2006). I follow Priest’s presentation of 
his ideas closely, beginning with his discussion of the semantic paradoxes, 
followed by the set-theoretic paradoxes, before moving on to the more 
constructive discussion of the details of dialetheist logical theory including his 
views on truth, falsity, the connectives and entailment. I then move on to 
discuss Priest’s account of paraconsistent set theory (which he takes as his 
working metatheory) and the recapture of classical reasoning. 
Though dialetheists, such as Graham Priest, defend the existence of dialetheia in 
a number of areas, it is fair to say that the most powerful, and widely discussed, 
defence of the view concerns the semantic and, to a lesser extent, set-theoretic 
paradoxes. The central argument, at Priest sees it, is that since no consistent 
theory has succeeded, or could succeed, in resolving these paradoxes, an 
inconsistent (dialetheist) solution is the only option. 
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The separation of the logical paradoxes into the two categories ‘semantic’ and 
‘set-theoretic’ is, for Priest, merely a matter of convenience (2006, p.9). 
Though the distinction is common, he thinks it almost impossible to draw the 
distinction satisfactorily. One reason for this is the existence of a formal 
isomorphism between the abstraction scheme of set theory and the Tarski 
satisfaction scheme: 
x ∈ {y | α} ↔ α(y / x) 
x satisfies <α> ↔ α(y / x) 
Where α is a formula containing only y free and α(y / x) is the result of 
substituting in α all free occurrences of ‘y’ with ‘x’, where and ‘<α>’ is a 
quotation name for α. Given this isomorphism, a number of the paradoxes in one 
category appear to have counterparts in the other. For example, Grelling’s 
paradox (which arises when we ask whether ‘heterological’ – where an adjective 
is heterological just if  it does not apply to itself – is heterological) and Russell’s 
paradox (which arises when as ask whether the set containing all non-self-
membered sets is self-membered) can each be transformed into the other, under 
this isomorphism. 
However, according to Priest, not all paradoxes have such natural counterparts. 
For example, the Burali-Forti paradox does not have a natural semantic 
counterpart and the paradoxes of definability have no obvious set-theoretic 
counterpart. This is one reason he wishes to separate the two categories. A 
second is that the set-theoretic paradoxes have a solution which is (fairly) 
widely agreed-upon, whereas the semantic paradoxes do not. 
In fact, in later work, Priest has given a precise account of the way in which the 
paradoxes are related: the familiar paradoxes such as the Liar and those from 
set theory are inclosure paradoxes. 
3.2 The Semantic Paradoxes 
 
Priest’s strategy is to give a set of conditions (derived from those given by Tarski 
(1936)) which, if satisfied by a language, are sufficient for its inconsistency. He 
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then defends the claim that natural language satisfies these conditions. The 
purpose of this strategy is not only to provide evidence that the paradoxes 
cannot be consistently solved, but also to explain why this is so. 
According to Tarski, the paradoxes result from the supposition that language 
satisfies a set of closure conditions. Restricting, for simplicity, to the case of 
formulae containing one free variable, the conditions are as follows: 
(1) For every formula, α, there is a term of the language, <α>, which names 
it. 
 
(2) There is a formula with two free variables, Sat(x y), such that every 
instance of the scheme 
 
Sat(t <α>) ↔ α(v/t) 
is a theorem, where t is a term, α is any formula with one free variable, 
v, and α(v/t) is α with all free occurrences of ‘v’ replaced by ‘t’ (where 
we add the stipulation that ‘t’ cannot occur free within the scope of a 
quantifier binding v). 
(3) The rule of inference {α ↔ ¬α} ⊢ α ∧ ¬α is valid in the logic underlying 
the theory. 
To show that these conditions are jointly inconsistent, we substitute for α the 
formula ¬Sat(v v), and, for t, <¬Sat(v v)>. The scheme in (2) then delivers 
 Sat(<¬Sat(v v)>, <¬Sat(v v)>) ↔ ¬Sat(<¬Sat(v v)> <¬Sat(v v)>) 
By the inference principle in (3), we then have  
 Sat(<¬Sat(v v)>, <Sat(v v)>) ∧ ¬Sat(<¬Sat(v v)> <¬Sat(v v)>) 
which is a contradiction. According to Priest, these conditions apply not only to 
certain formal languages, but to natural language, though not in exactly this 
form. Substituting the purely formal notions in the above conditions for natural 
language counterparts suggested by Priest, we get the following conditions: 
(a) For every phrase α, there is a noun phrase <α>, which names it. 
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(b) There is a phrase Sat, requiring two noun phrases to be 
inserted to make a sentence, such that every sentence of the 
form Sat(t <α>) iff α(t) 
is true, where α is any phrase requiring a noun phrase, t, to 
be inserted to make a sentence, and parentheses mark insertion. 
(c) The following inference principle is truth-preserving: 
 α iff it is not the case that α 
Hence, α and it is not the case that α 
The proof that these are jointly inconsistent is analogous to the one given above, 
and suffices to show that any language satisfying (a)-(c) is inconsistent. 
Priest dismisses the possibility of denying (a) and instead focuses on how one 
might attempt to denying either (b) or (c), considering them in reverse order.  
The only reason Priest discusses as plausible for giving up (c) is the existence of 
truth value gaps. Priest characterises these gaps as ‘sentences which are neither 
true nor false’ (2006, p.13). Some care must be taken in interpreting this. 
Though a number of philosophers have attempted to avoid the paradoxes by 
denying that the laws of excluded middle and bivalence hold, at least 
unrestrictedly (famously Kripke (1975) and, more recently, Field (2008)), very 
few (if any) actually admit straightforward counterexamples to these laws. They 
don’t, for example think there is a sentence α such that ¬(α ∨ ¬α); nor do they 
think there is a sentence, β, such that ¬(T<β> ∨ F<β>). The reason for this is 
that, with little more than the De Morgan equivalencies, such sentences lead to 
contradiction. They do, however, deny the law of excluded middle holds of 
sentences like the liar, in the sense that they assert that it is neither 
determinately true nor determinately false, and perhaps it’s reasonable to say 
that, in some sense, those sentences fail to be either true or false (instead, 
normally, taking a third, ‘gap’ value), but ‘fail’ here cannot simply be negation, 
on pain of contradiction. 
So long as the conditional employed by these theories does not simply take the 
gap value when either its antecedent or consequent are assigned gap, the theory 
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can invalidate principle (c), since α ↔ ¬α may be true but α ∧ ¬α fail to be true 
(presumably taking gap). 
Priest suggests two ways in which this might be done (2006, p.13). The first is to 
take sentences to be truth-bearers, but reject that every sentence is either true 
or false. The second is to take what sentences generally express, propositions, 
to be truth-bearers, and to claim that some sentences fail to express a 
proposition. The essential problems Priest sees for attempts to deny (c) are 
independent of these competing accounts of truth-bearers, so I will not discuss 
them further. I will, however, note that the standard terms one must use here 
to discuss these matters, such as ‘sentence’, ‘statement’, ‘proposition’ and so 
on are not neutral on the issue of truth-bearers, and genuinely neutral terms are 
hard to find. So I use these terms more or less interchangeably and take it that 
partisans in the truth-bearer debate can recast the discussion in their favoured 
vocabulary without affecting the substance of the issues. 
3.2.1 Paracompletism 
 
The best known view which rejects the inference in (c) to avoid paradox is the 
paracomplete view first described in Krikpe’s classic paper Outline of a Theory 
of Truth (1975). The view is still one of the main competitors as a solution to the 
paradoxes, especially the version refined and advanced by Field (2008). 
For these paracompletists, the explanation of the liar’s gappiness is that the 
truth predicate is ineliminable – the sentence fails to be grounded in truth-free 
sentences. Since only grounded sentences can be true or false, and the liar is 
not grounded, it is assigned gap, and fails to be true or false. 
Priest offers a number of criticisms of this sort of view. The first is that certain 
sentences do not receive the truth-values they ought to. Take a sentence α 
which is not true at any fixed point. If truth at the fixed point is supposed to 
model natural language truth (which is the purpose of the construction) , then ‘α 
is not true’ ought to be true at the fixed point. But it does not: ‘α is not true’ 
receives the gap value at the minimal fixed point. 
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A second concern Priest raises for these approaches concerns the apparent 
asymmetry between the liar sentence and the truth teller: 
(Liar) The sentence Liar is false 
(Truth-teller) The sentence truth-teller is true 
Intuitively, in the case of Truth-teller, the sentence can consistently be either 
true or false, but there seems nothing to determine which it is. This, Priest 
grants, seems an obvious candidate for a truth-value gap. Liar, on the other 
hand, seems, on the face of it, to have its truth-value over-determined: we can 
show by seemingly-plausible reasoning that it is both true and false. This is a 
more plausible candidate for a truth-value glut (dialetheia) than a gap, 
according to Priest. 
Whether Liar seems plausibly a truth–value glut will depend, presumably, on how 
plausible one finds the existence of truth-value gluts. Many (perhaps most) 
philosophers find the existence of such gluts extremely implausible, and so 
would find it implausible that Liar is an instance of this phenomena. The force of 
Priest’s worry is, I take it, that there is an apparent asymmetry between the two 
sentences which is not explained by their truth-value assignments (both gap) on 
the paracomplete theory. 
It is unclear how much this objection ought to worry a paracompletists. That 
there are differences between the two sentences is clear: the most obvious one 
being the existence of an argument to contradiction from Liar, but no such 
argument in the case of Truth-teller. Paracompletists can accept this. But the 
assumption that these differences must result in a difference of truth-value in 
the sentences seems question-beggingly to depend on the assumption that the 
argument to contradiction in the case of Liar is sound. The paracompletists 
central claim is that groundedness is the determinant of whether a sentence 
receives a genuine truth-value or is assigned gap. Both of Liar and Truth-teller 
are ungrounded and so it seems quite in keeping with the view that both be 
treated as truth value gaps.  
Priest’s next argument against this approach concerns what he calls ‘extended 
paradoxes’. Paracompletists claim that some sentences are truth-value gaps 
and, on this basis, maintain that though paradoxical sentences like Liar are true 
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if and only if they are false, since they are neither, we can block the inference 
to their being both true and false. There is, Priest says, a ‘standard ploy’ to 
show that this does not work, which relates to my earlier point about how best 
to explain the sense in which some sentences fail to be either true or false. 
If the paracompletists is correct, one might think, some sentences are neither 
true nor false and this can be expressed in English using, as has just been done. 
In particular, for any sentence α which is neither true nor false, ‘α is not true’ 
must be true. This does not mean, Priest points out, that ‘α is true’ is false, 
because we might allow the negation of a sentence assigned gap to be true. 
However, the paracompletists ought to accept, Priest suggests, the following: 
(*) If α is not true, then ‘α is not true’ is true 
But consider the following sentence, often called the ‘strengthened liar’ 
(SL) The sentence SL is not true 
If we suppose this sentence true, then by the T-scheme it is not true. If we 
suppose it false, then, on the assumption that falsities are not true (which ought 
to be acceptable to all but certain dialetheists, such as Priest), it is not true 
and, hence, true. If we assign it gap, as the paracompletists view would seem to 
demand, then it would seem to be neither true nor false and hence, by (*), we 
have that (SL) is not true and we have a contradiction. A paracompletist might 
reject this appearance and take the view that one should be agnostic about 
whether liars like (SL) are true or false, but assert that they are neither 
determinately true nor determinately false. In this case, one might reformulate 
the problem with a sentence saying of itself that it is not determinately true. 
Priest grants that it might be objected that this proof assumes that (SL) is either 
true or false, and hence, assumes excluded middle. But paracompletists do not 
claim that every instance of excluded middle is false and, if they claim (SL) 
receives gap, and sentences which receive gap are not true, then all we require 
to establish that (SL) is either true or not true is the disjunctio –introduction rule 
‘weakening’, which is not in dispute. 
This problem is widely known, as Priest notes, and the response forced on 
paracompletists is generally to insist that the notions involved in expressing the 
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paradox (especially the notion of a truth-value gap) are inexpressible in the 
language in question. But, according to Priest, to concede this is simply to admit 
that the theory offered is not a model of natural language, since these notions 
are expressible in English. If this route is taken, the paracompletists has 
effectively admitted that, were their theory true, it would be inexpressible. This 
recurring problem which returns for non-dialetheists ‘like a bad penny’, 
according to Priest, is the problem of Revenge, discussed in detail in the second 
chapter of this thesis. 
There have been a number of responses to this problem on behalf of 
paracompletism, the most impressive coming from Field’s (2008) book Saving 
Truth from Paradox, whose technically innovative development of Kripke’s 
theory is, as well as attempting to improve on Kripke’s conditional, aimed at 
avoiding this problem. Priest is not convinced, and responds at length to Field’s 
book (Priest, 2010a), arguing that the revenge problem remains (and must 
remain), for the paracompletist, as intractable as ever. The purpose of this 
thesis, though, is not to assess the prospects for a paracomplete response to the 
revenge problem, but to see if dialetheism has this problem too. As should be 
clear from the preceding discussion, it would be a sore blow to the dialetheist 
case against paracompletism (and, hence, to the case for dialetheism itself), if 
dialetheism too suffers from this problem. 
3.2.2 Rejecting the T-Scheme 
 
So the attempt to avoid contradiction by invalidating (c) via a rejection of 
excluded middle seems to face the problem of revenge. The next strategy Priest 
considers is to avoid contradiction by rejecting (b): in other words, rejecting the 
Tarski satisfaction scheme. In fact, all Priest’s discussion focuses, not on 
satisfaction, but on truth, and the corresponding T-scheme: 
T<α> ↔ α  
Where α is any closed, non-indexical sentence. The reason he gives is that both 
principles ought to be treated the same, and discussing truth is both simpler and 
more in-keeping with the orthodox views he discusses. 
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Priest begins with the observation that English clearly contains a truth-predicate 
and that there is a strong presumption that it satisfies the T-scheme. Aside from 
its intuitive obviousness, one powerful reason to suppose the T-scheme holds is 
the crucial role that both directions of the biconditional play in allowing truth to 
do the generalising job for which it is so essential in English. 
Suppose Bob utters some sentences, A, B and C and I wish to agree with him. I 
may simply repeat what Bob said, but this strategy will only carry me so far. 
Suppose Bob said not just A, B and C, but a great many other things too. It would 
be, at the very least, cumbersome to have to repeat all the things he said in 
order to agree with him. Alternatively, suppose I wish to agree with Bob, not on 
the basis of having heard him utter A, B and C and my believing each of these 
sentences, but because I believe Bob to be very knowledgeable about the 
matters A, B and C concern. I may not even have heard Bob’s particular 
utterances, but still wish to agree with him, on account of his superior 
knowledge. I am in no position now to repeat A, B or C and so, to agree with 
him, I must say ‘What Bob said is true.’  
To take a different example, I may know very little of physics, but on the basis 
of some scientific authority’s assertions, want to agree with his endorsement of, 
say, quantum mechanics. I may be completely unable to understand quantum 
physics and so be unable to list any of its central claims, but still wish to endorse 
the theory on the evidence that those who do understand it believe it to be 
true. It is difficult to see how this could possibly be achieved without my saying 
something like ‘Quantum mechanics is true.’ 
Some philosophers (known as ‘deflationists’ or ‘redundancy theorists’) believe 
that this generalising job is, in some sense, all there is to the notion of truth. 
But that it plays this role at all ought to be uncontroversial. However, for truth 
to play this role, it would seem to be necessary that it obey both of the 
following in full generality: 
(Capture) α → T<α> 
(Release) T<α> → α 
For, if it fails to obey Capture, then there are things which are the case (that is, 
we have α), but which fail to be true (we don’t have T<α>). If it fails to obey 
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release, then there are some truths (we have T<α>) which are not the case (we 
don’t have α). So, prima facie, failure of either capture of release prevents 
truth from playing the generalising role it so obviously does in English. This 
would seem good reason for, at least, a strong presumption that the scheme is 
true. 
Priest discusses three reasons the T-scheme might be supposed to fail. The first 
is the existence of truth-value gaps. The objections already discussed apply as 
much in this context as in the previous. A further reason Priest gives is that 
admitting gaps does not straightforwardly falsify the scheme. Suppose we take a 
sentence, α, assigned gap and argue that it refutes the T-scheme in the 
following way: since α is assigned gap, α is not true and hence T<α> is false. 
Hence, α ↔ T<α> is false. This reasoning may be resisted, according to Priest, in 
two ways. Firstly, whether it follows from the fact that α is not true that α is 
false depends on the truth conditions of the truth predicate, given the existence 
of truth-value gaps, and the type of negation in play. It may be that, if α is 
assigned gap, T<α> is also assigned gap, not false. And though, he claims, if α is 
assigned gap, ¬T<α> must be true, it needn’t be that F<α>, if the negation is of 
the ‘external’ kind which takes a sentence assigned gap to truth. 
Secondly, regardless of whether T<α> is assigned false or gap, we do not know 
the truth-value of the biconditional until we have specified the semantics of the 
conditional involved. For example, if we stipulate it obeys gap in/gap out, then 
the assignment of gap to α will be enough for an assignment of gap to the 
biconditional, independently of the value assigned to T<α>. And if the 
biconditional is such as to be assigned truth when both sides are assigned the 
same value, then both α and T<α> receiving the same value, whatever that is, 
will be sufficient for the truth of the instance of the T-scheme. Finally, Priest 
suggests, if the conditional used is a relevant one (an entailment connective), 
the truth values of α and T<α> are not enough to settle the truth-value of the 
biconditional. 
Priest also provides the following argument, independent of the particular 
behaviour of the conditional, for why the scheme should hold. The inference 
from α to T<α> is necessarily truth-preserving, since if α is true, so must be 
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T<α>. Similarly, if it’s true that T<α>, then it must be that α is true too, so the 
converse is also necessarily truth-preserving. Since both inferences are clearly 
also relevant, this, Priest claims, satisfies everyone’s informal conditions for a 
true biconditional.  
The first two arguments Priest gives are not themselves demonstrations that one 
cannot falsify the T-scheme by allowing truth-value gaps. Rather they show that 
the falsity of the T-scheme is not automatic, once one has accepted truth-value 
gaps, and will depend, among other things, on the behaviour of the conditional 
invoked. The immediately preceding argument, however, is a direct argument 
against this approach. Effectively, Priest’s claim is that since the inference from 
α to T<α> (and vice versa) is necessarily truth-preserving, α entails T<α> (and 
vice versa) and that this is enough to make a biconditional true on anyone’s 
‘informal’ conditions.  Defenders of the view under discussion, then, are 
committed to the T-scheme anyway. 
 It is unclear what ‘informal’ conditions are in this case, as opposed to formal 
ones, or what the relationship between these conditions ought to be. Perhaps it 
is an appeal to the intuitive obviousness of the inference from α to T<α> (and 
vice versa). In any case, it seems to me that a paracompletist inclined to go the 
route Priest is discussing may respond by denying that entailment is a matter of 
necessary truth-preservation, but rather a matter of necessary preservation of 
designated value (non-false value).  
If they endorse the view that there are truth-value gaps, and that this violates 
the T-scheme because when a sentence α is assigned gap, T<α> is assigned false, 
then α has been assigned a designated value, but T<α>, not. Hence, the 
inference from α to T<α> does not necessarily preserve designated value and is 
invalid. Presumably such a paracompletist would wish to defend this as an 
account of informal validity and would resist the premise in Priest’s argument 
above that α entails T<α>. This is not to say that such a view is attractive, but 
merely that it is not shown to be false by Priest’s argument. 
Finally, Priest gives a third reason that attempting to invoke truth-value gaps to 
falsify the T-scheme will not avoid contradiction. If we take a strengthened liar 
sentence, α, equivalent to ‘α is not true’, paracompletists are committed to this 
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being assigned gap, and hence, plausibly, to the claim that α is not true, and 
hence to α. In other words, Priest says, α has a truth value and the relevant 
instance of the t-scheme holds. This is the familiar revenge objection from the 
previous section, which again seems to be bearing significant argumentative 
weight in Priest’s case against the paracompletist. 
3.2.3 Hierarchical Approaches 
 
The next class of solutions Priest discusses (2006, p.19) are hierarchical 
solutions, mainly developed from the work of Tarski. According to the first sort 
of hierarchical theory, the paradoxes result from the mistaken assumption that 
languages like English are unified, semantically closed languages. In fact, so the 
theory goes, English is a hierarchy of languages Li, each with a truth-predicate 
Ti, which applies only to sentences in the level below in the hierarchy. The 
effect of this is to rule-out as ill-formed putative liar sentences, since they 
attempt to predicate truth of a sentence in their own language. It should be 
noted that, although such theories make essential use of Tarski’s formal 
machinery, he himself did not endorse this formal picture as a model of natural 
language, which he took to meet the conditions specified in Section 3.2, and 
thus to be incoherent (Tarski, 1936). 
Priest claims a number of problems afflict this sort of view. The first is the 
apparent lack of evidence for the claim that English is a hierarchy of languages 
in this way, or that all uses of a truth-predicate in English are ambiguous 
between infinitely many truth predicates, each indexed to a distinct language in 
the hierarchy. It is neither intuitively obvious that this is the case, nor is there 
any evidence, linguistic or grammatical that this is the case. This, he says, is 
sufficient to make the view unsatisfactory. This seems a little quick. Dialetheism 
is not intuitively true, and some inferences which dialetheism is forced to claim 
are invalid, are intuitively valid. There is also very little evidence, to my 
knowledge, that people are wont to assent to contradictions, and a lot of 
evidence that they are wont to reason by disjunctive syllogism. Clearly this is 
not, on its own, reason to rule dialetheism unsatisfactory, though it seems good 
reason to be cautious of the view. Similarly, the absence of evidence of the kind 
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Priest mentions for the hierarchical view, warrants caution, but doesn’t seem 
quite a refutation. 
Priest does, however, discuss more powerful arguments against the view. One 
concerns a sentence which I adapt here as ‘Every sentence in Section 3.2.3 of 
this thesis is true.’ This is, he suggests, a perfectly clear sentence of English 
which, on the assumption that at least one other sentence in this section is 
false, is false. Yet the sentence cannot occur within the hierarchy, because it 
predicates truth of itself. Since the sentence occurs in English, but not in the 
hierarchy, Priest says, the hierarchy is not English. Priest attributes this, and 
related objections, to Kripke (1975) and his general observation that it is not 
intrinsic syntactic and semantic features of a sentence which render it 
paradoxical but also other, external factors. So any theory which focuses solely 
on the former to rule-out paradoxical sentences will also rule-out other, 
ordinary sentences and hence will be expressively weaker than English. 
A further objection to the view is characterised by Priest as follows. We call the 
language with the lowest ordinal at which a particular sentence occurs that 
sentence’s ‘rank’. The sentences which are true in the hierarchy are those which 
are true at their rank. We then construct a liar-type sentence which says, 
intuitively, ‘this sentence is not true at its rank’ 
(α) ¬Trk(α)<α> 
If this sentence occurs in the hierarchy, it has some rank, i. By the T-scheme for 
rank i, 
Ti<α> ↔ ¬Trk(α)<α> 
Substituting i for rk(α) delivers contradiction. The only response to this, 
according to Priest, is for the proponent of the view to deny that this is a 
sentence of the hierarchy, and that quantifying over the indices of truth-
predicates, which is required to define the notion of rank, is inexpressible in the 
hierarchy. But since these claims are expressible in English, Priest claims, this is 
simply to admit again that the hierarchy is not English. Indeed, to even 
characterise the hierarchical view, one must assert the existence for each i of a 
truth-predicate, Ti, which, since disallowed by the hierarchical view makes the 
view, if true, inexpressible. This, again, is the revenge problem. 
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A second class of hierarchical view discussed by Priest takes English to be a 
single language which enjoys a single, univocal truth-predicate, but takes 
interpretations of it to form a hierarchy (Priest refers here to the views of Gupta 
(1982) and Herzberger (1982)). The interpretations in the hierarchy differ only in 
their assignment of the extension of the truth predicate. According to Priest’s 
characterisation, given an arbitrary extension assigned T at level 0, the 
extension at ordinal level i, which we call Ei, is the set of sentences, α, such 
that for some ordinal j< i, and all ordinals, k, such that j≤ k < i, α holds in the 
interpretation at k. At a certain height, the hierarchy stabilises. Some sentences 
enter the extension of the truth-predicate and stay there for the remainder of 
the hierarchy and we call these ‘stably true’. If the negation of a sentence is 
stably true, we call it ‘stably false’. We call an interpretation ‘stabilised’ if all 
stable sentences have their ultimate value. 
According to Priest, the unstabilised interpretations are, in some sense, 
unimportant, since it’s the stabilised interpretations which give the important 
properties of sentences. Given a sentence α, the T-scheme for α is guaranteed 
to be true at a stabilised interpretation if and only if α is stable. Paradoxical 
sentences such as the liar are unstable and so the T-scheme may fail for those at 
stabilised interpretations. 
Priest offers a number of criticisms of this view. The first is, he claims, it is 
unclear what it is supposed to show: that is, the relationship between this 
formal structure and (the semantics of) English is unclear. It is unclear, 
according to Priest, what it means to say that English has a whole hierarchy of 
interpretations. 
A second objection is that the hierarchy must, in some sense, characterise the 
meaning of the language under consideration, and meaning is something grasped 
by the users of that language. So, if this theory were a characterisation of 
English, speakers of English would be able to grasp the notions it employs in 
characterising meaning. The notions this view presupposes are grasped by 
ordinary speakers of English include, according to Priest, transfinite ordinal, 
definition by transfinite induction and others. The implausibility of this, he says, 
need not be laboured.  
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Another objection Priest gives is as follows. Truth, he says, is the aim of a 
number of cognitive processes, such as asserting, theorising, and so on. The 
extension of the truth-predicate on the view under consideration varies from 
interpretation to interpretation. Which, Priest asks, is the target set? He 
considers a few options. The first, which is unlikely to be found attractive by 
anyone endorsing the view, is that we take the process of ascending the ordinal 
ranking of interpretations to be temporal. The choice of temporal unit would, 
Priest points out, be arbitrary. Worse, it would lead to the result that the liar 
might be assertible, say, on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, but not on 
Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays, for example. Another alternative is to take 
the true to be the union of all the extensions of the truth predicate (or perhaps 
just those in stable interpretations). But this would be inconsistent, and so 
would fail to avoid dialetheism. A final option Priest considers, which he takes to 
be the most plausible suggestion, and the one most likely to be endorsed by 
proponents of this view, is to take the intersection of all these sets (the set of 
stable truths) to be the target. The effect of this, however, would be to 
trifurcate sentences into the true (stably true), the false (stably false) and the 
rest (neither stably true nor stably false). But this is just the gap view already 
discussed. 
In particular, the revenge problem which Priest claims affects the gap view now 
returns for the present view: 
(β) The sentence β is not stably true 
Since classical logic holds at each stage in the hierarchy, β is either stably true 
or not. If it is stably true, it is true at every stabilised interpretation in the 
hierarchy and, hence, by the T-scheme (which, again, holds at every stabilised 
interpretation), ‘β is not stably true’ is stably true. Hence we must assert 
something which says it can’t be asserted. So we have shown, and can therefore 
assert, that β is not stably true. Hence we can assert something which says it 
can’t be asserted. A more precise characterisation of this argument is given in 
Priest (1987). 
One response Priest discusses to this problem comes from Gupta (1982). The 
idea is that the extension of ‘is stably true’ varies up the hierarchy. The obvious 
way to do this, Priest says, is to take the extension of the predicate at i to be 
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the set of things which, at that level, appear to be stably true. The result of 
this, according to Priest, is that the truth-predicate and the stably-true-
predicate become coextensional, and so the latter, vacuous. Priest points out 
that, even were a characterisation of the stable truth predicate given, it is 
unclear how this would help with the relevant liar-paradoxical sentences. The 
suggestion under consideration is that utterances about stable truth themselves 
may be unstable; but the argument from extended liar sentences does not 
obviously assume otherwise. Thus, according to Priest, the only real solution 
available is to deny that stable truth is expressible in the language and, since it 
is expressible in English, to deny that the language in question is English. 
 
3.3 Set-Theoretic Paradoxes 
3.3.1 The Inconsistency of Naïve Set Theory 
 
I now turn to Priest’s account of the set-theoretic paradoxes and his defence of 
a dialetheic solution to them. The situation with these paradoxes is different 
from that of the semantic paradoxes in a number of ways, according to Priest 
(2006, p28). The first is that there is a more or less clear account of what the 
naïve notion of set is and, moreover, a general consensus about what is wrong 
with it. 
Another difference is that semantics, even the formalised kind, has never been a 
mathematical theory in the sense of being studied for its interesting 
mathematical properties, or its ability to produce interesting mathematical 
results. This, he thinks, means that in debates about naïve semantics, there is 
no well-developed, generally agreed mathematical practice to which we can 
appeal to settle our disputes. 
A further, important difference is that the formalisation of semantics came 
after, and at least in part, as a result of, the semantic paradoxes. The result 
being that, for Priest, the formalisation is ‘far too self-conscious to be of much 
help’. The point, I take it, being that rather than simply being an attempt to 
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characterise our naïve understanding of various semantic notions, people like 
Tarski (and those who followed him) were well aware of the threat of 
inconsistency and attempted to avoid it, perhaps in an ad hoc way, and at the 
cost of losing the naiveté of the account. This is clearly true of Tarski, at least, 
who, as I have mentioned, was explicit about his theory not being an account of 
the naïve semantics of natural language, which he took to be obviously 
inconsistent. 
The situation with set theory differs importantly from semantics, Priest thinks, 
in large part because the development of set theory began before any awareness 
of the set-theoretic paradoxes. Even after early set-theorists became aware of 
certain of the paradoxes (for example, Cantor’s seemingly early recognition of 
the paradox that bears his name; though it seems he did not think of it as a 
paradox), at least some developments of set-theory, such as Frege’s, were 
characterised without knowledge of the paradoxes. So Frege’s characterisation 
was not, in Priest’s words, ‘deformed’ by attempts to avoid paradoxes, or the ad 
hoc refinements  of our naïve understanding which such attempts often seem to 
involve. According to Priest, this gives us good reason to suppose Frege’s theory 
an accurate account of our naïve understanding of set. The two pillars of Frege’s 
theory are: 
(Abs) ∃y∀x (x ∈ y ↔ β) 
(Ext) ∀x(x ∈ z ↔ x ∈ y) → z = y 
With the restriction (added by Priest, though not absolutely required) that β is 
any formula not containing y free. Priest points out that this is not exactly 
Frege’s formulation of the theory, which is second order with ‘∈’ defined, but it 
is close enough for our purposes. The second principle, Ext, stipulates that sets 
are extensional entities, identified by their members (as opposed, perhaps, to 
what some philosophers take to be intensional entities, like properties which 
might be such that two distinct properties have the same extension). The first, 
and perhaps most important, principle stipulates that every condition has a set 
as its extension: in fact, on this view, we may take a set just to be the extension 
of an arbitrary condition. 
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As was famously pointed out by Russell, the conception of set given by Abs and 
Ext is inconsistent: 
∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ x ∉ x) 
∃y(y ∈ y ↔ y ∉ y) 
∃y(y ∈ y ∧ y ∉ y) 
The first step being the instance of Abs giving the existence of a set of all non-
self-membered sets, the second, which follows from the first, is that this set is a 
member of itself if and only if it is not and the final is an application of the 
reductio rule, equivalent to excluded middle. 
A further argument Priest gives against the strategy is that not all of the set-
theoretic paradoxes seem to involve appeal to excluded middle. One is the 
Burali-Forti paradox, since, he says, a direct argument can be given that the set 
of all ordinals is an ordinal and an independent argument given that this is not 
the case. The contradiction that it both is and is not a member of itself is 
therefore delivered by an instance of conjunction introduction from the 
conclusions of these distinct arguments, without the need for appeal to an 
intermediate conclusion according to which the set is an ordinal if and only if it 
is not. 
Another example which Priest discusses in more detail (Priest, p.29) is 
Miraminoff’s paradox, which arises when we consider whether the set of all 
well-founded sets is well-founded. We define a regress from z to be a function, 
f, from the natural numbers such that f(0) = z, and for all n, f(n) = Ø or f(n + 1) 
∈ f(n). We call a regress bounded if, for some n, f(n) = Ø. Let W be the set of all 
well-founded sets: the set of all sets z such that every regress from z is 
bounded. Let f be any regress from W. If f(0) = Ø the regress is bounded. 
Suppose f(1) ∈ W. Let g be the function such that g(n) = f(n + 1). g is a regress 
from g(0) = f(1) ∈ W. So g is bounded and, hence, f is bounded. So all regresses 
from W are bounded and W ∈ W. But consider the function h such that, for all n, 
h(n) = W. h is an unbounded regress from W and so W ∉ W. 
Informally, we can construct a regress from a set, expressing the fact that the 
set is a member of another set, this of a further set and so on. If all the 
regresses we can construct from a set are finite, i.e. they all eventually 
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‘bottom-out’ in a final member (in the case of pure set theory, this will always 
be the empty set) , the set is well-founded. If there is at least one chain which is 
infinite, i.e. there is no final member of the chain, the set is non-well-founded. 
The simplest way to illustrate the latter is to consider a set, say, α, which is a 
member of itself. Since α heads the regress α ∈ α ∈ α… and so on indefinitely, α 
is non-well-founded; the same goes, obviously, for any self-membered set. 
Now, consider the set W of all well-founded sets: this set must be well-founded 
for, if none of its members heads an unbounded regress, then any regress 
headed by W must be bounded, since any such regress would have to proceed 
through one of W’s members. But now we can also show that W is non-well-
founded, since it is self-membered and thus heads the regress W ∈ W ∈ W… 
This, according to Priest, establishes the inconsistency of the naïve notion of set 
even if one denies excluded middle, since the proof makes no use of the latter. 
There are three responses available here: one might deny that arguments of this 
kind establish the inconsistency of naïve set theory; or one might accept the 
inconsistency of naïve set theory and abandon it on this basis; or one might 
accept the inconsistency of naïve set theory, but take this only to show that one 
ought to reason about sets paraconsistently.  
The second of these options is by far the most popular. Indeed, it is almost 
universally endorsed by both mathematicians and philosophers, who generally 
replace the naïve characterisation of set with the one specified by the standard 
Zermelo-Fraenkel axiomatisation of set theory (perhaps with the addition of the 
axiom of choice).  
Priest’s preference is, of course, option three: one should keep the naïve 
account of set and accept its inconsistency. His arguments for this approach, 
which I will describe presently, are generally concerned with attacking the 
orthodox position, option two. 
This, however, leaves unscathed option one, the defender of which might 
happily endorse Priest’s arguments against orthodoxy (and in favour of the naïve 
account) whilst demurring from the conclusion that dialetheism be endorsed. 
This view is defended by Alan Weir (in, for example, his (1998)) who attempts to 
avoid the paradoxical arguments for the inconsistency of naïve set theory by 
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restricting the structural rules of the underlying logic (specifically, the structural 
cut-elimination rule). Since my focus here is dialetheism, I will not discuss this 
view in any depth.  
No dialetheists, so far as I am aware, have attacked Weir’s views on set theory 
directly yet; but this will have to be done if Priest’s arguments are to persuade 
us, not just of naïve set theory, but of dialetheism. There are costs, of course, 
to Weir’s view (the most obvious being that there is a strong presumption that 
the structural rules he asks us to abandon are correct) but whether these costs 
are significant enough to make a dialetheist approach to naïve set theory the 
most plausible remains to be seen. One argument a dialetheist such as Priest 
may wish to give here is that, since Weir’s view is consistent, it cannot give a 
revenge-free treatment of paradoxes such as the liar. A discussion of whether 
this is correct is outwith the scope of this thesis, but if this is the best response 
to Weir’s view on behalf of dialetheism, it makes all the more clear the 
significance of the revenge problem in making a case for inconsistency. 
3.3.2 Priest Against Set-Theoretic Orthodoxy 
3.3.2.1 Lack of Motivation for the Cumulative Hierarchy 
 
The target of the next part of Priest’s defence of dialetheism is the orthodox 
conception of set given by the cumulative hierarchy (normally as specified in 
Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) set theory), against which he defends the naïve 
conception of set given by (Abs) and (Ext). 
Priest begins by claiming that the burden of proof lies with his opponent. If they 
grant, as he suggests most set theorists do, that (Abs) and (Ext) characterise the 
intuitive notion of set, then they must offer an account of what they take to be 
the correct account of set, and an explanation of why (Abs), in particular, fails. 
The cumulative hierarchy is obtained by beginning with (at least in the case of 
set theory without urelements) the empty set and taking its power set (the set 
of all its subsets), then taking the power set of this, and so on. This is iterated 
into the transfinite and each level in the hierarchy is indexed by an ordinal 
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number which gives its rank. Whenever a limit ordinal is reached (one such there 
are ordinals smaller than it and, for every such, there is a further ordinal 
between it and the limit), we progress by taking the set of everything which has 
come before. We stipulate that the only true instances of (Abs) are those which 
hold in this hierarchy and thus block the paradoxes, since the sets which 
generate them do not occur in the hierarchy.  
The first reason Priest gives against this view is that its intelligibility depends on 
a prior grasp of the notion of ordinal for, unless we know ‘how long’ the 
construction goes on for, we haven’t grasped the nature of the hierarchy. But 
ordinals are set-theoretic entities or, at least, they must be characterised set-
theoretically. 
If we endorse the naïve characterisation of set, according to Priest, we can 
characterise the ordinals and thereby define the cumulative hierarchy. But if the 
cumulative hierarchy relies on the ordinal numbers, the standard view must 
presuppose some other notion of set by which we grasp these. On the possibility 
of a theory such as the aforementioned ZF specifying the operative notion of 
ordinal, Priest says that this would introduce vicious circularity into the theory, 
since the rational for ZF presupposes the cumulative hierarchy. 
Another problem with supposing that only certain instances of (Abs) hold, 
according to Priest, is that there would appear to be no obvious explanation for 
why (Abs) seemed plausible to us in the first place. From the perspective 
according to which only certain instances of (Abs) hold, he thinks, (Abs) does not 
seem plausible. On Priest’s own view, the plausibility of (Abs) is explained by its 
truth and so, he claims, his view is explanatorily superior. 
This doesn’t seem quite fair. Our pre-theoretical believes about sets and related 
logical notions lead not just to inconsistency, but to triviality. If we wish to 
avoid this, as Priest himself does, some of our pre-theoretical beliefs must be 
given up. In his case, we must endorse a paraconsistent logic which invalidates, 
among other things, disjunctive syllogism. We certainly have a pre-theoretical 
belief that disjunctive syllogism is valid, but since it’s not on Priest’s view, we 
might ask why it seemed valid in the first place, if so many of our notions turned 
out to be inconsistent. Someone who endorses, say, classical logic, can explain 
why disjunctive syllogism seems valid by appealing to its actual validity. 
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Priest’s answer (defended in Chapter 8 of his (2006)) is that, in most ordinary 
contexts, disjunctive syllogism is truth preserving. It’s only when we start 
thinking about totalities which result in paradoxes that we discover dialetheia 
and hence discover that disjunctive syllogism can’t be valid. But a defender of 
the cumulative hierarchy may wish to say much the same thing about (Abs): a 
great many of its instances are true, and it is only when we consider paradoxical 
totalities that we realise we must give up some of its instances. 
The paradoxes demonstrate that anyone who wishes to avoid trivialism must give 
up some or other of our intuitive, pre-theoretic beliefs about sets, or logic, or 
semantics and from the perspective of the resulting, post-paradoxical view, 
those notions are apt to seem implausible in retrospect. It’s neither obvious that 
this is a genuine problem, nor that it is avoidable. At the least, further argument 
is needed that dialetheism has a distinct advantage on this score. 
Another objection Priest gives is that the claim that the only sets are those in 
the cumulative hierarchy lacks independent justification. This, he claims, is 
sufficient to make a view unsatisfactory. This may also be a little quick: whether 
this makes a view unsatisfactory may depend on whether the other views 
available can do better. It may be that certain theoretical decisions must be 
made simply because they avoid the paradoxes, or perhaps because they avoid 
triviality. A theory which avoids this is clearly, ceteris paribus, at an advantage, 
but it doesn’t seem right that a theory be automatically disqualified because 
certain of its features are motivated solely by considerations deriving from the 
paradoxes. 
Priest cites as a standard attempt to motivate the hierarchy, Devlin (1980): 
 Fundamental to set theory is the concept of being able to regard any 
collection of objects as a single entity. But before we can form a collection of 
objects, those objects must first be “available” to us…Before we can build sets 
of objects, we must have the set of objects out of which to build these sets. The 
crucial word here is, of course, ‘build’. Naturally we are not thinking of actually 
building sets in any sense, but our set theory should reflect this idea. 
Priest criticises this rational in a number of ways. Firstly, it employs an 
inappropriate temporal metaphor, suggesting that sets come into existence after 
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their members, which is not true (though Devlin does admit that sets are not 
actually built ‘in any sense’). An alternative metaphor which would work equally 
well, says Priest, is of starting with the biggest set and building down ‘as one 
might build a chain suspended from a rafter’ (Priest, 2006, p.32), which would 
allow for non-well-foundedness. 
The only non-metaphorical sense to be made of the building metaphor, 
according to Priest, is to take the claim to be something like ‘a set is 
conceptually prior to its members’.  Though it’s unclear, Priest thinks, that 
exactly what this means, he points out that it doesn’t seem to rule out non-well-
foundedness, since there’s no reason this dependency should always bottom-out 
in a well-founded way. 
Priest discusses one attempt to show that there is no indefinite regress here, 
due to Mayberry (1977). According to Mayberry, the determinacy of any set 
depends on the determinacy of its members. Thus, on this view, any argument 
for the determinacy of a set must be given via arguments for the determinacy of 
its members. So, to argue for the determinacy of non-well-founded sets would 
require non-well-founded arguments; but, says Mayberry, ‘it is obvious that no 
argument whose premises proceed in a circle or a regress to infinity can be 
valid’ (Mayberry, 1977, p.31).  
This, according to Priest, does not work. First, it is not true that regressive 
arguments are invalid, since α, because α, because α… is a ‘paradigm of 
validity’. Though Priest doesn’t discuss the case, neither is it true that circular 
arguments cannot be valid since α ⊨ α is clearly valid. 
As Priest points out, neither must an argument that some set x is determinate 
have ‘y is determinate’ as a premise for each y ∈ x. There, for example, be a 
single premise (perhaps (Abs)), which entails the determinacy of x and all its 
members. 
Finally, he notes, the argument depends on the assumption that, if one cannot 
show by argument that something is determinate, it follows that the thing is 
indeterminate. Which is fallacious. 
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3.3.2.2 Category Theory 
 
A further consideration of Priest’s against the view that the cumulative 
hierarchy exhausts the universe of sets is its inadequacy in category theory. 
Category theory is a highly abstract theory of structure whose objects are 
certain algebraic entities, the categories, and the structure preserving relations 
(morphisms) which hold between them.  
One of the interests of category theorists is in studying the structural features of 
entities described by other highly abstract mathematical theories; so they are 
interested, for instance, in the category of sets and the category of groups. But 
these are the very sorts of totalities disallowed by defenders of the cumulative 
hierarchy. Worse, according to Priest, category theorists want to carry out 
operations on these categories. For example, from the category of sets, V, and 
the category of groups Grp, they might wish to create the functor category, VGrp, 
of all functors from Grp to V. But these constructions, says Priest, are not 
possible in the cumulative hierarchy. 
Priest considers, and rejects, some suggestions for avoiding this problem. The 
first is to take problematically large categories (such as the sets or the groups) 
to be proper classes, where these are subcollections of the hierarchy (all their 
members occur in the hierarchy), but which cannot be members of any other 
collection (and, a fortiori, don’t occur in the hierarchy themselves).  
The first problem Priest suggests for proper classes is that they are ‘a 
masquerade’ (Priest, 2006, p.34). He claims that ‘proper class’ is an evasive 
renaming of certain sets which don’t occur in the hierarchy and, if we have to 
admit that there are sets outside the cumulative hierarchy, this demonstrates 
the incompleteness of the hierarchy as a picture of the sets. Depending on how 
this problem is put, a defender of the hierarchy may find it question-begging: to 
defend the existence of proper classes is only to accept the existence of sets 
outside the hierarchy if it is assumed that proper classes are sets, which is 
precisely what proponents of proper classes deny. 
However, Priest goes on to say that the insistence that proper classes cannot be 
members of other collections cannot be given independent motivation. There is 
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no reason, he claims, why such entities, if they are determinate entities, cannot 
be members of other collections, such as their singletons. Another example, 
which seems even more implausible than their inability to be members of a 
singleton is this: as much as any other kind of mathematical entity, we are able 
to talk about and use proper classes (using locutions such as, for example, ‘the 
proper classes’), even describe them axiomatically, in theories such as 
Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory, yet we cannot in any sense countenance as 
a totality ‘the proper classes’, since it can be neither a set nor a proper class. So 
we have a type of mathematical entity, all of whose tokens are perfectly 
determinate objects and seem every bit as much a totality of entities as any 
other, yet they are somehow precluded from ‘coming together’ to form a 
collection. 
Some independent motivation must be given for this restriction, or there is 
considerable justice in Priest’s charge that this is simply an ad hoc renaming of 
what are really sets, just to avoid the contradictions generated by the paradoxes 
(or, perhaps more generally, to avoid revising our logic to endorse naïve set 
theory without triviality). 
Even if this can be done, Priest points out, since proper classes cannot be 
members of other totalities, we cannot carry out operations on them, for 
example by forming functor categories of them, such as the one given above. So 
whilst, properly motivated, the invocation of proper classes might be hoped to 
give us the existence of the totalities studied by category theorists, it does not 
make sense of their practice of carrying out operations on those totalities. 
In response to this, a defender of the hierarchy might suggest that proper classes 
can be members of some totalities, perhaps ‘hyper-classes’, but not of other 
proper classes or of sets. The proper classes, therefore, would form a hyper-
class. This response invites two replies: firstly, the fact that we can ask exactly 
the same questions of hyper-classes as we did of proper classes seems to invite a 
vicious regress: we will be forced to invoke super-duper-hyper-classes, which 
will be members of even higher order classes, and so on. We may then wish to 
form the totality of all the totalities which occur in this hierarchy of classes, and 
so be back in exactly the same difficulty which was supposed to be solved by the 
introduction of proper classes in the first place. Secondly, allowing for proper 
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classes to be members of other totalities makes the insistence that they not be 
members of sets even more difficult to motivate. The reason proper classes were 
not allowed to be members of sets was that proper classes are not the sort of 
entities to be members of other mathematical totalities. But if they can be 
members of hyper-classes, this is no longer the case, so why can’t they be 
members of sets? These and related objections are made by a number of other 
philosophers, such as Boolos (1998), Lewis (1991) and Weir (1998). 
The second solution Priest considers to this problem is, rather than invoking 
proper classes, to represent the claims of category theory as being about initial 
segments of the hierarchy, rather than its entirety. The first way of doing this 
Priest outlines is to suppose the existence of some inaccessible cardinal κ and, 
since the sets less than κ have certain useful closure properties, interpret the 
claims of category concerning the sets as being about the “sub-universe” of sets 
less than κ. The problem with this strategy, according to Priest, is that, though 
it produces a model for category theory, it’s not the intended one. The point of 
category theory is to describe the structural isomorphisms holding between all 
algebraic structures of the relevant kind. But on this view, category theory does 
not describe the sets, it describes the sets less than κ. 
A related, alternative proposal is to suppose the existence of arbitrarily many 
inaccessible cardinals, each of which provides a ‘mini-universe’ in which 
category theory may be interpreted. There are two reasons, according to Priest, 
that this proposal fails. The first is that the claims of category theorists are still 
not being interpreted as being about all the sets: all of their claims are 
interpreted as being about one of the mini-universes in the hierarchy. The 
second is that it suffers from familiar expressive limitations: we want to make 
claims which cross levels in the hierarchy, but cannot, on this proposal, succeed 
in doing so. For example, we may wish to claim that some group bears some 
relation, R, to every other group whatever (i.e. at every level in the hierarchy). 
But on the present proposal, the best that can be done is to interpret this as 
claiming that, for any mini-universe, there is a group in that universe which 
bears R to all other groups in that universe. The claim that the group bears R to 
every group can’t, Priest claims, be expressed. 
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3.3.2.3 Logic 
 
Priest also thinks logic, in particular logical validity, provides further reason to 
doubt that the cumulative hierarchy exhausts the sets (2006, p.36-37). Consider 
a first-order language with validity defined as follows: 
Σ ⊨ α iff in every interpretation in which all the members of Σ are true, α is true 
Interpretations, understood model-theoretically, are set-theoretic entities 
whose domains are arbitrary sets. So the quantifiers in the definition above, 
Priest suggests, appear to range over all the sets. Definitions of the above kind 
are given in some language (in this case, mathematized English), which 
presumably has semantics. But, according to Priest, if we restrict ourselves to 
the cumulative hierarchy, no semantics for the language can be given, for an 
interpretation is an ordered pair <D, I>, where D is the interpretation’s domain, 
but since D in this case is not a set, this interpretation is not available. 
As Priest notes, similar responses can be made to this problem as were 
considered in the previous section, but since similar objections can be raised to 
these responses in the present context, Priest thinks they fail for the same 
reasons as before. 
This argument strikes me as powerful, and an instance of the more general 
problem, sometimes called the problem of ‘absolute generality’ (Rayo and 
Uzquaino, (2006)), of making sense of expressions (such as ‘the sets’, ‘the 
ordinals’ or even ‘everything’) which appear to concern totalities normally 
thought too large to be sets. There are a number of responses to this problem, 
all of which seem to face serious problems (Rayo and Uzquaino, (2006) contains 
defences of a number of approaches to the issue). If, however, one is able to 
endorse naïve set theory (either inconsistently, as Priest does, or consistently, as 
does, for example, Weir (1998)) absolute generality presents no particular 
problem. If the central claim of this thesis is correct, and dialetheism cannot be 
motivated by appeal to revenge arguments, this is one promising avenue for the 
dialetheist to philosophically motivate their view. 
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3.3 Paradoxes of Inclosure 
A final argument I will consider for a Priest’s version of dialetheism concerns the 
apparent structural isomorphism between the semantic and set-theoretic 
paradoxes. Though this was not discussed in detail in In Contradiction (the 
reader is referred, on p.263, to his (2002)), in later work (particularly his (1994) 
and (2002)) Priest has developed a precise account of the sense in which he 
takes the paradoxes of self-reference to be related: they are all paradoxes of 
inclosure. If this account of the underlying structure of the paradoxes is correct, 
then combined with the plausible assumption that like problems require like 
solutions (the Principle of Uniform Solution), this seems to show that the 
semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes require unified treatment. One significant 
upshot of this is that it would make Priest’s revenge arguments for dialetheism 
about the semantic paradoxes an indirect argument for dialetheism about the 
set-theoretic paradoxes. Another is that it puts pressure on those who wish to 
endorse the classical picture of set theory given by the cumulative hierarchy 
whilst endorsing a non-classical solution to the semantic paradoxes (this is the 
view taken by Field (2008), for one, and Beall (2009) for another). If Priest is 
correct, these views are problematically bifurcated, and their proponents would 
seem to face a choice between a more thoroughgoing non-classicality, extending 
to set-theory, or a classical solution to the semantic paradoxes. 
Priest first gives an account of what he would later call the ‘Inclosure Schema’ 
in his (1994), where he explains the roots of the account in Russell’s work. He 
settles on the following conditions as characterising the structure of the 
paradoxes (2002, p.134): 
(1) Ω = {y; φ(y)} exists, and ψ (Ω) 
(2) if x is a subset of Ω such that ψ(x):  (a) δ (x) ∉ x 
(b) δ(x) ∈ Ω 
Where φ and ψ are properties, δ is some function and Ω is a class. Priest calls δ 
the ‘diagonaliser’ function, since, paradigmatically, it will be defined by 
diagonalisation paradigmatically (though, so long as it is defined systematically 
such that the result of applying it to a set does not deliver a member of that set, 
diagonalisation isn’t essential). Condition (1) Priest calls ‘Existence’, for the 
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obvious reason that it stipulates the existence of a set, Ω, of all those things of 
which φ holds and that ψ hold of Ω. Conditions (a) and (b) are called, 
respectively, ‘transcendence’ and ‘closure’, since if (a) is satisfied, δ transcends 
the boundary of x and, if (b) is satisfied, Ω is closed under δ. These conditions 
generate contradiction, since applying (a) and (b) to Ω gives us δ(Ω) ∉ Ω and 
δ(Ω) ∈ Ω, respectively. 
This is a generalised version of an earlier schema he calls ‘Russell’s Schema’ 
(2002, p.129) which lacks the stipulation in the schema above that δ only need 
operate on the members of Ω’s powerset of which ψ holds. Though the 
paradoxes of absolute infinity (such as Cantor’s Paradox) fit Russell’s Schema, 
the generalisation which gives the Inclosure Schema is necessary to capture the 
paradoxes of definability. For those paradoxes fitting Russell’s original schema, 
we simply take ψ to be some universal property, such as λxx = x, and so take δ 
to operate on the entirety of the powerset of Ω. 
We can illustrate how the paradoxes in question are supposed to fit this schema 
by giving a couple of examples. First, Russell’s paradox, as Priest presents it in 
his (2002, pp. 129-133): we take the property φ(y) to be φ ∈ V (where V is the 
universal set), the property ψ(x), as above, to be the universal property λxx = x, 
the set Ω to be V and δ(x) to be the function which takes any x to the set of all 
its members which are not members of themselves ({y ∈ x; y ∉ y}), which we 
label ρx. 
The case of interest is the one in which we take x to be V. We obtain 
transcendence since, if ρv ∈ ρv, then ρv ∉ ρv and, hence, ρv ∉ ρv. But if ρv ∉ ρv, 
then we have ρv ∈ ρv and, hence, we have closure and the contradiction ρv ∉ ρv 
and ρv ∈ ρv. 
Priest also, explains (1994, p.30) how the familiar Liar Paradox fits the Inclosure 
Schema. We take the property φ(y) to be the property ‘y is true’ (and so Ω is the 
set of all true sentences), the property ψ(x) to be the property ‘x is definable’, 
and δ to be the function σ, definable by diagonalisation, such that if α is a 
definable set, σ(α) = α where α = <α ∉ α> (i.e. α says ‘α is not in α’). 
If α is definable and a subset of Ω, then σ(α) ∈ α and so <α ∉ α> ∈ α (since σ(α) = 
<α ∉ α>). Therefore <α ∉ α> ∈ Ω and, by the T-scheme, α ∉ α and so (since σ(α) 
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= α), σ(α) ∉ α. But if from σ(α) ∈ α, it follows that σ(α) ∉ α, then we have σ(α) ∉ 
α and so we have transcendence. But, if we have σ(α) ∉ α, then we also have α 
∉ α and, by the T-scheme, <α ∉ α> ∈ Ω, which means that we have σ(α) ∈ Ω 
(again, since σ(α) = <α ∉ α>) and closure, too, is satisfied. The liar sentence here 
is σ(Ω) and the contradiction is σ(Ω) ∈ Ω and σ(Ω) ∉ Ω. 
An interesting, and perhaps problematic, case is Curry’s paradox. Priest points 
out (1994, p. 33) that for many of the paradoxes he discusses, we can replace ¬α 
uniformly with α → ⊥ (where ‘⊥’ entails everything) and generate a ‘Curry’ 
version of the given paradox. Whether these paradoxes are of the Inclosure 
variety depends, according to Priest, on the meaning of ‘→’. If the conditional is 
material, then, on his view, ‘α → ⊥’ is equivalent to ‘¬α’ and so the Curried 
versions of the paradoxes are not distinct from the originals and thereby fit the 
Inclosure Schema just if the originals do. If the conditional is something else, 
perhaps a strict conditional, then, Priest claims, the Curried versions of the 
paradoxes are not Inclosure paradoxes.  
On the one hand, it is important for Priest that this is so, since, if those 
paradoxes fit the Inclosure schema, that would seem to demand that they 
receive a dialetheic treatment. But in the case of a strict conditional, this 
generates not just inconsistency, but triviality. On the other hand, the Curry 
paradox is clearly of-a-piece with paradoxes like the Liar, at least in the sense 
that it is a paradox of self-reference. So if the Curry paradox does not fit 
Inclosure, one might think the Inclosure Schema can no longer be thought of as 
giving an account of the structure common to the paradoxes of self-reference. 
Were this the case, the argument that all paradoxes fitting Inclosure must be 
given like treatment might be thought to lose some of its bite: if it doesn’t 
capture that which underlies all self-referential paradoxes, why think that what 
it does capture is important enough to justify the demand for similar theoretical 
treatment in our accounts of those paradoxes? 
A number of problems, some concerning Curry’s paradox and some not, have 
been suggested for the uses to which Priest puts the Inclosure Schema (for 
example, Grattan-Guinness (1998), Smith (2000), Badici (2008) and Zhong 
(2012)) and dialetheists (principally Priest) have replied in turn (for example, 
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Priest (1998), Priest (2000), Weber (2010c) and Priest (2012)). Priest has also 
attempted to extend further the scope of the Inclosure Schema to encompass 
the paradoxes of vagueness (for example, Priest (2010b)) and to paradoxes 
arising from indefinitely extensible concepts (Priest 2013).  
The debate concerning the Inclosure Schema is ongoing, and it is not my 
intention to adjudicate it here. What is clear, though, is that, if Priest is correct 
that it provides an accurate account of the paradoxes, and that like problems 
demand like solutions, then, firstly, his arguments for dialetheism about the 
semantic paradoxes (especially the revenge problem) extend far beyond the 
semantic paradoxes. Secondly, this puts pressure on competitor solutions to the 
paradoxes (such as Field’s paracomplete account defended in (2008)) to develop 
similarly unified accounts of the paradoxes of inclosure. 
3.4 Summary of Priest’s Case for Dialetheism 
This chapter has considered only some of the arguments presented by Priest for 
dialetheism. A number of other arguments have been made (by Priest and 
others) for the view. Many of these involve defending the usefulness of the 
applications of dialetheism to various problems in philosophy. If dialetheism can 
provide useful solutions to outstanding philosophical problems, this provides 
further, indirect support for the view. A number of these are discussed in In 
Contradiction: for example Priest argues that, in metaphysics, dialetheism offers 
an account of change (and, in particular, motion) which allows for genuine 
instants of change (see chapters 11 and 12 of In Contradiction, and chapter 15 
for a related discussion of the metaphysics of time). In the philosophy of law, 
Priest thinks, dialetheism offers the best account of inconsistent legal systems, 
by treating the apparent contradictions arising therein as bona fide dialetheia. 
The central arguments of Priest’s other book-length treatments are also 
sometimes of this kind. His third book, for example, Towards Non-Being (2005) 
defends a view he calls ‘noneism’, a development of the view of Richard Routley 
(later Sylvan) given in his Exploring Meinong’s Jungle (1980), itself a 
development of the views presented in various works by Alexius Meinong, 
especially his The Theory of Objects (1960). Noneism is the view that some 
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things don’t exist and is put to work as a solution to a cluster of puzzles 
involving intentionality, as well as an account of mathematical objects, fictional 
objects and possible worlds. The biggest obstacle to this view, according to 
Priest (chapter 8 of his (2005) can be consulted for the details), is that a 
paradox of multiple denotation, to which the view appears subject, delivers the 
rather worrisome conclusion that 0=1. The argument for this unpalatable 
conclusion crucially requires the substitutivity of identicals, which fails in cases 
of multiple denotation, on the dialetheic semantics Priest provides. So a suitably 
dialetheic development of noneism, Priest hopes, can deliver an attractive 
solution of a number of long-standing philosophical problems concerning both 
intentionality and ontology. 
Priest’s most recent book One (2014) further expands dialetheism’s potential 
applications in metaphysics, giving inconsistent accounts of unity, mereology, 
identity and instantiation, among other notions. These are interesting parts of 
the positive case for dialetheism, deserving of serious engagement and scrutiny 
which they don’t receive here. 
One reason for this is that it’s fair to say that most philosophers regard the case 
for dialetheism based on the paradoxes, as discussed above, as the most 
powerful and persuasive case available for the view3. Another is that my concern 
in this thesis is with the problem of revenge.  My aim in this chapter has been to 
sketch the case for dialetheism, based on the paradoxes, as it has been 
defended by Priest, and to emphasise the centrality of revenge to this case. The 
purpose of this is to illustrate the place of the thesis in the debate surrounding 
dialetheism, and to give a sense of the importance of my claims in this regard, if 
they are shown to be correct. 
The case for dialetheism summarised in the other sections of this chapter is 
primarily negative, in the sense that it is concerned to rule-out alternatives to 
dialetheism by demonstrating their theoretical inadequacy. The first arguments 
discussed concerned the semantic paradoxes, paradigmatically, the Liar. The 
broad strategies considered in response to these paradoxes were Paracompletism 
                                                          
3
 It’s possible that Priest, himself, is an exception to this, since he has said (25 Years In Contradiction 
conference, Glasgow, 2012) that the apparent contradictions arising from inconsistent laws have always 
struck him as the clearest cases of dialetheia. He may, of course, still think that the most persuasive case for 
his view is still made on the basis of the paradoxes. 
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(defenders of truth-value ‘gaps’), rejection of the T-scheme (which overlaps 
with the discussion of paracompletism) and hierarchical approaches (hierarchies 
of truth predicates, and hierarchies of interpretations, respectively). In the 
arguments against each of these, expressive limitations and, in particular, 
revenge problems, played a crucial role: the inability of paracompletism to 
express the notion of truth-value gap and the inability of hierarchical theories to 
express claims about the hierarchy as a whole are, in Priest’s view, devastating 
revenge problems. 
The second class of arguments concerned the paradoxes of set-theory. Again, 
considerations of expressive limitation loom large. Priest attacks the underlying 
motivation for the view that the cumulative hierarchy exhausts the universe of 
sets in a number of way. But chief among the objections to this picture is that, 
in order to avoid the paradoxes, the view must disallow certain totalities, such 
as the set of all sets, which seem required for a proper interpretation of our 
practices. For example, we seem to be able, in Category Theory, to carrying out 
operations on the totality of the sets, but the only way to treat this behaviour in 
accordance with the picture of the sets given by the cumulative hierarchy is to 
interpret it as being about some initial segment of the cumulative hierarchy, 
rather than the universe of sets itself. In other words, we have seem to have 
expressive abilities, exemplified in the work of category theorists, which, on 
pain of triviality, defenders of the cumulative hierarchy must deny.  
Finally I discussed Priest’s Inclosure Schema, which is an attempted 
characterisation of the underlying structure of the paradoxes. Though this is not 
directly related to revenge, in combination with the Principle of Uniform 
Solution, the Inclosure Schema promises to extend the reach of Priest’s 
arguments for dialetheism in the realm of the semantic paradoxes (especially, of 
course, revenge) much further afield. If he is right that the Inclosure Schema 
captures the root of the paradoxes, and the Principle of Uniform solution is 
correct, the problem of revenge may compel us to endorse dialetheism about a 
number of subjects, such as set theory, indefinitely extensible concepts, 
vagueness and perhaps others. 
It should be clear now that as far as the case for dialetheism arising from the 
paradoxes goes, the problem of revenge is of singular importance. Dialetheism is 
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argued to be the only available view of these paradoxes because it is the only 
view to avoid the problem of revenge. So long as dialetheism can be thought to 
avoid the problem of revenge, this argument is clearly powerful. But if, as I 
claim, dialetheism too suffers from revenge, the argument loses its bite. 
Arguably, dialetheism is no worse off as regards revenge than any other view 
since, (again, arguably) they all seem subject to the problem too. But, if we 
agree that accepting true contradictions is theoretically more costly than, say, 
accepting violations of the law of excluded middle, or stratifications of the truth 
predicate, as I suspect most philosophers (though Priest may be an exception) 
would, then if dialetheism is to remain a tenable view this extra burden must be 
borne elsewhere. I suspect many philosophers in this area think that this burden 
could only be met by immunity from the revenge problem and, if this can’t be 
had, dialetheism is untenable. This is not my view. Though I think it clear that a 
revenge problem is a blow to dialetheism (indeed, a serious one), I do not think 
dialetheism need be thought to stand or fall by revenge immunity. The set-
theoretic arguments given by Priest, for example, still stand, and may be the 
best way for dialetheism to be motivated, if they do face revenge. 
3.5 Priest’s Dialetheism 
This section describes Priest’s version of dialetheism. I begin with his account of 
truth and falsity, then present the semantics underlying his theory and finally 
discuss the view’s paraconsistent metatheory. As in 3.1, I follow Priest’s 
presentation of things closely. 
Priest begins his account of truth with a defence of the T-scheme (2006, p.55). 
As already discussed, one reason to accept the T-scheme is its important role in 
allowing generalisation. Another, according to Priest, is its importance for a 
theory of meaning. So long as one accepts Frege’s observation that to give the 
meaning of a sentence is to give its truth conditions, truth is obviously central to 
a theory of meaning. As Priest says, one might, as Davidson (1967) does, think 
that a theory of meaning is just a Tarski-type construction of the kind discussed 
above and that the meaning of α is given by the relevant instance of the T-
scheme, T<α> ↔ α. Alternatively, he suggests (citing Montague (1974), Lewis 
(1970) and Routley et al. (1982)), one might give truth conditions not in terms of 
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truth simpliciter, but truth-in-a-possible-world, where α’s meaning is given by 
the relevant instance: <α> is true in world w ↔ α, where α is parameterised to 
w. This is an instance of a more general scheme of which the T-scheme is the 
more specific case where w is taken to be the actual world. Even verificationists 
(See Dummett (1978)), who understand truth constructively, accept the T-
scheme and that it gives sentences their truth-conditions and, thereby, their 
meaning. So, Priest thinks, the T-scheme must hold for any meaningful 
sentence, since it is a necessary part of the specification of its meaning. 
Priest accepts that the T-scheme gives an extensional characterisation of truth, 
but thinks that it might provide more than this, depending on what we take its 
conditional to be. On the dialetheic semantic theory defended by Priest, the 
material conditional does not validate modus ponens. But the conditional in the 
T-scheme, Priest says, certainly seems to detach. So a dialetheist will need to 
add some other (intensional) conditional to their theory which supports 
detachment: what Priest calls a ‘genuine’ conditional. This gives us reason to 
hope, Priest thinks, that the T-scheme will provide more than a merely 
extensional account of truth. 
However, Priest thinks, there must be more to truth than the T-scheme alone, 
even with the conditional understood intensionally. The argument for this, which 
he attributes to Dummett (1978, p. xxi), is as follows. According to Priest, to 
give the meaning of a sentence is to give its truth-conditions, which are given 
for a sentence α by the relevant instance of the T-scheme, T<α> ↔ α. This being 
the case, Priest claims, this instance of the T-scheme cannot be thought to 
provide both the sense of α and α’s truth-conditions. He explains this by 
supposing that someone has no grasp either of truth or of the senses of the 
sentences of some language L. If all such a person knows of T, and of the senses 
of the sentences of L, is that all the instances of the T-scheme hold, then they 
are not in a position to infer anything about either. For example, he says, the T-
scheme would be satisfied if the sense of every sentence of L were its negation 
and T was taken to be a falsity-predicate. He illustrates with an example: 
consider a propositional language containing the connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬ and 
formulate its truth theory with every instance of T<p> ↔ p’ as an axiom (where 
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p’ is a translation into English of p, if L is not English, and simply p, if L is 
English) and the following recursive clauses for the connectives: 
T<α ∧ α> ↔ T<α> and T<α> 
T<α ∨ β> ↔ T<α> or T<β> 
T<¬α> ↔ it is not the case that T<α> 
Though, for this language, we can prove every instance of the T-scheme, we 
cannot, says Priest, take this to have determined the senses of the sentences of 
the language, or that T is a truth-predicate; for the theory is compatible with T 
being a falsity predicate for the language, with every atomic sentence having its 
negation as its sense, with ‘∧’ meaning ‘or’ and with ‘∨’ meaning ‘and’. Since 
meaning and truth are mutually dependent, he thinks, we can fix the nature of 
one and find out about the other, but if neither is fixed, no information about 
either is available. 
Hence, on Dummett’s view, endorsed by Priest, the truth definitions specifying 
when an arbitrary sentence of the language is true cannot simultaneously 
provide an account of the meaning of each sentence in the language, unless we 
already know what the purpose of the predicate, T, is supposed to be. So the T-
scheme on its own does not provide an adequate characterisation of truth. 
There are a couple of points here with which one might take issue. Firstly, the 
Dummettian argument Priest gives does not directly establish that there is more 
to truth than the T-scheme. If it is correct, it establishes that one cannot both 
take there to be nothing more to truth than the T-scheme and take meaning to 
be nothing more than giving truth conditions. So though Priest takes the upshot 
of the argument to be that there must be more to truth than the T-scheme, one 
might equally, without independent arguments to the contrary, take it to show 
that there is more to meaning than truth conditions; perhaps what’s required is 
a teleological account, not of truth, but of meaning. 
Secondly, the move from these considerations directly to the claim that what’s 
required for a grasp of meaning is an understanding of the purpose of the truth 
predicate is a non sequitur. At best what has been established is that something 
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extra is required in our characterisation of truth. Whether this is a 
characterisation of the purpose of the predicate (as in Priest’s teleological 
account described below) is a further claim that must be argued for. 
So, at the least, it seems that further argumentation is required here. But 
supposing this can be given, we now need an account of truth which goes beyond 
that offered by the T-scheme and which characterises the purpose of the truth 
predicate. Priest’s preferred account is what he calls the ‘Teleological Account’ 
of truth, and I turn to this now. 
3.5.1 The Teleological Account of Truth 
Priest’s view is that the purpose (telos) of assertion is to say something true and 
that this is the essential fact about truth missed by the T-scheme (2006, p.61). 
He attributes this view to Dummett ((1973), p.320) and also approvingly 
endorses Dummett’s analogy comparing assertion to the playing of a game, and 
of speaking the truth with winning. Merely knowing what counts as a winning 
position in, say, chess, without knowing that this position is what players of 
chess are aiming at, is insufficient for knowing what winning is. Similarly, 
according to Priest, merely knowing what it is that makes each sentence true is 
insufficient for grasping the nature of truth. We must also know that truth is the 
aim of assertion. 
He admits that this is not to say that every speaker aims all the time at speaking 
the truth, just as it may not always be the aim of every player of every game to 
win. Someone may assert with the intention of deceiving, or play a game with 
the intention of losing. Nonetheless, he thinks, this does not change the fact 
that the point of asserting and of playing games as such are, respectively, 
speaking the truth and winning. 
One reason he gives for thinking this is the way in which abstract theories of 
truth are tested (citing discussions by Davidsonians, and suggesting that similar 
tests would apply to Montague grammar). According to Priest, this is done (given 
that the meaning of α is supposed given by the instance of the T-scheme T<α> ↔ 
α) by seeing whether speakers are disposed to assert α “…when they may 
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reasonably be taken to believe that α’ (or at least may reasonably be taken to 
intend the hearer to believe (that they believe that) α’).”(2006, p.62).   
This, according to Priest establishes, or at least supports, the claim that “…it is 
the use to which the truth predicate is put, and in particular its connection with 
the things that speakers wish to or are prepared to assert, that completes its 
characterisation.” (2006, p.62). 
It’s not clear that the fact of the use of these techniques really helps Priest’s 
case. Firstly, is not normally taken to straightforwardly follow from the fact that 
something forms part of our method of finding out about a particular thing that 
it is thereby a part of the correct characterisation of that thing. No one but the 
most extreme instrumentalist thinks, for example, that an account of telescopes 
is an essential part of the proper characterisation of what it is to be a star. 
Secondly, what those testing theories of truth are aiming at is discovering 
whether natural language is such that the meaning of α is given by T<α> ↔ α. 
The most relevant piece of information, in this regard, is whether speakers’ 
actual linguistic practices, and the contents of their beliefs (and perhaps other 
cognitive states), are in accord with this; that is, whether speakers take α to be 
true if and only if they believe α. The best way of finding out whether this is the 
case is to look at speakers’ assertions as a guide to when they think ‘It’s true 
that α and, obviously, to consider only those cases where we may reasonably 
believe that the phonemes uttered are such that the ‘α’ within the scope of the 
truth-predicate is actually supposed to pick out α.  
Whether this is a reasonable way of testing the veracity of truth-conditional 
semantics is independent of whether the teleological account of truth is correct, 
and so the fact that this is the methodology used by Davidsonians to check 
theories of meaning provides no support to the teleological account of truth. 
This is partly evidenced by the fact that neither Davidson nor Davidsonians are 
themselves proponents of a teleological theory of truth. 
Another way one might object to Priest’s account (see Weir (2004)) is to deny 
that assertion has any telos at all: like any linguistic act, assertion is put to a 
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wide range of uses (to deceive, to amuse, to make money etc.) and there is no 
good reason to prefer one as fundamental. 
3.5.1.1 Falsity 
The most important part of Priest’s account of truth, from the point of view of 
revenge, is that he uses it to motivate an asymmetric treatment of truth and 
falsity and, in turn, to reject the principle that falsity entails untruth. This 
makes a significant difference to Priest’s position with respect to various 
revenge objections often thought to beset dialetheism, so I will now give an 
account of Priest’s views on the matter. 
As is standard, Priest defines falsity in terms of truth and negation via the 
following schema: 
F<α> ↔ T<¬α> 
He notes (2006, p.64) that with the obvious definition of negation as a sentential 
function taking a true sentence to a false one and vice versa, combined with the 
above definition of falsity, results in circularity. But he also points out that this 
problem is not unique to dialetheism: in general, negation and falsity are 
definable only in terms of one another. There are, however, general principles 
concerning the notions, on which Priest takes a view. Firstly, he accepts what he 
calls ‘exhaustion’, that untruth entails falsity: 
¬T<α> → F<α> 
He sees this principle as following from the teleological account of truth. In a 
two-player game, a draw is possible; but in a one-player game, one either 
succeeds in winning, or one fails. Assertion, according to Priest, is a one-player 
game. The goal of asserting is to speak truly and anything less than this is 
failure: there is “no third possibility” (2006, p.64).  
I find the principle that untruth entails falsity extremely compelling. 
Nonetheless, it’s unclear that Priest’s discussion here really motivates it. Firstly, 
when he talks of a “third possibility” here, what he has in mind is truth-value 
gaps. But if the existence of truth-value gaps are thought to motivate rejecting 
82 
 
the principle, then it is this, not the teleological account of truth, which is doing 
the work. The gappist could, after all, perfectly well accept the point that 
anything less than truth counts as ‘losing’ at assertion, but think that there are 
two ways to lose: by asserting a falsehood, or by asserting a gap. A similar point 
is made by Parsons (1990, p.342). 
But, in fact, it is not clear that admitting truth-value gaps need violate the 
principle at all. If we take gap theory to be committed to the claim that some 
sentences are neither true nor false, then the principle can be easily seen to 
fail. But there is an important reason for gappists to avoid putting their view in 
this way: it takes very little to demonstrate that it leads to inconsistency. But if 
it is not a consequence of a gappist theory that gap sentences are untrue, then 
there is no reason that I can see to reject the principle that the sentences which 
do receive the value untrue should also be false. In any case, to reject the 
principle is a further claim and one that a gappist need not endorse. On the 
other hand, is hardly a virtue of gappist theories that they cannot assert that 
sentences receiving the gap value fail to be true (since those sentences, 
plausibly, do fail to be true). 
In a brief discussion of the claims, related to my own, made by Parsons, Priest 
concedes the point that it his acceptance of the law of excluded middle plays an 
important role in the argument (2006, pp.267-268). But, he says, the argument 
is still significant, because it shows that there is nothing flowing just from 
considerations of assertion which distinguishes between the ways in which an 
assertion may fail: and so nothing “…for the distinction between α being false 
and α being neither true nor false to get a grip on.” (2006, p.267) It therefore 
raises a problem, he thinks, for gappist theories: they must find something which 
grounds the distinction between being false and being neither true nor false. He 
expresses scepticism that this can be done. 
Setting aside the concerns already mentioned about this way of putting the 
gappist view, this is a problematic point for Priest to be making. He goes on, as 
is important for his view, to defend the claim that there is an important 
difference between being false and being untrue. But if there is nothing in 
assertion to distinguish being false from being neither true nor false, then 
equally, there seems nothing in assertion to distinguish being false from being 
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untrue. Each seems to count merely as a failure, as far as Priest’s view goes, and 
the prospects for grounding the distinction elsewhere seem as good (or bad) as 
the gappist’s for grounding their distinction. I return briefly to this issue in the 
next section. 
3.5.1.2 Untruth 
Another principle one might expect to hold, which Priest calls ‘exclusion’, 
relates falsity with untruth: 
F<α> → ¬T<α> 
Priest rejects this principle (2006, pp. 70-72). One reason, he suggests, to think 
the principle holds is that it follows from the contraposed T-scheme combined 
with the transitivity of the conditional. This argument fails for Priest, since the 
conditional he takes to occur in the T-scheme does not contrapose. 
One reason he considers that it does not hold, at least for dialetheists, is that 
there are some things, viz. dialetheia, which are false but are also true, and so 
it we ought not to think falsity entails untruth. This argument, too, is 
unpersuasive, at least for Priest’s version of dialetheism since, as he says, if we 
have a sentence which is both true and false, exclusion delivers the result that 
the sentence is both true and untrue. But this sort of contradiction is perfectly 
acceptable by the lights of Priest’s dialetheism. There are also strengthened liar 
sentences, predicating untruth of themselves, which Priest accepts 
(independently of exclusion) are both true and untrue. So exclusion is not, as 
might be thought, incompatible with dialetheism, at least of the kind endorsed 
by Priest. 
Though contradictions of this sort are perfectly acceptable for Priest, one effect 
of accepting exclusion would be to turn every ‘internal’ contradiction (one 
which is true and false) into an external one (which is true and untrue). The 
main reason Priest gives for rejecting exclusion is that this feature of it 
multiplies contradictions beyond necessity which, he argues (2006, p.115), we 
should not do.  
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A thorough discussion of this methodological maxim is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, so I restrict myself to a few brief remarks. Firstly, accepting exclusion 
does not multiply contradictions in the sense of generating a new, external, kind 
of dialetheia, previously absent. As I have said, Priest already accepts that the 
strengthened liar is both true and untrue, independently of exclusion.  
Moreover, once we have one such sentence, we can generate infinitely many. So 
neither does exclusion multiply contradictions in the sense of increasing the 
cardinality of the set of external contradictions. 
One reason Priest gives for the principle is that dialetheia have a low statistical 
frequency (2006, p.116) and that this is, generally, though of course defeasibly, 
grounds for rejecting them (2006, p.102). But the statistical frequency of 
dialetheia will vary depending on the discourse (Priest asks us to do a ‘head-
count’ of randomly chosen assertions recently encountered, and suggests that if 
it’s high, we’ve been reading about dialetheism (2006, p.116)). But the effect of 
exclusion is to turn internal contradictions into external ones, and so the 
discourse we’re considering is, perhaps, semantics, or the metaphysics of 
change, and already granted to be rife with inconsistency. So, it seems to me, 
we have reason to be at least cautious of the maxim and the claim that it tells 
against exclusion. 
In any case, as above, the principle that contradictions not be multiplied is 
defeasible, and considerations in favour of exclusion may well be taken to 
outweigh the maxim, even if we take it to carry weight in this case. I mention 
two potential reasons in its favour. 
The first is that, without exclusion, the behaviour of untruth is seems 
problematically underdetermined. From the exhaustion principle, we know that 
anything untrue is thereby false, but we don’t have principles determining when 
a falsity is, additionally, untrue. For example, a strengthened liar sentence, L, 
predicating untruth of itself is accepted by Priest to be untrue. One would 
therefore expect, for example, the double-negation of L to also be untrue. But 
there is no way that I can see of showing this to be the case, on Priest’s view. 
Indeed, without any principle like exclusion, it is difficult to see what, in Priest’s 
theory, is determining the matter. 
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Since falsity is defined as truth of negation, the same point applies to the less-
discussed notion of lacking falsity which we might call ‘unfalsity’. For any 
sentence α which is unfalse, ¬T<¬α>, I see no way in general of obtaining the 
result that its double-negation, ¬T<¬¬¬α> is unfalse, and again, see nothing 
which determines whether this is so. These issues arise again in the context of 
my own revenge problem for Priest’s view. 
The second reason is, as mentioned above, that, if Priest’s account of truth is as 
the telos of assertion, and he wishes to defend that falsity and untruth are 
distinct, then it would be desirable for this asymmetry to be grounded in our 
practices of assertion (at least as he understands those practices). But, from the 
point-of-view of Priest’s characterisation of assertion, there is no difference 
between falsity and untruth, since both are just equally unsuccessful ways of 
failing to achieve the goal of speaking the truth. As I have said, Priest himself 
takes a sceptical view on whether such a distinction, in the case of gappists, can 
be grounded elsewhere. 
Priest accepts that the differences between falsity and untruth are “surprisingly 
little” (2006, p.71) and provides, as the only example of their distinctness, the 
following. The strengthened liar is both true and untrue. It follows that: 
∃x(T<x> ∧ ¬T<x>) 
But by the law of excluded middle (or at least an instance of it), ∀x(T<x> ∨ 
¬T<x>), the De Morgan equivalencies and the quantifier rules, it follows that: 
¬∃x(T<x> ∧ ¬T<x>) 
So there both are and are not truths which are untrue. In the case of falsity, it is 
certainly true (dialetheically) that ∃x(T<x> ∧ F<x>), but it is not (or at least not 
obviously) the case that ¬∃x(T<x> ∧ F<x>). So, Priest thinks, untruth is ‘more 
inconsistent’ than falsity. This seems true enough, as things stand, but it is 
clearly not the sort of difference which would ground a distinction between 
falsity and untruth sufficient to motivate rejecting exclusion. This is because the 
only reason that this difference between falsity and untruth exists is that 
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exclusion has already been taken to fail: if we add exclusion, falsity and untruth 
are logically equivalent and ¬∃x(T<x> ∧ F<x>) follows. 
3.5.2 Formal Semantics for Priest’s Dialetheism 
This section describes the formal semantics underlying Priest’s theory, beginning 
with the connectives Priest takes to be extensional, followed by the conditional, 
which he takes to be intensional. The presentation, in In Contradiction, of the 
semantics for Priest’s preferred logic, LP, treats an interpretation, as is 
standard, as a function from a formula to a set of truth values. However, Priest 
has revised his view and now treats an interpretation as a relation between a 
formula and a truth value. So in this section, I follow his presentation of the 
semantics given in his (2001, Section 8.2). 
3.5.2.1 Extensional Connectives 
Priest describes his semantics as follows (2001, pp.142-144): we consider, 
initially, a propositional language with the set of parameters, P, whose set of 
formulae, F, is the closure of P under ∧, ∨ and ¬. We can define a material 
conditional, α ⊃ β, by ¬α ∨ β. An evaluation is a relation, ρ, between a formula 
a truth value, ρ ⊆ P × {1,0}. With no restriction on ρ other than that every 
member of P be related at least one member of π, the recursive clauses for the 
connectives are as follows: 
(1a) ¬αρ1 iff αρ0 
(1b) ¬αρ0 iff αρ1 
(2a) (α ∧ β)ρ1 iff αρ1 and βρ1 
(2b) (α ∧ β)ρ0 iff αρ0 or βρ0 
(3a) (α ∨ β)ρ1 iff αρ1 or βρ1 
(3b) (α ∨ β)ρ0 iff αρ0 and βρ0 
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As Priest points out, these are essentially the conditions of classical semantics, 
except that in that case, the exclusivity of truth and falsity make the second 
condition of each pair redundant. 
We then define logical consequence as follows: If Σ ⊆ F and α ∈ F, then 
Σ ⊨ α iff for every interpretation, ρ, if βρ1, for all β ∈ Σ, then αρ1 
And logical truth as: 
⊨ α iff for every interpretation, ρ, αρ1 
Some important features of LP (refer to (2006, pp. 80-81) for proofs) are: 
1) ⊨ α iff α is a logical truth of classical logic 
2) If Σ ⊨ α then α is a classical consequence of Σ 
3) It is not the case that, if α is a classical consequence of Σ, Σ ⊨ α. 
Importantly, α ∧ ¬α ⊨ β fails, as does ¬α, α ∨ β ⊨ β 
The third fact is of particular importance for dialetheism, since the invalidity of 
these principles is required for avoidance of triviality, and is what makes the 
logic ‘paraconsistent’. 
We add quantifiers to the picture in the following way (2001, pp.467-469). An 
interpretation is a pair <D, v>, where D is the (non-empty) domain of 
quantification. For every constant term in the language c, v(c) ∈ D, for every n-
place predicate, P, v(P) is the pair <E,A>, where E and A are subsets of Dn and 
understood to be the extension and anti-extension of P, respectively. We can 
write these as vE(P) and vA(P), respectively. 
We can then introduce the relation, ρ, between formulae and truth-values 
recursively with the following conditions: 
Pα1…αnρ1 iff <v(α1),…,v(αn)> ∈ v
E(P) 
Pα1…αnρ0 iff <v(α1),…,v(αn)> ∈ v
A(P) 
The conditions for the connectives are the same as the propositional case above. 
The conditions for the quantifiers are: 
88 
 
∀xAρ 1 iff for all d ∈ D, Ax(kd)ρ1 
∀xAρ0 iff for some d ∈ D, Ax(kd)ρ0 
∃xA ρ1 iff for some d ∈ D, Ax(kd)ρ1 
∃xAρ0 iff for all d ∈ D, Ax(kd)ρ0  
Negation interacts with the quantifiers as follows: 
¬∀xAρ1 iff ∃x¬Aρ1 
¬∃xAρ1 iff ∀x¬Aρ1 
As in the propositional case, validity is defined as preservation of value 1: 
Σ ⊨ A iff in every interpretation where Bρ1 for all B ∈ Σ, Aρ1 
The following two constraints are available: 
Exclusion: for every m-place predicate, P, and d1,…,dm ∈ D, <d1,…,dm> ∉ v
E(P) ∩ 
vA(P) 
Exhaustion: for every m-place predicate, P, and d1,…,dm ∈ D, <d1,…,dm> ∈ v
E(P) 
∪ vA(P) 
If the first is imposed, but not the second, we obtain quantified K3. If we impose 
the Exhaustion but not Exclusion, we obtain quantified LP, as desired. If we 
impose both, classical logic results. 
3.5.2.2 Priest’s Conditional 
The logic just specified is LP. As already mentioned, we can define a material 
conditional for LP, ‘⊃’, such that ‘A ⊃ B’ is equivalent to ‘¬A ∨ B’. But with the 
conditional defined in this way, modus ponens, A ⊃ B ⊨ B, is equivalent to 
disjunctive syllogism, A ∨ B, ¬A ⊨ B, and disjunctive syllogism is invalid in LP, 
and so modus ponens is invalid in LP for a material conditional. There are two 
options here, for the dialetheist endorsing LP: they can either accept that modus 
ponens fails for the theory’s conditional, or they can add a conditional to the 
language which does satisfy modus ponens. 
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The first option, to accept the invalidity of modus ponens, has not proved 
attractive with dialetheists (though see Beall (2013)), for the obvious reason that 
modus ponens is not only essential to our reasoning, both theoretical and 
everyday, but seems an essential part of what a conditional is.  It does not seem 
unreasonable to insist that, if our definition of ‘→’ is such that modus ponens 
fails, then ‘→’ is not a conditional. Priest himself (2006, p.83) thinks it analytic 
of implication that it satisfies the principle. 
So Priest chooses the second option and introduces a conditional satisfying 
modus ponens into the language. Important constraints are placed on this 
account by Curry’s paradox. One way, which Priest favours, is to reject the 
principle of contraction: 
 α → (α → β) ⊨ α → β  
Which he puts in the form of the principle he calls ‘assertion’: 
((α ∧ (α → β)) → β   
 Priest characterises the paradox as arising from a sentence, C, equivalent to: 
T<C> → β  
The T-scheme instance for C gives us: 
(1) T<C> ↔ (T<C> → β) 
 Supposing assertion holds, then, by the substitutivity of equivalents: 
(2) (T<C> ∧ T<C>) → β  
And hence, by the properties of conjunction: 
(3) T<C> → β  
By (1) and modus ponens, T<C>, and, by (3) and modus ponens, β. Hence, 
according to Priest, any logic containing assertion is trivial. This is true, of 
course, only if the view in question also contains the other things involved in the 
proof of triviality, but certainly Priest’s view contains these principles, and so, 
for him (and many others), assertion will have to be avoided. 
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The conditional favoured by Priest is a strict, non-contraposable conditional. He 
augments the semantics already provided in the following way (2006, p.270-
273). An interpretation contains two disjoint sets of worlds, P and I, which are 
the logically possible worlds and the logically impossible worlds (the worlds at 
which the laws of logic differ from the actual), respectively. Validity is defined 
as truth preservation at the possible worlds. 
The conditions for the extensional connectives carry-over unchanged except that 
they are relativized to worlds. For example, the conditions for conjunction are 
now: 
(α ∧ β)ρw1 iff αρw1 and βρw1 
(α ∧ β)ρw0 iff αρw0 or βρw0 
Since the law of excluded middle is a law of logic, we add as a constraint on the 
logically possible worlds, P, (but not on the impossible worlds, whose laws may 
differ) that: 
(*) For all w ∈ P, αρw1 or αρw0 
The truth and falsity conditions for the conditional are now, where w ∈ P: 
(α → β)ρw1 iff for all x ∈ W, if αρx1, then βρx1 
(α → β)ρw0 iff for some x ∈ W, if αρx1, then βρx0 
These conditions make p → p a logical truth, but at impossible worlds, logical 
truths may be different. Priest’s preferred way to represent this (2006, p.271) is 
to invoke the ternary relation, R, on worlds of Routley/Meyer semantics. If w ∈ 
I, the truth/falsity conditions of the conditional are then: 
(α → β)ρw1 iff for all x,y ∈ W, such that Rwxy, if αρx1, then βρy1 
(α → β)ρw0 iff for some  x,y ∈ W, such that Rwxy, αρx1 and βρy0 
In fact, Priest takes these conditions to give the truth/falsity conditions for ‘→’ 
uniformly, but with the restriction on R that, if w ∈ P, then Rwxy holds iff x = y, 
we obtain the simplified conditions given previously (2006, p.271n25). These 
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conditions now explain how p → p can fail at impossible worlds: we consider a 
case where Rwxy and p holds at x, but not at y. 
We can also, Priest says, see how contraction fails: consider some w ∈ P, such 
that p → (p → q) holds at w, and Rwxy. Suppose x is some world such that p 
holds there and, hence, p → q holds there too. It does not follow that q also 
holds at x, since x might be an impossible world at which modus ponens fails. We 
can also see that the conditional fails to contrapose: consider some world w such 
that p → q holds at w, and Rwxy, and p is true only at x, but q is both true and 
false at x, so ¬q → ¬p fails to hold at w. This follows from the fact that it is not 
stipulated of the conditional that it preserve falsity backwards. 
Thus far, nothing in the above conditions ensures that excluded middle holds, 
though it is Priest’s view that it does. His preferred way of avoiding this problem 
(2006, p.272) is to add a principle he calls the ‘Augmentation Constraint’, 
according to which: 
AC: if α is neither true nor false at w, there are worlds, w0 and w1, such that [w] 
⊆ [w0] and [w] ⊆ [w1], α is false at w0, and true at w1 
Where [w] is understood as the set of all those things true at w. The principle, 
according to Priest, captures the thought that, for any world containing a truth-
value gap, that gap could be filled, either with a falsity or with a truth. So, for 
any world containing a gap, there exist worlds, essentially the same, but with 
the gap filled with a truth/falsity. For example, if there were some world w, at 
which p → q were neither true nor false, then there would be some other world 
at which p is true (only), but q is neither true nor false. But then, by AC, there 
will be some further world at which p is true (only), but q is false and, hence, p 
→ q is false (not neither true nor false) at w after all. 
Priest notes that whether AC holds given the specification of an arbitrary 
interpretation is not, in general, effectively checkable. Though, “[w]hether 
there are conditions on the components of an interpretation that are necessary 
and sufficient to realise the constraint, and which can be effectively checked, is 
not, at the time of writing, known” (2006, p.272). One thing to which we can 
appeal, however, is the existence of the trivial world, w⊥. At w⊥, everything is 
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both true and false, and the only instance of R into which w⊥ enters is Rw⊥w⊥w⊥. 
For any world, w, and any propositional parameter, α, w⊥ plays the role of both 
w0 and w1. On the effects of the trivial world, w⊥, Priest says, “The presence of 
w⊥ has a very strong effect on conditionals at possible worlds: they are all at 
least false; but the behaviour of negated conditionals is often not very 
important.” (2006, p.273) 
So, for any possible world, w, and any propositional parameters p and q, p is 
true at w⊥ and q is false at w⊥, and so p → q is false at w. So, in fact, every 
formula containing a conditional, at every possible world, including the actual, 
is false. All dialetheists accept that at least some things are both true and false, 
and almost all reject trivialism (though, for the one exception of which I am 
aware, see Kabay (2010)). Between these two, there is room for reasonable 
disagreement about how much inconsistency is too much. But it seems to me the 
conclusion that every conditional expression (at least, every expression 
containing the conditional above) is false is a very radical one indeed, and that 
it deserves serious discussion, and some explanation. It certainly doesn’t seem 
that every true conditional is a true contradiction, nor does it seem that this 
being so follows obviously from dialetheism, so that its denial might be thought 
to arise from a question-begging refusal to take dialetheism seriously. The claim 
that the behaviour of negated conditionals is often not important is, even if 
granted, insufficient, since the behaviour of negated conditionals often is quite 
important too. 
One problem for Priest which arises from this is that it puts pressure on his 
account of classical recapture. It’s clear that some instances of, for example, 
disjunctive syllogism, are perfectly legitimate. If I know that someone is either 
in the park or the pub and discover that they are not in the pub, I am entitled to 
conclude that they are in the park. Priest agrees and proposes that the way for a 
dialetheist to account for this is to defend the legitimacy of reasoning by the 
(strictly invalid) disjunctive syllogism in consistent contexts (this is the goal of 
(2006), Chapter 8). Part of this account rests on the improbability of dialetheia, 
which “…appear to occur in a quite limited number of domains: certain logico-
mathematical contexts, certain legal and dialectical contexts (which I will 
discuss in Part Three), and maybe a few others.” (2006, p. 116) 
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But if every conditional is false and, hence, every true conditional is a 
dialetheia, this is no longer true. Dialetheia appear in every context in which 
conditionals occur and so occur with very great frequency in almost every 
discourse. This might be thought unfair, since it is not Priest’s view that the 
logical conditional specified above is the conditional ‘if…then…’ in English (2006, 
p.273n29). Perhaps, then, the logical conditional and its inconsistency occur less 
frequently than might be thought, though some case ought to be made to this 
effect. 
Priest’s preferred account of the conditional in English is as a relevant ceteris 
paribus conditional (as specified in his ((2001), pp.84-85). Very roughly, on this 
view, A → B is true (at a world) just if, at every (accessible) world at which A ∧ 
CA holds (where CA is an open-ended set of ceteris paribus conditions), B also 
holds. Whatever the ceteris paribus conditions require will trivially be satisfied 
at the trivial world and so, for any world w at which the trivial world is 
accessible, A ∧ CA will hold, but B will fail to hold, at the trivial world, and so A 
→ B will be false at w. Whether the trivial world is accessible from the actual 
may depend, for example, on the restrictions placed on the accessibility 
relation: it will be accessible if, for example, the relation is reflexive, 
symmetric and transitive; but it may not be if the relation is weaker, though this 
has other costs. In any case, the trivial model at least threatens to falsify every 
such conditional at the actual world. This being the case, some account of which 
conditionals are falsified by the trivial model, why we should think this is 
acceptable and the extent to which this affects, for example, classical 
recapture, seems important. 
Some facts (the first of which has already been noted above) which hold of 
Priest’s conditional4 (2006, p.86-87) are: 
1. ⊨ α → α 
2. ⊨ α ↔ ¬¬α    
                                                          
4
 In Priest’s original (2006, pp.86-87) presents these in two distinct lists. The first is originally given as a list 
of principles holding of an entailment connective, of which another condition, contraposability, also holds. 
Since this doesn’t hold of Priest’s strict conditional, but the rest do, they are presented without the 
contraposability condition. On the second list, the condition {α ↔ β} ⊨ δ ↔ δ(α/β), where δ(α/β) is δ with 
any subformula α replaced by β, appears (again concerning entailment), though I omit it since it may fail for 
the strict conditional in cases where δ contains a negation. 
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3. ⊨ (α ∧ β) → α 
4. ⊨ α → (α ∨ β) 
5. ⊨ (α ∧ (β ∨ γ)) iff ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)  
6. ⊨ ((α ∧ β) ∧ (α ∧ γ)) → (α → γ) 
7. ⊨ ((α → β) ∧ (α → γ)) → (α → (β ∧ γ)) 
8. ⊨ ((α → γ) ∧ (β → γ)) → ((α ∨ β) → γ) 
9. {α, β} ⊨ α ∧ β 
10. {α, α → β} ⊨ β  
11. {α ∧ ¬β} ⊨ ¬(α → β) 
12. {α → β} ⊨ (γ → α) → (γ → β) 
13. {α → β} ⊨ (β → γ) → (α → γ) 
14. {α → ¬α} ⊨ ¬α 
Now that the semantics for the conditional are fully specified, a slightly 
modified (constant domain) semantics for quantification and the identity 
predicate are added. The details can be found in ((2006) pp.92-93 and p.273). 
Now that the account of the semantics of Priest’s theory has been specified, I 
turn to Priest’s paraconsistent metatheory. 
3.5.3 Paraconsistent Set Theory 
As has already been said, perhaps the most important feature of Priest’s theory, 
from the point-of-view concerned with revenge, is that it is taken to be 
characterised in dialetheic terms. That is, Priest’s inconsistent theory is 
characterised in a paraconsistent (indeed, inconsistent) metatheory. This allows 
Priest to dispose of the object-theory-metatheory distinction as a significant 
distinction, and for the object language to describe its own semantics. 
The effect of this, apart from the attractive consequence that the object theory 
(mirroring natural language) is able to describe its own semantics, is to block the 
argument for what I have called ‘formal revenge’. The revenge problem is, in 
essence, the problem that a theory subject to the problem is unable to express 
some notion, expressible in natural language, due to certain extended liar-type 
paradoxes. The theory is therefore inadequate as a characterisation of how 
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natural language is not trivialised by the paradoxes, since natural language 
possesses the expressive powers the theory in question lacks. The formal version 
of this problem arises when we construct a notion in the account’s metatheory 
which, were it expressible in the object theory, would result in the account’s 
triviality. Since natural language contains this metatheory, the notion is a 
fortiori, expressible in natural language, though not in the account’s object 
language, and we have a revenge problem. 
Since, on Priest’s account, the object language describes gives its own 
metatheory, anything expressible in the metatheory is, a fortiori, expressible in 
the object theory. The attempt to get formal revenge on Priest’s theory, then, is 
just, in effect, the attempt to find a triviality proof for his theory. The prospects 
for this do not look terribly promising. 
This, as we shall see, still leaves open the possibility of developing what I have 
called an ‘informal revenge’ problem for Priest’s dialetheism. That is, we find 
some notion dialetheists use in their informal characterisation their view (and 
which they are thereby committed to the legitimacy of) and demonstrate that, 
due to certain revenge paradoxes, it cannot be expressed in the dialetheist’s 
object theory. 
If Priest’s metatheory is to be paraconsistent, then it must be characterised in 
paraconsistent set theory. Priest discusses three possible strategies for 
developing paraconsistent set theory: The Material Strategy, The Relevant 
Strategy and The Model-Theoretic Strategy. Again, this discussion follows Priests 
(2006) closely, particularly Chapter 18. 
As might be guessed from Priest’s views on the set-theoretic paradoxes, 
discussed in, one thing common to each of the approaches he discusses to 
paraconsistent set theory is that they each contain: 
(Abs) ∃y∀x (x ∈ y ↔ α) 
(Ext) ∀x(x ∈ z ↔ x ∈ y) → z = y 
Priest endorses the further restriction that x not occur free in α (2006, p.248), 
though notes that this is optional (citing Routley (1980, p. 924 f.) as showing 
that the system proves choice and Brady (1989) as demonstrating its non-
96 
 
triviality). As Priest says, paraconsistent set theory must find a balance between 
being too strong (proving triviality) and being too weak (so as not to be able to 
capture at least some reasonable amount of standard set theory). One important 
issue here concerns the conditional. If the conditional satisfies both modus 
ponens and contraction, then Curry’s paradox delivers triviality (along with some 
other assumptions, like the standard structural rules). So the details of the 
conditional employed in the theory will be of particular importance. 
One option is to employ a material conditional. On Priest’s view (2006, p.249), 
this would involve employing the logic LP characterised earlier, but without the 
addition of a genuine conditional. Instead, on this strategy, the conditional is 
material, with α ⊃ β defined as ¬α ∨ β. Since, in LP, modus ponens fails for the 
material conditional (because modus ponens is equivalent to disjunctive 
syllogism, which must fail), this avoids Curry’s paradox. 
Priest points out (citing Restall (1992) for the details) that this system is non-
trivial, validates all the axioms of ZF which are instances of (Abs), the Axiom of 
Infinity, but not the Axiom of Foundation and proves the existence of a universal 
set. What else is proved by the system (especially interesting theorems 
established in ZF) is, according to Priest, unknown, but the prospects do not look 
good. The importance of modus ponens to mathematical reason is enormous and 
its invalidity, on this strategy, is “a singular handicap” (2006, p.249). 
He is slightly more hopeful that more can be established in the non-monotonic 
extension of LP, LPm (described in (2006, Chapter 16)). According to Priest 
(2006, p.251), it was not known at the time of his writing how much can be 
established in this way, and as far as I am aware, the situation has not changed. 
Since the approach still lacks a detachable conditional, we should be 
pessimistic. 
According to Priest, another, more plausible option, is to carry out 
paraconsistent set theory in a logic containing a conditional which obeys modus 
ponens, but for which contraction fails. In particular, he suggests a ‘depth 
relevant’ logic, for which he provides a tableau system (2006, pp.251-255), and 
discusses the prospects for developing set theory in this logic.  
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Since the publication of these remarks in the second edition of In Contradiction, 
significant progress had been made on this strategy. In particular, Zach Weber 
has developed paraconsistent set theory using a relevant logic, and has proved a 
number of interesting results, including the Axiom of Choice, Cantor’s Theorem, 
the existence of large cardinals, the falsity of the Continuum Hypothesis as well 
as the main results of ordinal and cardinal arithmetic ((2010a), (2010b) and 
(2012)). 
The logic employed by Weber is not the same as that employed by Priest (one 
difference is that Weber’s conditional is contraposable ((Weber) 2013, p.316)), 
but this still makes the relevant strategy a very promising option for a 
dialetheist development of set theory, though work on it is still in its early 
stages. 
A further option returns to the theory of the material strategy, but rather than 
attempting to prove results directly in the theory, using the (non-detachable) 
material conditional, we construct models of the theory, which we call M. There 
are a number of models of the theory, many of which, Priest points out, are 
pathological e.g. the model containing a single set which both is and is not a 
member of itself. 
More interesting models of the theory can be constructed using the Collapsing 
Lemma (details of exactly how these are constructed can be found in (2006, 
p.227 and pp.256-258)). Priest’s preferred model is ℳ⁻, which contains an initial 
segment of the cumulative hierarchy, Vξ, up to some inaccessible ξ, as well as a 
single inconsistent set [a]. The interesting features of ℳ ⁻ from Priest’s point of 
view are, firstly, that it is a model of naïve set theory (in particular, M), 
secondly, that it is, by the Collapsing Lemma, a model of ZF and, finally, that 
with quantifiers restricted to Vξ , any theorem of ZF holds in ℳ ⁻ and, so, it 
contains an initial segment of ZF as a consistent inner model. 
Priest says “We may therefore suppose that the true interpretation of the 
language of set theory has these properties…And to return, at last, to the 
question of what to make of the theorems of orthodox set theory, ZF, on this 
approach. The answer is obvious. Since the universe of sets is a model of ZF (as 
well as naive set theory), these hold in it. We may therefore establish things in 
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ZF in the standard classical way, knowing that they are perfectly acceptable 
from a paraconsistent perspective.” (2006, pp.257-258) 
So, on the model-theoretic strategy for paraconsistent set theory, we 
demonstrate that there exists a model of both ZF and our paraconsistent set 
theory, M, and, on that basis, we conclude that everything true on ZF is true on 
the universe of sets, materially construed by M. The advantage this has over the 
material strategy, where we try to prove things directly in M without a proper 
conditional, is that, in addition to the small number of results obtainable in M, 
we gain all the extra results about the universe of sets provided by ZF. 
There are a number of problems with this approach. One is that we are not, in 
general, entitled to conclude on the basis of the existence of a model of two 
theories, in this case ZF and M, that everything true on one, ZF, is true on the 
other, M. We are not, for example, entitled to conclude that the Continuum 
Hypothesis is true according to ZFC, on the basis of Gödel’s results that there 
are models of ZFC + CH. Or, as Weir (2004, p.398) puts the objection, the 
existence of a model of ZFU (ZF with urelements) in which Scotland wins the 
world cup does not entail that ZFU shows Scotland will win the world cup. So it 
doesn’t seem that Priest is entitled to conclude that M contains all the truths of 
ZF, and, if not, this undermines the model-theoretic strategy. 
A second problem is that the model-theoretic strategy employs the wrong logic. 
As Priest himself says “If the paraconsistent strategy for set theory is to be 
anything more than an intellectual exercise, the underlying logic used must, in 
some sense, be the right one for reasoning about sets.” (2006, p.258) Priest is 
not a logical pluralist: he has argued in a number of places, correctly in my 
view, that logic is universal, and validity is to be defined as preservation of truth 
in all situations (for example, in his (2008) and Chapter 12 of his (2005). He has 
also, as discussed in Section 3.0, defended as the correct logic, LP with the 
addition of a relevant conditional. If he is right, this is the correct logic for 
reasoning in any situation and, in particular, it is the correct logic for reasoning 
about the sets: all its inferences are truth-preserving in set-theory, as 
everywhere else, and we ought to expect the relevant strategy to be executable 
in this logic. But this is not the logic employed on the model-theoretic strategy, 
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and so, on the model-theoretic strategy, the underlying logic is not the right one 
for reasoning about sets. 
Priest might respond that LP without a conditional is a sub-logic of the one he 
takes to be correct (LP with the addition of a suitable conditional). This is true, 
but it’s not clear that it helps. The correct logic, we’re supposing, is LP plus a 
conditional and, if so, all the valid inferences of that logic should be valid when 
reasoning about sets. So, if Priest is right about the correct logic, we should be 
able to reason about sets using all of it, including with a proper conditional, 
rather than being restricted to a conditional-free sub-logic. 
Another problem for this approach is that it is highly incomplete. As far as we 
know, we cannot establish directly in M anything like enough results for an 
adequate account of the universe of sets. Setting aside the objections above, 
the model-theoretic strategy promises to add to these results all the truths 
establishable in ZF. But this is not enough. Inconsistent naïve set theory goes far 
beyond what can be characterised in ZF: importantly, it contains universe-sized 
sets (indeed, the set of such sets is itself universe-sized). But the model-
theoretic strategy has almost nothing to say about this vast part of the universe 
because, if something cannot be established in ZF (and then appropriated by M), 
it must be established in M directly, without a conditional satisfying modus 
ponens. So given the paucity of results establishable in this way, a crucial, and 
exceedingly large, part of the universe of sets is woefully under-described.  
3.5.4 Paraconsistent Metatheory 
Priest considers an objection to dialetheism that dialetheism requires a 
metatheory in which its semantics and proof systems are characterised and in 
which important results such as soundness and completeness can be proved. The 
only available metatheory, so the objection goes, is classical logic and so 
paraconsistent logic is incorrect (Priest, 2006, p.258). 
His response to the objection is to deny that a classical metatheory is the only 
available. Instead, we should take paraconsistent set theory to be our 
metatheory. He points out that whether model theory can be adequately 
characterised on the relevant strategy for set theory, as outlined above, is an 
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open question (though he wrote this before Weber’s results had been 
established, so may now be more hopeful on this point). Instead, he suggests, 
that we employ the model-theoretic strategy, carry out our metatheory in ZF, 
then simply appropriate the results into our paraconsistent set theory, M. 
The objection he considers is not, it seems to me, characterised as well as it 
might be. Paraconsistent logic is not a logic but a family of logics, unified by the 
fact that, in those logics, the principle of explosion is invalid. The demand 
merely that paraconsistent logics be given paraconsistent metatheories, in light 
of this, is too weak on its own. For example, it would be far too weak a 
constraint on non-paraconsistent logics that they must have as their metatheory 
a non-paraconsistent logic, since this would allow paracomplete views to employ 
a classical metatheory with impunity. Rather, the constraint ought to be that a 
paraconsistent logic should have its metatheory carried out in the very same 
logic. A logic pluralist might reject this constraint, claiming that different logics 
can be true of different domains, none is uniquely correct and, perhaps, two 
such differing domains, requiring different logics, are the object theory and the 
metatheory. They would, of course, have to independently motivate this 
difference in treatment in these particular cases. But, as above, Priest is not a 
logical pluralist and so, it seems to me, has no reason to reject the constraint. 
Whatever the correct logic, it is the correct logic in every situation, including 
the logic’s own metatheory. In light of this, the model-theoretic strategy cannot 
be employed in giving Priest’s paraconsistent metatheory. This is, of course, 
much the same objection raised against the model-theoretic strategy in the 
context of set-theory itself. 
Another problem with the model-theoretic strategy, which is particular to its 
being employed metatheoretically, concerns the definition of validity. Priest 
defines validity here (simplifying to the one-premise case) such that and 
inference from α to β is valid just if 
Val  for every interpretation, I (I ⊩α ⊃ I ⊩ β) 
The ‘⊃’ here is the material conditional which, as noted, does not detach. In 
fact, calling ‘⊃’ the material conditional is slightly contentious, since, as Priest 
himself has noted, “[a]ny conditional worth its salt,→, should satisfy the modus 
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ponens principle: {α, α → β}⊨β. This is, indeed, analytically part of what 
implication is.”(2006, p.83) So, by Priest’s own light, ‘⊃’ is not a conditional at 
all. Moreover, he also notes “[f]or exactly the same reason, its necessitation is 
not the entailment connective either. Let α be some paradoxical sentence, 
which is not only a dialetheia, but necessarily so (such as the liar sentence). 
Then, for any β, ¬α ∨ β is not only true, but necessarily so. This helps not a whit 
in inferring β from α.” (2006, p.83) 
This seems quite right, and so it is peculiar, and problematic, that Priest is now 
characterising validity using this very ‘conditional’, of which he has previously 
said “… dialetheism disposes, once and for all” (2006, p.83). Priest anticipates 
an objection to this, according to which defining validity in this way “deprives 
the notion of validity of its punch” (2006, p.259). He claims that it does not, and 
gives two reasons why. The first is that, though modus ponens is strictly invalid, 
it is perfectly usable, if the situation is consistent. So we may detach the 
conclusion of a valid argument, so long as the premises are true and consistent 
(which, in this context, means that we don’t have both I ⊩ α and I ⊮ α, which 
I’ll call ‘externally inconsistent’ premises, which is different from the ‘internally 
inconsistent’  I ⊩ α and I ⊩ ¬α). The second is that, whether characterised 
relevantly or materially, the conditional in Val is simply a true or false 
statement, whereas inference is an action, to which no number of true 
statements is equivalent (this, he says, is the moral of Lewis Carroll’s dialogue 
between Achilles and the Tortoise (1895)). Still, the statements may ground the 
action, but there is no reason, Priest thinks, that statements containing material 
conditionals may not do this every bit as much as those containing relevant 
conditionals; it is just that relevant conditionals always ground the action, but 
material conditionals only sometimes. 
It’s unclear exactly what is the content of the objection to which Priest is 
responding, or what exactly ‘depriving validity of its punch’ amounts to. But, it 
seems to me, there are two problems with this account, neither of which is 
addressed either by Priest’s references to his views on classical recapture, or to 
the moral of Carroll’s dialogue. The first is that, even granting Priest’s account 
of classical recapture and that we can happily detach the consequent in 
externally consistent cases, we still can’t do so in externally inconsistent cases. 
102 
 
The effect of this is that we simply cannot reason from externally inconsistent 
premises. If the premises are such that we have I ⊩ α and I ⊮ α, then we can 
never obtain the truth conclusion, whatever it is. This is a significant limitation 
for a dialetheist. There is nothing illegitimate, by the dialetheists lights, about 
such contradictions, and as such, we should expect to be able to reason about 
them, and to discuss what truths follow from them (as some things clearly must: 
to take the most trivial example, presumably they follow from themselves). But 
we cannot do this, and so the material definition of validity is inadequate. 
A second problem, alluded to above, is that detachment is analytically part of 
what validity is, and so Val cannot be a definition of validity, if it is understood 
materially. Priest accepts that detachment is a “sine qua non of any implication 
connective” (2006, p.86), in which he includes the entailment connective 
expressing what follows logically from what. But the definition of validity simply 
tells us under what conditions the conclusion of an argument follows logically 
from its premises. So, if it is a sine qua non of any implication connective, 
including entailment, that it detach, it should be a sine qua non of validity that 
the conclusion of a valid argument can be detached when the premises are true. 
At the very least we need some account making sense of this asymmetry. I am 
doubtful that any plausible account vindicating the difference can be given, and 
in its absence, we should conclude that non-detachable validity is not validity at 
all. 
A related problem is that each of the logical connectives, ∧, ∨, ¬, →, plausibly, 
obeys principles which are, at least in part, constitutive of the meaning of the 
connectives in question. For example, it is part of what conjunction is that, 
whenever we have {A, B} true, we also have the truth of A ∧ B. But if the truth 
of the premises of a valid argument does not, in general, allow us to obtain the 
truth of its conclusion, this is no longer so. There are infinitely many A’s and B’s 
such that we have {A, B}, but cannot conclude that A ∧ B  is true. So, if validity 
doesn’t always deliver the truth of the conclusion, given the truth of the 
premises of a valid argument, then not only don’t we have a notion of validity, 
we don’t have a proper conjunction, or any other of the connectives, either. 
In sum, the model-theoretic strategy faces decisive objections, both as an 
approach to set theory and, more specifically, as a metatheory for dialetheism. 
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The relevant strategy is more promising. Set theory, carried out in a relevant 
logic, is still in its infancy, and it remains to be seen whether it can be 
developed into a fully-fledged account of the sets comparable with set-theory 
classically-understood, but Weber’s results give us some reason to be hopeful. 
3.6 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter was about metatheoretically paraconsistent dialetheism, especially 
the version defended by Graham Priest in his (2006). He motivates his view in a 
negative way by attempting to rule-out the alternatives to dialetheism. The 
most important arguments against opposing accounts of the paradoxes was the 
problem of revenge, though there were other arguments too (importantly, those 
concerning set theory). One issue, of crucial importance for revenge, is the 
metatheory of the view. This is, on the version of dialetheism under discussion, 
paraconsistent (indeed, inconsistent) set theory. Priest gives a few strategies by 
which this might be carried out. I have argued against two of these, and 
suggested that the most promising is the so-called ‘relevant strategy’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
Chapter 4: Getting Revenge on Metatheoretically 
Paraconsistent Dialetheism 
4.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter characterised a thoroughgoing version of dialetheism 
whose metatheory is paraconsistent (indeed, inconsistent) set theory. The only 
philosopher who has a thoroughly developed version of this view is, to my 
knowledge, Graham Priest, and so the chapter focused on the view as developed 
by Priest (principally in his book, In Contradiction (2006)). 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the sort of thoroughgoing dialetheism 
defended by Priest is subject to a revenge problem. Showing that this is the case 
is not easy. As mentioned in the previous chapter the fact that Priest’s object 
language gives its own, inconsistent, metatheory, makes it very resilient against 
standard strategies for revenge. As I said, the attempt to get formal revenge on 
the theory i.e. to show that we can construct notions in its metatheory which 
would trivialise in the object theory, is collapsed into the attempt to 
demonstrate the triviality of the theory as a whole. The prospects for this do not 
look good. 
The possibility of developing what I call an ‘informal revenge’ problem, 
however, is still a live one, and this is the strategy pursued in this chapter. We 
show that a view suffers an informal revenge problem by demonstrating that 
there are certain notions which appear in dialetheists’ informal characterisation 
of their view which cannot be expressed in the dialetheist’s theory. We prefer 
notions which appear in the dialetheist’s characterisation of their view, since 
the dialetheist is thereby committed to the legitimacy of the notion, and cannot 
simply dismiss it as incoherent. 
A number of attempts have been made at showing dialetheist suffer expressive 
limitations, and I discuss some in this chapter, with a particular focus on the one 
which seems most closely-related to my own: the so-called ‘just false’ problem. 
First, I discuss attempts to demonstrate that dialetheists are unable to express 
each of a cluster of notions involved in the characterisation of ‘normal’ 
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sentences: that is, sentences, or sets thereof, which are not of the kind 
dialetheists treat inconsistently. I also discuss some responses to these 
problems, especially Priest’s ((2006), (2010a)). 
Then, I develop my own revenge problem, which concerns the notions ‘invalid’ 
and ‘just invalid’. First, I show that one feature of the dialetheist’s 
paraconsistent metatheory is that it commits them to dialetheism, not just 
about truth, but about validity: that is some inferences will be both valid and 
invalid. I will argue that the extent of the overlap between the valid and the 
invalid inference principles is so great as to rob dialetheists of the ability to 
express invalidity. The exact extent of the overlap may well depend on the 
details of the dialetheist’s view: in particular, the behaviour of the truth, and of 
the conditional. On some views, the conclusion that every inference principle is 
invalid is easy to establish; not so on others. I discuss these in turn. 
Once the view that some contradictions are true was introduced, it became 
important to be able to express the status of the other ‘normal’ sentences, for 
example, the ‘just false’ sentences. Similarly, if validity is shown to be 
inconsistent, and some inference principles both valid and invalid, we ought to 
be able to express the status of the principles which are ‘just invalid’. But, as I 
point out, on the obvious ways of characterising the notion, ‘just invalid’ is 
equivalent to invalid. Moreover, a necessary condition on characterising a notion 
of ‘just invalid’ for which this is not the case is characterising a notion of ‘just 
false’ which behaves consistently. The revenge problem, then, is that both 
‘invalid’ and ‘just invalid’ overlap so thoroughly with notions like ‘valid’ and 
‘inference principle’ that they are deprived of their meaning. For versions of 
dialetheism for which the stronger result can be established that every inference 
principle whatever is invalid (which may yet be all available views), then 
‘inference principle’, ‘invalid’ and ‘just invalid’ are logically equivalent notions. 
I consider some possible responses to this problem on behalf of dialetheism and 
argue that they are inadequate. 
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4.1 Revenge, Just False and Non-Dialetheia 
Dialetheists admit that there exist true contradictions but, as non-trivialists, 
they take these dialetheia to be the exception: most sentences are not like this. 
But dialetheists seem to run into expressive difficulties when trying to classify 
the ‘normal’ sentences as such. The reason for this is that the cluster of notions 
one would wish to employ in these characterisations turn out to be inconsistent. 
This has been developed into an objection to dialetheism by a number of 
philosophers (for example, Batens (1990), Parsons (1990), Littman and Simmons 
(2004), but the objection is best presented, it seems to me, by Shapiro (2004), 
and so I draw on Shapiro’s characterisation of the problem in what follows.  
Shapiro argues that dialetheists cannot express the notions ‘just true’ (though he 
calls this ‘simple truth’), ‘just false’ (though he calls this ‘simple falsity’), ‘non-
dialetheia’, consistency and, relatedly, they cannot express disagreement. The 
reasons for each are, in essence, the same: it seems part of the meaning of 
these notions that they behave consistently, or, at the least, not too 
inconsistently. In this chapter, I discuss two of these notions, ‘just false’ and 
‘non-dialetheia’, the reasons we might think they are inexpressible for 
dialetheists and some dialetheist responses to the problems. I discuss these two 
only since they relate most closely to my own revenge problem, and so best help 
illustrate it, and because the arguments concerning the others are similar 
enough that these should be sufficient to illustrate the general problem. 
One very simple way of characterising dialetheism (of the non-trivialist variety) 
is as the view that some statements are both true and false, some are just true 
and some are just false. Claims of this kind appear with great frequency in 
descriptions of dialetheism, by dialetheists as well as others. So dialetheists 
ought to be able to express the notions involved in such claims, especially ‘just 
true’ and ‘just false’. As I have said, I focus here on the latter notion (though 
much the same things are true of the former). We take the obvious definition of 
‘just false’ as ‘false and not true’, as Priest does (for example in his (2010a), 
p.137, though he endorses this in a number of other places too). 
We can see that the notion of ‘just false’, defined in the obvious way, is 
inconsistent by considering the following sentence, Σ, equivalent to: 
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F<Σ> ∧ ¬T<Σ> 
Intuitively, this sentence says of itself that it is just false. We can derive 
contradiction from Σ in much the same way as with the strengthened liar 
sentence: 
 
(1) T<Σ>    (suppose for reductio) 
(2) Σ    (1, T-scheme) 
(3) F<Σ> ∧ ¬T<Σ>  (2, substituting equivalents) 
(4) ¬T<Σ>    (3, ∧-elimination) 
(5) ¬T<Σ>    (1, 4, reductio) 
(6) F<Σ>    (5, exhaustion) 
(7) F<Σ> ∧ ¬T<Σ>  (5, 6, ∧-introduction) 
(8) Σ    (7, substituting equivalents) 
(9) T<Σ>    (8, T-scheme) 
(10) T<Σ> ∧ (F<Σ> ∧ ¬T<Σ>) (7, 9, ∧-introduction) 
So Σ is both true and just false, and so the notion ‘just false’, defined in this 
way, is inconsistent. In fact, matters are simpler than this. Though it is not 
Priest’s view, a number of other philosophers (for example, Field (2008) and 
Beall (2009)) have endorsed the view that the T-scheme should be fully 
transparent and, hence, contraposable;  so (on the assumption that falsity is 
defined as truth of negation) F<α > ↔ ¬T<α> holds. On this view, take a 
sentence, α, and suppose it is false, so we have F<α>. Given the properties of 
the T-scheme just mentioned (in particular, what Priest calls ‘exclusion’), we 
have ¬T<α>, and so F<α> ∧ ¬T<α>. So, on the assumption that α is false, α is 
just false. Since, obviously, the converse also follows, ‘false’ and ‘just false’ are 
equivalent, on this view. So every falsehood is just false, including every 
dialetheia. So, paraphrasing Shapiro (2004, p.342), saying that something is just 
false says no more than that it is false: the ‘just’ comes for free and adds 
nothing. 
Since, on this version of dialetheism, ‘just false’ makes no distinction between 
dialetheia and the non-dialetheia we wish to pick out, it fails to capture what 
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we want when we utter expressions like ‘Some sentences are both true and 
false, some are just true and some are just false’. For all the distinction drawn, 
we may as well have said ‘Some sentences are both true and false, some are 
true and some are false’, which is not at all what was intended. 
Priest responds on behalf of this variety of dialetheism that “…this objection is 
entirely question-begging. If one does subscribe to the exclusion scheme, there 
is no distinction—nor, therefore any work to be done to draw it.” (2006, pp.292-
293) I disagree that the objection is question-begging. There certainly seems to 
be a difference between ‘false’ and ‘just false’, captured by the difference 
between sentences like ‘Some sentences are false, but some are just false’, on 
the one hand, and ‘Some sentences are false, but some are false’, on the other. 
These, and sentences like them, again, are uttered by dialetheists frequently, 
and it seems to me that we clearly understand what is intended. To pick an 
arbitrary example, Priest and Berto (1998) characterise an historical form of 
dialetheism as follows: 
“In ancient Indian logic/metaphysics, there were standardly four possibilities to 
be considered on any statement at issue: that it is true (only), false (only), 
neither true nor false, or both true and false. Buddhist logicians sometimes 
added a fifth possibility: none of these.” 
For another example, just before JC Beall defends the view that ‘true’ and ‘just 
true’ are equivalent (since his metatheory is consistent, I leave a proper 
discussion of his view until Chapter 5), he says: 
“Rational dialetheists maintain that some (actually, many) [truths] are just true; 
they reject that all or even most claims are gluts. Indeed, on my account, it is 
only the spandrels of [truth] (or related notions) that are gluts; the rest are ‘just 
true’.” (2009, p.48) 
The ‘only’ used in the first passage adds something to the characterisation of 
the view described above (why else would the authors have written it?) 
Similarly, though perhaps Beall adds ‘scare quotes’ to indicate that the notion 
he is discussing is problematic, I suspect most readers understand exactly what 
these sentences mean, and so grasp a difference between ‘true’ and ‘just true’ 
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(and, correspondingly between ‘false’ and ‘just false’), which can’t simply be 
dismissed. 
If it were a straightforward consequence of dialetheism generally that this 
distinction could not be accounted for, this would be a problem for dialetheism, 
and it would not be question-begging to says so. But the equivalence of falsity 
and just-falsity is not an immediate consequence of dialetheism, and so the 
charge of question-begging seems to me to have even less plausibility. 
Though many philosophers have endorsed the account of the T-scheme on which 
the preceding remarks are based, as I have said, this is not Priest’s view. Priest 
rejects the principle of exclusion according to which falsity entails untruth: F<α> 
→ ¬T<α>. This means that the situation for Priest, with regards to the ‘just 
false’ problem, is different from that sketched immediately above. In particular, 
since falsity does not entails untruth, we cannot in general show that an 
arbitrary falsehood is thereby untrue and, hence, just false. 
The notion of just false, though, is still inconsistent for Priest, since he still 
accepts the proof above. Moreover, we can show, since Priest accepts 
exhaustion, ¬T<α> → F<α>, that any sentence, α, which is untrue, is thereby 
false and, hence, just false. So the strengthened liar, λ, equivalent to ¬T<λ>, 
since it can be shown to be both true and untrue, is both true and just false. The 
same holds for every untrue dialetheia, of which there are infinitely many. 
Notions like just false certainly seem, on the face of it, to have as part of their 
meaning that they behave consistently. Still, it might be thought, it is unfair to 
expect these notions to behave consistently for a dialetheist, since they are 
semantic notions which can be employed in the construction of liar sentences, 
which are the very sorts of thing dialetheists urge us to treat inconsistently. But, 
Shapiro claims (2004, p.342), the point of introducing the notion of just false in 
the first place was to distinguish falsehoods from at least paradigmatic 
dialetheia, which the strengthened liar is. So, even if we don’t demand the 
notion behave consistently, if the strengthened liar, as well as infinitely many 
other untrue dialetheia, are just false, we might think the notion too 
inconsistent to be of use. 
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In response to this, Priest says “I am not sure what the first place was in this 
case, nor, therefore, what its point was. But since F<α> and F<α> ∧ ¬T<α> are 
not logically equivalent, there is a distinction between being false and being 
simply false. The fact that some sentences (be they paradigm dialetheias or 
anything else) may be in both camps is just one of those contradictory facts of 
life that populate the dialetheic landscape. [some sentences are]… simply false—
and…[some are]…true as well.”(2006, p.294) 
So Priest’s response to the problem is to simply accept the inconsistency of ‘just 
false’ and deny that this prevents it from meaning just false, regardless of its 
inconsistency in the case of ‘paradigm’ dialetheia, because we still have a 
distinction (because of the failure of exclusion) between being false and being 
just false.  
 
This response, in a way, is an admission of an expressive limitation, as Priest has 
said himself elsewhere, he “cannot assert that something is false-only if this is 
required to exclude things that are true as well.”(2010a, p.136) He does not 
think this constitutes a revenge problem, however. The reason is that the 
consistent theories which he argues are subject to revenge are completely 
unable to express a key notion in their theory: they have no way to express ‘not 
true’, ‘not determinately true’, ‘defective’, or whatever the notion involved in 
the revenge problem happens to be. His position, he thinks, is not like this. He 
cannot express ‘just false’ where this is understood consistently, but he can 
express it inconsistently: “[t]he dialetheist about the paradoxes does have a way 
of expressing that something is false only – in the very words ‘false and not 
true’.”(2010a, p.137) 
 
This response is adequate only if the notion expressed when dialetheists use the 
expression ‘just false’ still means ‘just false’, despite its inconsistency 
(especially in paradigm cases like the strengthened liar). I have sympathy with 
Shapiro’s claim that it does not. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what 
argument can be given to this effect whose premises a dialetheist like Priest 
would be happy to accept. This is not, of course, to concede that Priest is right; 
rather the situation seems to have reached a stalemate. It is worth re-iterating, 
though, that this response from Priest is only available to him because of his 
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rejection of exclusion. If one accepts the equivalency of falsity with untruth, the 
distinction between falsity and just-falsity is collapsed. 
 
A closely related problem concerns the notion ‘non-dialetheia’. Shapiro points 
out (2004, pp.342-343), attributing the original complaint to Parsons (1990, 
pp.345-346 n. 10), that there are a number of ways of expressing that 
something, α, is a dialetheia. We might say, though this may not exhaust the 
possibilities, α ∧ ¬α, or T<α> ∧ F<α>, or perhaps T<α> ∧ ¬T<α>. Corresponding 
to each of these is a way of expressing what it is to be a non-dialetheia: ¬(α ∧ 
¬α), ¬(T<α> ∧ F<α>) and ¬(T<α> ∧ ¬T<α>), respectively. Each of these is 
inconsistent, in the sense that each holds of some dialetheia (so some dialetheia 
are non-dialetheia, on each of these definitions). The first, ¬(α ∧ ¬α), is a 
dialetheic logical truth, and so holds for any sentence α, including every 
dialetheia. So this option is inadequate. The third option, ¬(T<α> ∧ ¬T<α>), is 
also true of every sentence, α, as Priest has shown (2006, pp.90-91). The second 
option, ¬(T<α> ∧ F<α>), differs only if exclusion fails. If both exclusion and 
exhaustion hold, then falsity and untruth are equivalent and, hence, ¬(T<α> ∧ 
¬T<α>) and ¬(T<α> ∧ F<α>) are equivalent. This would mean the second option 
is also true of any α. Since Priest rejects exclusion, things are different for him. 
 
The situation is similar to the one described above for ‘just false’. Since it does 
not follow from the falsity of some sentence, α, that α is untrue, it does not 
follow from the falsity of α that α is not both true and false. So, for Priest, this 
definition of non-dialetheia, though inconsistent (some dialetheia are non-
dialetheia), is not vacuous (not all dialetheia are non-dialetheia). 
 
Unsurprisingly, Priest chooses the option which is not vacuous: α is a dialetheia if 
T<α> ∧  F<α> and so a non-dialetheia if ¬(T<α> ∧ F<α>). Though the definition is 
not vacuous, Shapiro still thinks it is problematic. Any sentence which is untrue 
is thereby not both true and false, and so not a dialetheia, on this definition. 
This includes paradigm dialetheia like the strengthened liar. He says: 
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“It is surely reasonable to demand that our definitions be non-vacuous. If we 
have to say that every sentence is a non-dialetheia, then the notion is useless. 
And the notion is all but useless if we have to say that every untruth is also a 
non-dialetheia, including the Original Liar and nearly all the dialetheias we run 
across in the course of thinking about this stuff—every non-truth and every non-
falsehood are also non-dialetheias. I would have thought that a dialetheist, like 
Priest, would deny that the Original Liar is a non-dialetheia, rather than 
asserting that it is one.” (2004, p.344) 
 
Priest’s response is to down-play the overlap between the dialetheia and the 
non-dialetheia: 
 
“Shapiro overplays his hand here. There is indeed an overlap in the categories of 
being and not being a dialetheia. But the only denizen of the overlap we have on 
the table is ξ(¬ T<ξ>). And this is very special. By its particular properties, it is 
true and it is not true—and so not (true and false). But the same is not the case 
for any other of the standard paradoxes of self-reference (including the liar in 
the form ‘this sentence is false’). (See the comments on chapter 1 in section 
19.3) And I am quite happy to assert that ξ is a non-dialetheia, provided that I 
can add that it is as well.” (2006, p.294) 
 
The strengthened liar may be the only denizen of the overlap ‘on the table’, but 
it is certainly not the only denizen of the overlap there is. For one, once we 
have one dialetheia of this kind, it follows that there are, by similar 
constructions, infinitely many. So at least in terms of cardinality, there is not 
only one such contradiction. Still, a more charitable way of reading Priest is as 
claiming that the strengthened liar is the only kind (in some sense) of paradox 
which is both true and untrue. But this isn’t right either. At least some of the 
other paradoxes of self-reference can be ‘strengthened’ in a similar way to the 
liar. 
 
For example, Grelling’s paradox is treated dialetheically by Priest. Grelling’s 
paradox arises from the predicate ‘heterological’, which is defined as being true 
of a predicate when that predicate does not apply to itself. For example, 
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‘monosyllabic’ is heterological, since it is not monosyllabic. The contradiction is 
produced by applying the predicate to itself: that is, by asking whether 
‘heterological’ is heterological. But we can define heterologicality differently to 
obtain a strengthened version of the paradox: define a predicate to be 
heterological when the result of applying it to itself is, not false, but untrue. 
The dialetheia generated by this version of the paradox is both true and untrue 
and, hence, a non-dialetheia. 
A little more precisely, if we introduce our heterologicality predicate, Het, 
defined such that it holds of a predicate just if it is untrue that the predicate 
applies to itself, then we can derive contradiction as follows: 
(1) T<Het<Het>>   (Suppose for reductio) 
(2) Het<Het>    (1, T-scheme) 
(3) ¬T<Het<Het>>   (Definition of Het) 
(4) ¬T<Het<Het>>   (1, 3, reductio) 
(5) Het<Het>    (4, definition of Het) 
(6) T<Het<Het>>   (5, T-scheme) 
 
Another example is Russell’s paradox, which can be strengthened by introducing 
a satisfaction predicate, along with the naïve principles for satisfaction. We take 
the Russell set to be {x: ¬Sat(x, v   v} and prove a contradiction as follows: 
 
(1) R ∈ R    (Suppose for reductio) 
(2) ¬Sat(R, <v ∈ v>)  (1, comprehension) 
(3) Sat(R, <v ∈ v>)  (2, exhaustion) 
(4) R ∉ R    (3, definition of satisfaction) 
(5) R ∉ R    (1, 4, reductio) 
(6) Sat(R, <v ∈ v>)  (comprehension, contraposition, DNE) 
(7) R ∈ R    (6, definition of satisfaction) 
(8) ¬Sat(R, <v ∈ v>)  (7, comprehension) 
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Since for x to satisfy φ is for φ to be true of x, it is both true and untrue of this 
Russell set that it is self-membered, and we have another denizen of the 
overlap.5 
It is not clear to me at the moment how many of the commonly discussed 
paradoxes of self-reference (others being Berry’s, Quine’s or Yablo’s) can be 
strengthened in this way, though it strikes me as likely that they can. Even if 
they cannot, the examples given seem like enough to undermine Priest’s claim 
that the strengthened liar is unusual or special, among the self-referential 
paradoxes, in being both true and untrue. This lends further strength to 
Shapiro’s claim that the overlap is too great for the notion of ‘non-dialetheia’ to 
be of much use. This is especially so if a similar treatment can be extended to 
other paradoxes. 
 
On the other hand, the notion is still not vacuous: not every dialetheia is a non-
dialetheia. In particular, Priest may still think that the fact that a significant 
number of the self-referential paradoxes, especially those characterised using 
falsehood rather than untruth, are both true and false but not untrue, is 
sufficient for the term ‘non-dialetheia’ to preserve its meaning and usefulness. 
 
My sympathies are with Shapiro here, that non-dialetheia ought to behave 
consistently, or at least, less inconsistently than it does, for it to mean what’s 
needed. But as with the just false problem, it is difficult to see how, if Priest 
takes the view described above, one can argue for this conclusion from premises 
Priest is likely to accept. Again, though, this is only because Priest rejects 
exclusion: if this principle is accepted, all of the obvious definitions of non-
dialetheia collapse into vacuity. 
 
The problems discussed, of the apparent expressive limitations of dialetheism, 
arise from the obvious definitions of ‘just false’ and ‘non-dialetheia’, 
respectively. One avenue of response is to define a new, unobvious, definition of 
‘just false’ and, correspondingly, of ‘non-dialetheia’, which behaves 
consistently. 
 
                                                          
5
 My thanks to Alan Weir for the proof just given. 
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The most obvious problem facing such attempts is the threat of revenge 
paradoxes employing the newly defined notion. So, for any newly-defined notion 
just false, we construct a sentence: 
 
(*) The sentence marked (*) is just false 
 
From this sentence, little is required to derive the conclusion that (*) is both 
true and just false. This obstacle must be avoided if the notion to do its job, 
which is no easy task. 
 
Still, attempts have been made to solve the problem in a way which avoids this. 
Some options which have been considered are a form of primitive exclusion 
(Berto, 2014), a form of negation called ‘arrow falsum’, as well as non-logical 
‘shriek rules’ (see Beall (2013) for a discussion of the second two). 
 
I don’t discuss these options here for a few reasons. The main reason is that 
each of the attempts at solving this problem with a new definition of ‘just false’ 
has been carried out in a setting where the metatheory is taken to be 
consistent. The views under discussion in this chapter are ones which take the 
metatheory to be inconsistent. It is not obvious how these solutions behave in 
this different setting, and it seems more appropriate to discuss the details of 
them in Chapter 6, which concerns metatheoretically consistent dialetheism. 
 
A second reason is that to take devices like arrow-falsum, shriek rules or 
primitive exclusion as putative solutions to the just false problem is to conflate 
the just false problem with the, admittedly related, problem of exclusion. This 
conflation appears frequently in the literature, but it occurs importantly in 
Beall’s response, based on shriek rules, to this problem. So I explain in detail the 
differences between just false and exclusion when I turn to potential revenge 
problems for Beall’s version of dialetheism in Chapter 6. 
 
I do, however, discuss Berto’s primitive exclusion device, briefly, in this 
chapter, since one might think something like this device could help with my 
own revenge problem for dialetheism. 
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So, although it may be that some new, consistent notion of ‘just false’ can be 
defined for metatheoretically inconsistent dialetheism, no such definition has, 
to my knowledge, been offered. The principal reason for this, I suspect, is that if 
such notions are strong enough to capture anything like ‘just false’, a revenge 
liar will demonstrate them to be inconsistent, defeating their purpose. So Priest, 
the most prominent proponent of this version of dialetheism, simply settles for 
the original definitions and accepts their inconsistency. This seems to me, at 
least dialectically, the strongest option for proponents of this sort of view to 
take. 
 
Another strategy one might wish to pursue here is to take ‘just false’ to be some 
kind of pragmatic device, perhaps a Gricean conversational implicature or some 
such. So, if a dialetheist says of some sentence that it is just false, this somehow 
pragmatically indicates that the sentence is not also true. An account of how 
exactly this works, and how it addresses the just false problem in particular 
would have to be given. One initial reason to be sceptical of this approach is 
that, by employing this strategy, the dialetheist has accepted that there is no 
expression whose actual content captures that something is just false, since, if 
there were such an expression, there would be no need to invoke pragmatic 
devices. This being the case, we might wonder exactly what kind of strange, 
ineffable fact is being pragmatically alluded to, but whose content cannot be 
captured by any expression. As Ramsey famously quipped, though about 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, “What we can’t say we can’t say, and we can’t whistle 
it either.” (1990) Whether dialetheists taking this approach would really be 
trying to whistle something that can’t be said will depend on the details of the 
approach yet to be provided. But it seems likely that in giving this account, the 
dialetheist will have to assert some statement indicating what the pragmatic 
device is supposed to be capturing. Some independent reason for why we should 
not simple take this statement to capture the theory’s account of ‘just false’, 
employ it in the construction of a liar sentence, and so demonstrate that the 
account is really inconsistent, will have to be given. If the only reason this is 
debarred is that it is necessary to avoid inconsistency, then the account is ad 
hoc. 
 
117 
 
Another, perhaps more decisive objection is given by Shapiro (2004, p.339), who 
points out that pragmatic devices of this kind cannot be embedded in the 
antecedent of a conditional, or within the scope of a negation, or in a 
hypothesis. Since we clearly can embed expressions containing ‘just false’, as 
well as negate them and form hypotheses containing them, the just false 
problem cannot be solved this way. 
4.2 Inconsistent Validity and Revenge 
 
Dialetheism which takes classical ZF set theory as its metatheory, of course, 
allows some sentences to be both true and false: that is, some sentences are 
assigned both 1 and 0 in the same model. But this inconsistency infects the 
metatheory no more than my views become inconsistent when I report that, 
according to Graham Priest, some sentences are both true and false. But if the 
metatheory is inconsistent, we should expect the assignments of truth-values to 
sentences themselves to become inconsistent: that is, we should expect some 
sentences both to be assigned 1 and not assigned 1 (in a model), and some 
sentences both to be assigned 0 and not assigned 0 (in a model). For the 
situation to be otherwise would be extremely peculiar; we should expect the 
inconsistency of the metatheory to make itself manifest. 
 
As I show in this section, we do indeed find that metatheoretically inconsistent 
dialetheism makes inconsistent assignments of truth values to sentences. One 
significant effect this has is to make, not just truth, but validity dialetheic. This 
fact is significant and interesting on its own, but it has greater significance 
because it leads to a revenge problem: we can show that so many inference 
principles (perhaps all of them) are invalid that dialetheism becomes unable to 
express invalidity. This is a very serious expressive limitation, since there are 
crucial semantic facts about the theory, for example the invalidity of the 
principle of explosion (A, ¬A ⊨ B), which the dialetheist must use the notion to 
express. 
 
The ease with which, and the extent to which, it may be shown that inference 
principles are invalid on this view varies with respect to a handful of factors, 
118 
 
especially the behaviour of the truth-predicate. So I take a number of options in 
turn and show the extent of the overlap between validity and invalidity for each 
option. On the first two options, it is straightforward to show the invalidity of 
every inference principle there is. On the second two options, because of the 
behaviour of Priest truth predicate (in particular, again, the failure of 
exclusion), things are more difficult. I begin by showing that every inference 
principle capable of taking an atomic sentence as its conclusion is invalid. I then 
extend this, using a result by Richard Heck (2013), to every inference principle 
whose conclusion contains only extensional connectives.  
 
Next, I address principles whose conclusion contains a conditional. I show, in a 
piecemeal way, that a number of these are invalid. I do not, at the present, 
have a general result that every such principle is invalid, though I suspect there 
is one to be had. I discuss a number of avenues of response to this problem, and 
argue against them. Throughout most of this chapter, I assume that the 
dialetheic metatheory under discussion is carried out in paraconsistent set 
theory, where the underlying logic is LP with the addition of a suitable, relevant 
conditional. I first discuss the view which takes truth to be transparent, and so 
which takes the biconditional in the T-scheme to contrapose. I don’t take a view 
on whether the conditional added to LP ought itself to contrapose, since if it 
does not, the same effect may be achieved (as regards the T-scheme) by 
stipulating, in addition to T<α> ↔ α, ¬T<α> ↔ ¬α. I conclude the chapter with 
a brief discussion of the prospects of developing my revenge problem on Priest’s 
model-theoretic strategy. I give arguments which seem to show that there must 
be metatheoretically inconsistent assignments of truth values to sentences 
(some both get 1 and don’t), but point out the difficulties involved in showing 
how these might invalidate valid inference principles.  
 
Validity is understood throughout as necessary preservation of truth, as defined 
by Val, such that A ⊨ B iff 
 
(Val) for every interpretation I, (I ⊩ A) → (I ⊩ B) 
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I assume throughout, as Priest accepts (2006, p.87), that the conditional 
validates the principle A ∧ ¬B ⊨ ¬(A → B) and so any instance such that A 
relates to 1 while B fails to relate to 1 will invalidate A ⊨ B. 
4.2.1 Inconsistent Validity with Transparent Truth 
 
Though it is not Priest’s view that truth is transparent, a number of philosophers 
have found this view attractive. If the adoption of metatheoretically 
paraconsistent dialetheism were to become more widespread, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that a number of dialetheists would want the T-scheme to 
behave in this way. In fact, this is the easiest sort of view for which we can 
demonstrate the inconsistency of validity. 
 
Defenders of this view accept the T-scheme in full generality. They also accept 
both of: 
 
(Exclusion)  T<¬α> → ¬T<α> 
 
(Exhaustion)  ¬T<α> → T<¬α> 
 
One would expect them to accept similar principles regarding truth-in-a-model 
(TIAM) so, in Priest’s relational semantics, for any interpretation ρ: 
 
(TIAM-Exclusion)  <¬α>ρ1 → ¬<α>ρ1 
 
(TIAM-Exhaustion) ¬<α>ρ1 → <¬α>ρ1 
 
In fact, Priest suggests that they may not need to endorse these principles. He 
says, discussing a claim from Shapiro about the exclusion principle, that “[o]ne 
should note, here, that we are talking about truth/falsity simpliciter, not 
truth/falsity in an interpretation. Truth/falsity in an interpretation is quite 
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different. Even if one endorses the exclusion schema, this does not entail that, 
for any given interpretation, ρ, <α>ρ0 → ¬<α>ρ1.” (2006, p.293) 
 
If one accepts Exclusion, it is highly problematic to reject TIAM-Exclusion. To 
accept an asymmetry of this kind between truth/negation simpliciter and truth-
in-a-model/¬ is to make the semantics of the theory ad hoc and unnatural. After 
all, the semantics are meant to be characterising the features of actual 
negation, and, via truth-in-a-model, actual truth. But if Exclusion holds of truth, 
though the corresponding principle fails of truth in a model, then there is an 
important asymmetry between the real notions and the notions as they appear in 
the semantics. In fact, it doesn’t seem unreasonable to say that ‘¬’ is not 
negation and ‘truth-in-a-model’ is not truth-in-a-model. 
 
Shapiro argues that Priest’s semantics are artificial, since he denies TIAM-
Exclusion, and is thereby denied a homophonic semantics (2004, p.352). Priest 
responds by denying that a homophonic semantics is desirable, and claims that 
the objection amounts to nothing more than the question-begging insistence that 
dialetheic negation is not negation (2006, pp.294-295). Moreover, he thinks, 
once we admit dialetheia, homophonic semantics are unappealing since, if α is a 
dialetheia, ¬α holds, but then so does α. This is the same argument as that 
discussed in 3.5.1.2, and is still unpersuasive in this context. Having said that, if 
Priest is right to reject Exclusion in the case of truth, he ought also to reject 
TIAM-Exclusion for truth-in-a-model, for the same reason that those accepting 
Exclusion of truth ought to accept TIAM-Exclusion for truth-in-a-model: if the 
semantics are otherwise there is a problematic asymmetry between the notions 
occurring in the model theory and the real semantic notions we are trying to 
model. So one ought to accept TIAM-Exclusion/TIAM-Exhaustion if and only if 
one accepts the corresponding principle about truth simpliciter i.e. 
Exclusion/Exhaustion. 
 
So, on the view under discussion, the dialetheist has accepted both Exclusion 
and Exhaustion, as well as their truth-in-a-model counterparts, TIAM-Exclusion 
and TIAM-Exhaustion. Given these principles, the invalidity of every inference 
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there is follows straightforwardly from the existence of a trivial model of the 
logic LP. In the trivial model, every atomic sentence receives the values 1 and 0. 
By TIAM-Exclusion, then, every atomic sentence receives 1 and fails to receive 
1. By TIAM-Exclusion, TIAM-Exhaustion, and the recursive clauses for the 
extensional connectives, every conditional-free complex sentence receives 1 and 
fails to receive 1. We extend this to sentences containing a conditional by 
considering, in Priest’s tertiary semantics, the instance of the relation Rw⊥w⊥w⊥ 
(that is, the instance which relates the trivial model, or rather, in this case, the 
trivial world, to itself). This makes every conditional false at the trivial world 
and, by TIAM-Exclusion, untrue at that world. This makes every inference 
principle invalid since each has an instance, at the trivial world, at which the 
premises are true and the conclusion fails to be true at that world. 
 
We can illustrate with a couple of examples. To take the simplest, consider 
 
(Reflexivity) R ⊨ R 
 
Take some atomic sentence, φ, and substitute for R to obtain the following 
instance of Reflexivity 
 
 φ ⊨ φ 
 
Since φ both relates to 1 and fails to relate to 1 in the trivial model, in this 
instance of Reflexivity, the premise relates to 1 and the conclusion fails to. So 
Reflexivity is invalid. To take another example, ∧-introduction: 
 
(∧-Intro) A, B ⊨ A ∧ B 
 
Take the conjunction of sentences φ ∧ ψ, which receives 1 and fails to receive 1 
in the trivial model (as do its conjuncts). Substituting, we obtain the following 
instance of ∧-Intro: 
 
φ, ψ ⊨ φ ∧ ψ  
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Again, since φ, ψ and φ ∧ ψ receive 1 and fail to receive 1 in the trivial model, 
the premises in this instance of ∧-Intro receive 1, the conclusion fails to receive 
1 and so the inference is invalid. This strategy invalidates every inference 
principle there is. 
 
Though I have argued that dialetheists should accept both TIAM-Exclusion and 
TIAM-Exhaustion for truth-in-a-model so long as they accept their counterparts 
for truth simpliciter, one might wonder what effect it would have on invalidity 
to reject TIAM-Exclusion whilst accepting Exclusion. The answer, I think, is 
nothing: every inference is still invalid, though our strategy for demonstrating 
this will have to be slightly different, and more akin to the strategy to be 
employed in the next section against Priest’s view. So, in addition to being an 
unattractive feature of the semantics for independent reasons, it does not help, 
on its own, with this revenge problem. 
 
On this strategy, we construct special, model-theoretic liar sentences, such as L 
equivalent to: 
(L) ¬(M ⊩ L) 
This sentence, informally, says of itself that it is not true in the model M. On 
Priest’s view, strictly speaking, L will be specified relationally as ρ(M,<L>,1), but 
I stick to the notation just given for simplicity of presentation. If we try to prove 
a contradiction from this, following similar reasoning to the strengthened liar, 
we find that the proof breaks down at the point at which the T-scheme would 
normally be invoked, since we have no equivalent to the T-scheme for truth-in-
a-model. What we must do instead is to select M carefully, such that something 
like the T-scheme holds for it. The model we are interested in is the actual 
model where truth-in-a-model matches exactly truth simpliciter in English. It is 
a great virtue of metatheoretically inconsistent dialetheism allows for the 
existence of such a model, since otherwise, arguably, truth-in-a-model fails to 
characterise truth simpliciter. 
The obvious condition to stipulate in picking out this model, M, is that, for any 
sentence α, 
123 
 
(*) M ⊩ α ↔ T<α> 
One question arising here is what sort of conditional we should take (*) to 
contain. I suggest that it ought to contrapose (and so, if ‘→’ is not taken to 
contrapose, (*) is really M ⊩ α ↔ T<α> ∧ ¬M ⊩ α ↔ ¬T<α>). The reason for this is 
that the conditional must contrapose if truth in M is to exactly match (both the 
positive and negative extensions of) truth simpliciter; if it does not, we are left 
with the possibility, for any α, of having ¬M ⊩ α but failing to have ¬T<α> and 
vice versa. In fact, if the conditional does not contrapose, (*) does not specify a 
unique model: for there are infinitely many models, each satisfying non-
contraposable (*), but differing in their assignments of ¬M ⊩ α and ¬T<α>, 
respectively. 
In any case, I see nothing dialetheically objectionable about the conditional in 
(*) being contraposable. Certainly there is nothing dialetheically problematic 
about the mere existence of a model satisfying (*) so-construed. This being so, it 
seems reasonable that we be able to pick it out as above. It’s worth pointing out 
that Priest’s reasons for rejecting the contraposability of the T-scheme do not 
apply here: one can perfectly well accept the contraposability of (*) and reject 
the contraposability of the T-scheme.  
So there is nothing wrong with us taking (*) in its strongest, contraposable, form. 
Even if this is rejected, however, this does not avoid the revenge problem. It 
does, however, collapse the difference, from the point-of-view of this problem, 
between the view currently under discussion and the view of Priest’s discussed 
in the next section. So, if a dialetheist accepts the transparency of truth 
simpliciter, but rejects TIAM-Exclusion as well as the contraposed form of (*), 
then they will fare exactly as Priest’s view does there, though for the reasons 
given, their view will, additionally be unpleasantly ad hoc. 
To return to the case where (*) is accepted as contraposable, the proof of 
contradiction from L proceeds as follows: 
(1) M ⊩ L   (suppose for reductio) 
(2) T<L>   (1, (*)) 
(3) L   (2, T-scheme) 
(4) ¬(M ⊩ L)  (3, substituting equivalents) 
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(5) ¬(M ⊩ L)  (1, 4, reductio) 
(6) L   (5, substituting equivalents) 
(7) T<L>   (6, T-scheme) 
(8) M ⊩ L   (7, (*)) 
(9) M ⊩ L ∧ ¬(M ⊩ L) (5, 8, ∧-Intro) 
So L both receives 1 in M and fails to receive 1 in M. We can now demonstrate 
the invalidity of Reflexivity by substituting L to obtain the instance L ⊨ L in 
which the premises receive 1 and the conclusion fails to receive 1. In fact, since, 
on the view under consideration, the T-scheme is transparent, and so Exclusion 
holds, the effect of (*) understood contraposably, is to reinstate TIAM-Exclusion 
in the restricted case of M. So, for any complex sentence, A, built from L using 
the recursive clauses for the connectives, A both receives 1 and fails to. 
Moreover, as Priest has pointed out the existence of the trivial model falsifies 
(at the actual world) every sentence containing a conditional, and so, by the 
contraposable T-scheme, delivers the untruth of every sentence containing a 
conditional. By (*), then, every sentence containing a conditional fails to receive 
1 in M and so every inference principle whose conclusion contains a conditional 
is invalid. 
So, if the dialetheist accepts that truth is transparent, and accepts TIAM-
Exclusion, it follows from the existence of the trivial model (or world) that every 
inference principle is invalid (so long as one accepts Priest’s account of the 
conditional). If, problematically, I have argued, they reject TIAM-Exclusion 
(despite accepting Exclusion), then so long as they accept (*) in its 
contraposable form, it follows from the universal model M and the existence of a 
liar sentence L, that every inference principle is invalid. If (*) is accepted only in 
its non-contraposable form, then the situation is the same as is described in the 
next section. 
4.2.2 Invalidity with a Non-Contraposable T-scheme 
If the conditional in the T-scheme does not contrapose, the situation is different 
to that described above. Though it is true that every sentence in the trivial 
model receives both 1 and 0, in the absence of TIAM-Exclusion, we cannot 
demonstrate that any such sentence additionally fails to receive 1. So the 
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straightforward strategy of employing the trivial model will not work in this 
case. Instead, we employ the strategy which invokes the universal model M. The 
proof of a the contradiction M ⊩ L ∧ ¬(M ⊩ L) proceeds exactly as in the previous 
section, since it does not depend on the contraposability of the T-scheme. So we 
may use L to demonstrate the invalidity of any inference principle which is 
capable of taking an atomic sentence as its conclusion; not, of course, because L 
is atomic, but because we can obtain an instance of the principle simply by 
substituting L for the single sentence letter in the conclusion. For example, each 
of ∧-elimination, ∨-elimination (reasoning by cases), modus ponens, reflexivity 
and double negation elimination. The relevant instances being: 
(∧-Elim) L ∧ L ⊨ L 
(∨-Elim) L ∨ L, (L → L), (L → L) ⊨ L 
(MP) L, L → L ⊨ L 
(Reflexivity) L ⊨ L 
(DNE) ¬¬L ⊨ L 
In each case, since L both receives 1 and fails to receive 1, the premises in each 
instance receive 1 while the conclusion fails to do so, and each inference 
principle is invalid. 
One might suppose that L could be used to invalidate inference principles with 
more complex conclusions. For example, one might think the following instance 
would do to eliminate ∧-introduction: 
(∧-Intro) L, L ⊨ L ∧ L 
Unfortunately, this does not work. The reason is the same as discussed in section 
(untruth) that the failure of Exclusion appears to leave the behaviour of untruth 
somewhat underdetermined. One would think that, if a sentence, A, is untrue 
that each of A ∧ A, A ∨ A, ¬¬A would also be untrue (infact, one would think it 
obvious that this is so). In fact, given the failure of Exclusion, there is no obvious 
way of showing that this is the case. I do not think this an advantage to Priest’s 
view. In fact, it seems highly undesirable that untruth is underdetermined in this 
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way. Though it does make getting revenge on Priest’s view slightly more 
difficult. 
What we must do instead, for inference principles with more complex 
conclusions, is to tailor our liar sentence to the particular inference principle. 
For example, to invalidate ∧-introduction, we use the sentence A equivalent to: 
(A) ¬(M ⊩ A ∧ A) 
Intuitively, A says that the result of conjoining it with itself is untrue in M. We 
prove a contradiction from A as follows: 
(1) M ⊩ A ∧ A    (Suppose for reductio) 
(2) T<A ∧ A>    (1, (*)) 
(3) A ∧ A     (2, T-scheme) 
(4) A     (3, ∧-elim) 
(5) ¬(M ⊩ A ∧ A)    (3, substituting equivalents) 
(6) ¬(M ⊩ A ∧ A)    (4, reductio) 
(7) A     (5, substituting equivalents) 
(8) A ∧ A     (6, ∧-introduction) 
(9) T<A ∧ A>    (7, T-scheme) 
(10) M ⊩ A ∧ A    (8, (*)) 
(11) (M ⊩ A ∧ A) ∧ ¬(M ⊩ A ∧ A) (5, 9, ∧-introduction) 
So, in M, A ∧ A both receives 1 and fails to receive 1. We can then substitute A 
to obtain the instance of ∧-introduction: 
A, A ⊩ A ∧ A 
So the premises will receive 1 in M and the conclusion will fail to receive 1 and 
so ∧-introduction is invalid. The case establishing the invalidity of ∨-
introduction, A ⊨ A ∨ B, employing the sentence B, equivalent to ¬(M ⊩ B ∨ B) 
mirrors that of ∧-introduction almost exactly. For double-negation-introduction 
involves the sentence N, equivalent to ¬(M ⊩ ¬¬N), from which a contradiction is 
proved thus: 
(1) M ⊩ ¬¬N   (suppose for reductio) 
(2) T<¬¬N>   (1, (*)) 
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(3) ¬¬N    (2, T-scheme) 
(4) N    (3, double-negation-elimination) 
(5) ¬(M ⊩ ¬¬N)   (4, substituting equivalents) 
(6) ¬(M ⊩ ¬¬N)   (5, reductio) 
(7) N    (6, substituting equivalents) 
(8) ¬¬N    (7, double-negation-introduction) 
(9) T<¬¬N>   (8, T-scheme) 
(10) M ⊩ ¬¬N   (9, (*)) 
(11) (M ⊩ ¬¬N) ∧ ¬(M ⊩ ¬¬N) (6, 10, ∧-introduction) 
Again, we now substitute N into double-negation-introduction to obtain the 
instance N ⊨ ¬¬N in which the premise relates to 1 and the conclusion fails to 
and, thus, double-negation-introduction is invalid. N will also serve to invalidate 
Priest’s reductio rule, α → ¬α ⊨ ¬α by substituting ¬N for α. 
One question is whether this piecemeal strategy can be developed into a general 
result. I think, by appeal to a result by Heck (2007)6,that it can. In his paper, 
Heck analyses the extent to which genuine self-reference is possible in certain 
expanded languages for arithmetic. The result in which I am interested is his 
proof of the Structural Diagonal Lemma. In the language PAs, which is {0, S, +, 
×} extended by the addition of a truth-predicate T. 
He states the Structural Diagonal Lemma as follows (2007, p.9): 
Structural Diagonal Lemma: Let P be a truth-functional schema in (distinct) 
sentence letters p1,...,pn. Let A(x) be the substitution instance of P in which 
each of pi has been replaced by a corresponding formula Ai(x) containing just x 
free. Then there is a formula G such that: 
(1) G is the substitution instance of P in which each pi has been replaced by a 
corresponding formula Gi; 
(2) PAs ⊢ Gi ≡ Ai(<G>) 
(3) PAs ⊢ G ≡ A(<G>) 
I refer the reader to Heck’s paper (2007, pp.10-12) for the proof, of which Heck 
says “nothing in the proof actually requires the assumption that A(x) contain 
                                                          
6
 My thanks to Dave Ripley who, in conversation, pointed me in the direction of Heck’s paper. 
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only x free, so [the proof] easily adapts to a proof of the form that allows 
parameters.” (2007, p.10n.11) There is no machinery here which is dialetheically 
unacceptable and so no reason, that I can see, for a dialetheist to reject the 
Structural Diagonal Lemma. 
This establishes that, for any inference principle whose conclusion contains only 
extensional connectives, there is a sentence G, equivalent to ¬(M ⊩ G), such 
that the G has the same logical form as the conclusion of the principle. We can 
then reason in the standard way to the conclusion that M ⊩ G and ¬(M ⊩ G), 
which invalidates the principle. This delivers the result that any inference 
principle whose conclusion does not contain a conditional is invalid. 
This leaves the inference principles which contain in their conclusion a 
conditional. Since Priest’s conditional is not truth-functional, it is not covered by 
Heck’s result. One way one might expect to demonstrate the invalidity of such 
principles, following the piecemeal strategy above, would be as follows. 
Consider some inference principle whose conclusion is P → Q and take the 
sentence β, equivalent to ¬(M ⊩ β → β). Unfortunately, this does not work, 
since β is not a liar sentence: β → β is a logically true (only), and so β, which 
says of β → β that it is untrue, is simply false.  
What we might do instead is use the sentence κ, equivalent to ¬(M ⊩ t → κ), 
where ‘t’ is a truth-constant; most simply, we can simply take ‘t’ to be the 
conjunction of all truths. Two useful features of t are that t → α ⊨ α, and α ⊨ t 
→ α both hold, which I will call ‘t-elim’ and ‘t-intro’, respectively. Given these 
features, contradiction is proved from κ as follows: 
(1) M ⊩ t → κ    (suppose for reductio) 
(2) T<t → κ>   (1, (*)) 
(3) t → κ     (2, T-scheme) 
(4) κ    (3, t-elim) 
(5) ¬(M ⊩ t → κ)  (4, substituting equivalents) 
(6) ¬(M ⊩ t → κ)  (1, 5, reductio) 
(7) κ     (6, substituting equivalents)  
(8) t → κ    (7, t-intro) 
(9) T<t → κ>   (8, T-scheme) 
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(10) M ⊩ t → κ    (9, (*)) 
(11) (M ⊩ t → κ) ∧ ¬(M ⊩ t → κ) (6, 10, ∧-introduction) 
As before, we now have a counter example to any inference principle which can 
take as its conclusion a conditional with atomic antecedent and consequent. This 
strategy can be applied in a piecemeal way to a number of inference principles 
whose conclusions contain conditionals. For a final example, I show how to 
invalidate the principle α → β ⊨ (γ → α) → (γ → β), which Priest has shown 
holds for his conditional (it is listed as fact 12 in section 3.2.1). This argument 
takes advantage of the fact that, since ⊨ t and ⊨ t → t, we have t ⊨ t → t and t 
→ t ⊨ t, so t and t → t are equivalent. We employ the sentence γ, equivalent to 
¬(M ⊩ ((t → t) → (t → γ)) and demonstrate that contradiction follows thus: 
(1) M ⊩ ((t → t) → (t → γ))   (suppose for reductio) 
(2) T<(t → t) → (t → γ)>   (1, (*)) 
(3) (t → t) → (t → γ)    (2, T-scheme) 
(4) t → (t → γ)     (3, substituting equivalents) 
(5) t → γ      (4, t-elim) 
(6) γ      (5, t-elim) 
(7) ¬(M ⊩ ((t → t) → (t → γ))   (6, substituting equivalents) 
(8) ¬(M ⊩ ((t → t) → (t → γ))   (1, 7, reductio) 
(9) γ      (8, substituting equivalents) 
(10) t → γ      (9, t-intro) 
(11) t → (t → γ)     (10, t-intro) 
(12) (t → t) → (t → γ)    (11, substituting equivalents) 
(13) T<(t → t) → (t → γ)>   (12, T-scheme) 
(14) M ⊩ ((t → t) → (t → γ))   (13, (*)) 
(15) M ⊩ ((t → t) → (t → γ)) ∧ ¬(M ⊩ ((t → t) → (t → γ))) (8, 14, ∧-
introduction) 
As before, we simply substitute γ into the principle in the obvious way, and so 
have a counterexample to its validity. It is unclear whether something like this 
strategy can be extended to a general result for every inference principle with a 
conditional conclusion; at any rate, I do not have a general result at the 
moment.  
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One further possible strategy worth mentioning is one invoking what we might 
call a ‘super trivial’ model in which every atomic sentence both relates to 1 and 
fails to relate to 1. In fact, if the dialetheist accepts TIAM-Exclusion, this is just 
the standard trivial model. Priest, however, does not accept this principle, and 
so in the trivial model he already accepts, every sentence relates both to 1 and 
to 0, but not all sentences additionally fail to relate to 1. If Priest accepts the 
existence of such a model (which he may well do), then this immediately 
invalidates every inference principle which can take an atomic sentence as its 
conclusion. However, it is not clear that it invalidates anything else, since (as 
already discussed) the failure of TIAM-Exclusion would seem to block the obvious 
arguments for the untruth of complex sentences from the untruth of their 
component sentences. So even though dialetheists may allow for the existence 
of such a model, and it will certainly invalidate some inference principles, the 
more complicated strategy outlined above, which invokes the model M, may still 
be required to spread inconsistency to more complex principles. 
So, on Priest’s strategy, both Exclusion and TIAM-Exclusion fail. This rules-out 
the strategy from the previous section (5.2.1) which employed the trivial model. 
Instead, we used the strategy which employs the universal model M and 
constructs ‘bespoke’ liar sentences for each inference principle we wish to 
invalidate. This allowed us to invalidate every inference principle whose 
conclusion can be an atomic sentence, a conjunction of atomic sentences, a 
disjunction of atomic sentences or a negated atomic sentence (as well as 
double-negation introduction). This was extended to every inference principle 
with a conditional-free (and so extensional) conclusion by a result due to Heck 
(2007). Finally, any principle with a conditional conclusion, able to take atomic 
sentences as antecedent and consequent, is also invalid. This can be extended in 
a piecemeal fashion to some principles with more complex conditional 
conclusions, but, as yet, no more general result has been demonstrated. 
Whether, in the end, Priest’s view, by rejecting Exclusion and TIAM-Exclusion, 
fares any better here than versions of dialetheism accepting those principles 
depends on whether the stronger result, that every inference principle whose 
conclusion contains a conditional is invalid, can be established. It seems to me 
that this result should be obtainable, but even if it is not, Priest’s view is not 
much better off. It is still the case that almost every inference principle is 
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invalid, including all the introduction and elimination rules for the logical 
constants, and all of the principles we are likely to find in a logic textbook, or 
use in everyday reasoning. 
4.2.3 Revenge and the Inexpressibility of Invalidity 
The fact that validity is dialetheically inconsistent (at least for versions of 
dialetheism with a paraconsistent metatheory) is interesting and important, all 
the more so because of the extent of its inconsistency. At worst, every inference 
principle is invalid, and at best, almost every inference principle one is likely to 
encounter is invalid. The revenge problem this generates is that is renders 
dialetheists unable to express invalidity. One of the crucial features of 
dialetheism is that it is, we think, non-trivial: dialetheists are able to accept 
inconsistency, but also contain inconsistency. So it is a crucial semantic fact 
about dialetheism that principles such as explosion and disjunctive syllogism, 
which would otherwise trivialise the theory, are invalid. If dialetheists cannot 
express this fact, then their view suffers from expressive limitations of the very 
kind they argue that non-dialetheists fact: that is, they have a revenge problem. 
Consider, first, the case in which every inference principle is invalid. This is the 
position of metatheoretically inconsistent dialetheism in which TIAM-Exclusion 
holds, and perhaps also Priest’s view, pending some more definitive result 
concerning principles whose conclusions contain conditionals. In this case, 
‘invalid’ and ‘inference principle’ are logically equivalent notions. So, for all the 
distinction the notion draws when they say ‘Disjunctive syllogism is invalid’, they 
may as well have said ‘Disjunctive syllogism is an inference principle’. Invalidity, 
here, is completely vacuous, and so does not express what is intended about 
disjunctive syllogism; the feature predicated of disjunctive syllogism is 
possessed by every inference principle trivially. 
Just as, with the introduction of dialetheism about truth, it became necessary to 
introduce notions like ‘just true’ and ‘just false’ to characterise the sentences 
which are not dialetheia, it seems reasonable to want similar notions once we 
recognise that validity is dialetheic. So we may wish to introduce notions such as 
‘just valid’ and ‘just invalid’. In fact, the former notion is redundant, in this 
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case, since no inference principle is just valid. Still, though every principle is 
invalid, what is special and bad about principles like disjunctive syllogism and 
explosion is that they are just invalid, whereas the legitimate principles, like 
reflexivity and modus ponens, are both valid and invalid. 
The obvious definition of ‘just invalid’, of course, is ‘invalid and not valid’. 
Unfortunately, since ‘invalid’ and ‘not valid’ are equivalent notions, ‘invalid’ 
and ‘just invalid’ are also equivalent. So, on this obvious definition, ‘inference 
principle’, ‘invalid’ and ‘just invalid’ are logically equivalent. So, on this version 
of dialetheism, both invalidity and just-invalidity are vacuous notions which fail 
to pick out the feature of disjunctive syllogism that we are interested in.  
So, if dialetheists accept TIAM-Exclusion, they have a revenge problem. 
Specifically, they cannot express the crucial semantic facts about their theory 
which require for their expressibility non-vacuous notions of invalidity and just-
invalidity. 
Assuming that we cannot establish the stronger result mentioned above, Priest’s 
view (or, more generally, views in which TIAM-Exclusion fails) is different, but 
only slightly. It is not the case on theories of this kind that ‘invalid’ and 
‘inference principle’ are logically equivalent. The overlap, however, is still 
enormous. The notion being employed in sentences such as ‘Disjunctive syllogism 
is invalid’ still applies to every inference principle whose conclusion lacks a 
conditional, and a number of others, including reflexivity, modus ponens, ∧-
introduction, and almost every other inference principle anyone ever uses. It is 
still the case, on this version of dialetheism, that ‘just invalid’ is equivalent to 
‘invalid’ and so each of these principles is also just invalid. 
So, even if dialetheists reject TIAM-Exclusion, and assuming the stronger result 
cannot be established for these theories, they still have a revenge problem. Both 
‘invalid’ and ‘just invalid’ are equivalent, so these theories cannot express the 
latter as distinct from the former. Moreover, the overlap between these notions 
and validity is so significant that they are deprived of their usefulness and so 
cannot be used to express the crucial semantic facts about dialetheism which 
require either consistent, or at least less inconsistent, notions of invalidity. 
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4.2.3.1 Invalidity Revenge and Just False Revenge 
It is worth briefly discussing the differences between the ‘just false’ problem 
already extant in the literature and the invalidity revenge problem I have just 
introduced, in case it be thought that nothing new has been added. 
The first difference is that the ‘just false’ problem concerns only the notion 
‘just false’, leaving ‘false’ alone, and not threatening any further, unpalatable 
properties of ‘false’ that the dialetheist has not already happily accepted. The 
invalidity revenge problem, on the other hand, concerns both invalidity and just-
invalidity, demonstrating that the notions are both equivalent and vacuous (or 
near enough). 
This being the case, one might think the invalidity revenge problem concerns a 
more central notion than does the just false problem. The notion ‘just false’ 
only entered the debate surrounding truth and paradox when dialetheism 
became an important participant and the central notions of truth and falsity 
became inconsistent. But it is not unreasonable to characterise logic as being 
the study of (principally deductive) reasoning and how we ought to distinguish 
correct (valid) from incorrect (invalid) reasoning. So the notion of invalidity is 
one of the defining notions of logic, and this is one of the notions which the 
invalidity revenge problem threatens to demonstrate dialetheically 
inexpressible. 
A further difference is that the problematic overlap in the case of the invalidity 
revenge problem is far greater than in the case of the just false problem. If the 
dialetheist accepts Exclusion, then the obvious definition of ‘just false’ collapses 
the notion into ‘false’, but this does not extend the overlap between these 
notions and truth. With the invalidity revenge problem, on the other hand, 
‘invalid’ and ‘just invalid’, ordinarily defined, are equivalent, and the overlap 
between these notions and validity extends to cover all valid inference 
principles, on the assumption of TIAM-Exclusion: ‘invalid’, ‘just invalid’ and 
‘inference principle’ are logically equivalent. In Priest’s case, his rejection of 
Exclusion allows for falsity and just-falsity to be inequivalent, and for a 
significant number of standard self-referential, paradoxical sentences to be true 
and false, but to fail to be just false. But with the invalidity revenge problem, 
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rejecting TIAM-Exclusion may not help at all, and if it does, it helps very little. 
Invalidity and just-invalidity are still equivalent and the notions apply to either 
every inference principle or, at best, almost every inference principle one is 
likely to encounter. 
4.3 Avenues of Response 
I now turn to how a dialetheist might respond to the invalidity revenge problem I 
have characterised. One possible response would be to accept that invalidity is 
vacuous and to be given up, but to define ‘just invalid’ in some new way to 
express what is wrong with inferences like disjunctive syllogism. This will, I 
think, be parasitic on some more general, consistent redefinition of ‘just false’ 
(or, perhaps ‘just untrue’). The reason for this is that every counterexample to a 
valid inference principle described in the previous section consisted in finding 
some sentence which, in some model, was both true and untrue and inserting it 
into the inference principle in question such that the premises were true, but 
the conclusion untrue. In each case, because the inferences were valid too, the 
conclusion, in addition to being untrue, was also true (again, in the model). So 
the only time we have counterexamples to valid inference principles is when we 
construct cases in which the premises are true while the conclusion is both true 
and untrue. This is different from inference principles which are just invalid, 
because in those cases we have counter-instances in which the premises are true 
and the conclusion false only (or untrue only). 
So what the dialetheist wants here is some notion, some form of negation, which 
expresses that a sentence fails to be true, where this must be understood 
consistently (i.e. it cannot be such that something is untrue in this sense, but 
also true). We call this new notion NEG and define an inference to be invalid, A 
⊭ B just if there is some model I such that I ⊩ A ∧ NEG-(I ⊩ B). We can also 
define a sentence, α, to be just false if and only if F<α> ∧ NEG-T<α>. But, of 
course, we can also construct a sentence, β, equivalent to: 
(β) NEG-T<β> 
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From which we require very little to deduce T<β> ∧ NEG-T<β>, defeating the 
purpose of introducing NEG in the first place. An argument for this from β is as 
follows; 
(1) T<β>   (suppose for reductio) 
(2)  β    (1, T-scheme) 
(3) NEG-T<β>  (2, substituting equivalents) 
(4) NEG-T<β>  (3, NEG-reductio) 
(5)  β     (4, substituting equivalents) 
(6) T<β>   (5, T-scheme) 
(7) T<β> ∧ NEG-T<β> (4, 6, ∧-introduction) 
All that is required for this argument, beyond principles already accepted by 
dialetheists is that a reductio rule is valid for NEG. This need only be the weak 
reductio rule Priest already accepts for negation, α → NEG-α ⊨ NEG-α. It is 
difficult to see how the failure of such a rule could be motivated (at least, in the 
present context), but there are other arguments for T<β> ∧ NEG-T<β> which 
don’t involve it anyway. For example: 
(1) T<β> ∨ NEG-T<β>  (NEG-LEM) 
Case 1: 
(1a) T<β> 
(1b) β    (1a, T-scheme) 
(1c) NEG-T<β>   (1b, substituting equivalents) 
(1d) T<β> ∧ NEG-T<β>  (1a, 1c, ∧ -introduction) 
Case 2: 
(2a) NEG-T<β> 
(2b) β    (2a, substituting equivalents) 
(2c) T<β>    (2b, T-scheme) 
(2d) T<β> ∧ NEG-T<β>  (2a, 2c, ∧-introduction) 
(2) T<β> ∧ NEG-T<β>  (1, 1d, 2d, reasoning by cases) 
This argument, too, might be blocked, perhaps by denying that NEG obeys the 
law of excluded middle, or that reasoning by cases is valid, but again, there 
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doesn’t seem much motivation for this, and the more principles of this kind 
which fail for NEG, the less it looks like a form of negation at all. 
Perhaps there is some way to characterise a consistent form of negation for 
dialetheists whose metatheory is paraconsistent, but it is not at all obvious how 
this would be achieved, and it has not, to my knowledge, been seriously 
attempted thus far. 
One attempt which has been made for dialetheists with a consistent metatheory 
is worth discussing for illustrative purposes. Franz Berto, in, for example, his 
(2014) has developed a primitive notion of metaphysical exclusion, characterised 
as a predicative functor, holding between properties which metaphysically 
exclude one another. Though the notion is primitive, and so has no explicit 
definition, there are still formal principles which hold of it. One such is the 
principle in the metatheory that a property excludes another if and only if their 
extensions are (necessarily) disjoint. Since Berto’s metatheory is consistent, this 
principle does not make exclusion inconsistent in the object theory. It is difficult 
to see how anything like this principle could hold in the present, 
metatheoretically inconsistent context (where extensions are allowed to be both 
disjoint and not) without thereby introducing inconsistency into the notion of 
exclusion. It is not required, of course, that a definition be given of a notion 
which is supposed to be primitive, but we should still expect some formal 
constraints to hold of exclusion, and it is unclear what these could be such that 
the notion doesn’t turn out inconsistent. 
Still, supposing some constraints could be given to make the notion sufficiently 
wieldy, we might then hope to characterise an invalid inference, A ⊭ B as being 
such that there is some model I such that A is true in I and A’s truth in I excludes 
B’s truth in I. 
This might work for some invalid inference principles, for example A ⊨ B; 
presumably, so long as the truth of some sentences excludes the truth of some 
others, there is some instance of this such that the truth of the premise excludes 
the truth of the conclusion. The notion is less helpful in other, more interesting 
cases, however. The reason is that the obvious counter-examples to the just-
invalid inference principles in which we are interested, for example, disjunctive 
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syllogism or explosion, involve necessarily dialetheic sentences arising from 
semantic paradoxes like the liar. For example, a counter-instance to disjunctive 
syllogism might be ¬L, L ∨ A ⊨ A, where L is some liar sentence and A is some 
sole-falsehood, such as ‘Gareth Young is 10-feet-tall’. But since the liar sentence 
L is, presumably, necessarily true and false, it is difficult to see how it could 
metaphysically exclude anything, and, in particular, how it could be thought of 
as excluding my being 10-feet-tall. All the paradigmatic dialetheia are of this 
necessary sort, so it does not appear that metaphysical exclusion could help with 
this problem, even if a satisfactory account of the notion could be made in the 
metatheoretically paraconsistent context. 
Another strategy dialetheists might wish to pursue in response to the invalidity 
revenge problem appeals to triviality. One problematic feature of inference 
principles like disjunctive syllogism and explosion, and the main reason we want 
to be able to express their invalidity, is that, were they valid, the theory would 
trivialise. So it seems reasonable to wish to invoke this fact in our response to 
the problem. The response would be to give up on notions like invalidity and 
just-invalidity, but to express that a certain inference principle is bad by 
pointing to the fact that, were it added to the theory, the theory would entail 
everything. 
One might think that, rather than answering the objection, this simply 
underlines it. It is of course correct that these principles would be trivial were 
they valid, but this is the very reason we want to be able to say they are invalid. 
If I notice, when first introduced to dialetheism, that there is a straightforward 
argument from dialetheism to triviality via disjunctive syllogism, and inquire as 
to the principle’s validity, it will hardly assuage my concerns if the dialetheist 
simply replies that the principle does indeed entail triviality. 
In any case, this response will not work, since not all invalid inferences would 
trivialise if added to dialetheism. To take Priest’s theory as an example, not all 
inferences he rejects are rejected because they would, if he accepted them, 
entail everything. For example, for all α, T<¬α> ⊨ ¬T<α>, which is a rule form 
of what Priest calls ‘Exclusion’, is rejected by appeal to his teleological account 
of truth. It is, for Priest, invalid, but it would not, so far as I can see, trivialise 
his theory if he accepted it. For another example, related to the previous, Priest 
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rejects the contraposability of the conditional: P → Q ⊨ ¬Q → ¬P is, for him, 
invalid. But the reasons for this, again, are not the threat of triviality, but 
philosophical concerns about what conditional ought to appear in the T-scheme. 
For a final example, one obviously bad inference principle is A ⊨ Priest is a fried 
egg. This would, if valid, allow us to conclude that Priest is a fried egg from any 
sentence, but it would not, so far as I can tell, entail everything. It might be 
objected that since the conclusion of the principle is an interpreted sentence 
that it is not an inference principle, but this doesn’t matter. It is still a putative 
principle of some kind, by which one might reason, and which is bad, because it 
is invalid. This fact ought to be able to be expressed dialetheically, but cannot 
be if our only resources for expressing what’s bad about invalid inferences is to 
point to their triviality. 
4.3.1 Invalidity Revenge on the Model-Theoretic Strategy 
The characterisation of the invalidity revenge problem outlined above has 
assumed that the dialetheist’s metatheory is carried out along the lines of the 
relevant strategy, which I have suggested is the most promising option for the 
dialetheist. Priest thinks another, model-theoretic strategy is also available. I 
have argued that this strategy will not work. Still, it is worth briefly discussing 
the extent to which the invalidity revenge problem affects this strategy. 
As discussed, the only conditional available on this strategy is material (though 
whether, given the failure of modus ponens, this ought to be called the material 
‘conditional’, is contentious). Since this does not detach, and it features in the 
definition of validity, validity itself does not detach (which is to say just that we 
cannot ‘detach’ the truth of the conclusion of a valid inference from the truth of 
its premises). Priest’s response to this difficulty is to appeal to the fact that 
classical reasoning can be recaptured in consistent contexts. So, unless the 
premises of an inference are both true in a model and untrue in the same model, 
we are at liberty to detach the conclusion. But if the premises are both true and 
untrue in the same model, we cannot detach the conclusion. Because the 
invalidity revenge problem essentially involves sentences which are both true 
and untrue in the same model, one might think this makes things more difficult, 
since reasoning from such contradictions is almost impossible. Indeed, one might 
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wonder how we even demonstrate the existence of such contradictions if our 
ability to reason about them is crippled in this way. 
For example, consider the simplest model-theoretic liar sentence described 
above, L, equivalent to ¬(M ⊩ L). As before, we derive a contradiction as 
follows: 
(1) M ⊩ L   (suppose for reductio) 
(2) T<L>   (1, (*)) 
(3) L   (2, T-scheme) 
(4) ¬(M ⊩ L)  (3, substituting equivalents) 
(5) ¬(M ⊩ L)  (1, 4, reductio) 
(6) L   (5, substituting equivalents) 
(7) T<L>   (6, T-scheme) 
(8) M ⊩ L   (7, (*)) 
(9) M ⊩ L ∧ ¬(M ⊩ L) (5, 8, ∧-introduction) 
For each step in this argument, if we want the truth of the conclusion, we need 
to be able to obtain the truth of the conclusion of a valid argument from the 
truth of its premises but, if L is contradictory as in (9), we can’t do this. Still, 
we may think of this as providing a reductio of the supposition that there are no 
sentences which are both true and untrue in the same model, since, if there 
were no such sentences, could always obtain the truth of the conclusion of a 
valid argument from the truth of its premises, legitimating each step of the 
argument just given. So, if we suppose that there are no such sentences, we can 
demonstrate that there are some. In fact, the argument above seems to 
demonstrate that L itself must be of this kind since, if it were not, each step in 
the argument above would be licit and we could obtain the truth of (9). The only 
way for the argument to fail is for the conclusion, that L is both true and untrue 
in M, to be correct after all. The same will be true of each of the similar 
arguments given in the preceding section. So, in fact, there exist a great many 
sentences which are both true and untrue in the same model, and all the ones 
we used to invalidate dialetheically valid inference principles are among them. 
What we need to get from these sorts of sentences to the invalidity of a given 
inference principle, assuming that argument above gives us only {M ⊩ L, ¬(M ⊩ 
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L)} is an instance of ∧-introduction, to give us M ⊩ L ∧ ¬(M ⊩ L), then an 
instance of the principle, A ∧ ¬B ⊢ ¬(A → B), giving us ¬(M ⊩ L → (M ⊩ L)). This 
would, for instance, be a counter-instance to reflexivity. One might think that 
the fact that the conditional in the definition is material, and that the premises 
of this instance are both true and untrue in a model, would mean that these 
steps are illicit. This is not so. The definition of validity is such that, in certain 
cases, we cannot detach the truth of the conclusion of a valid argument from 
the truth of its premises. But this does not prevent us applying syntactic 
inference rules like ∧-introduction, to obtain the counter-example we want. 
Pending some argument that the weakness of the materially-defined notion of 
validity prevents, not just obtaining the truth of the conclusion of a valid 
argument from the truth of the premises, but the application of syntactic 
inference rules, we can demonstrate the invalidity of some valid inference 
principles, even on the model-theoretic strategy. Indeed, it would seem, all the 
same ones as before. Given the weakness of this strategy, this is a somewhat 
surprising result. 
4.4 Chapter Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been argue that versions of dialetheism which 
take their metatheory to be paraconsistent suffer from revenge problems. 
Priest’s dialetheism is the most sophisticated and well-described version of 
dialetheism in general, and this sort of dialetheism, more specifically. Priest 
gives powerful arguments for this view, which were critically discussed in 
Chapter 3. Chief among this was the problem of revenge: each of the extant 
theories of the paradoxes was argued by Priest to face self-refuting expressive 
limitations and dialetheism, he claimed, is the only way to avoid these. Other 
arguments, too, were described, for example that naive set-theory, 
paraconsistently construed, is the only account of sets able to respect our 
mathematical practices. My discussion of revenge problems for the view first 
focused on the alleged inexpressibility of the notions ‘non-dialetheia’ and ‘just 
false’. After giving a couple of possible responses to these problems, I moved on 
to my own ‘Invalidity Revenge’ problem, showing that, for dialetheist with a 
paraconsistent metatheory, either all, or almost all inference principles are 
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invalid and, moreover, that ‘just-invalid’ is equivalent to ‘invalid’. This renders 
these notions inexpressible and, I have argued, means that dialetheism has a 
revenge problem of the same kind they charge non-dialetheists as facing. If this 
is correct, it is a significant blow to the motivations for dialetheism. Many 
philosophers, I suspect, would think the demonstration of a revenge problem for 
dialetheism to, effectively, refute the theory. This is not my view. Though, of 
course, the revenge problem is extremely serious, plausibly, every available 
view of the paradoxes suffers from it. It may be that dialetheism, involving, as it 
does, the acceptance of true contradictions, requires some special theoretical 
benefit to outweigh this special cost. Revenge immunity would certainly be such 
a benefit. However, it may not be the only one available. In particular, the set-
theoretic arguments of Priest’s, and especially those concerning absolute 
generality, seem to me quite powerful. Though these are arguments for naïve 
set theory, rather than dialetheism per se, treating set theory inconsistently is 
certainly a strong contender for a naïve account of the sets. A proper assessment 
of these arguments, and whether dialetheism can really be motivated by them, 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, if dialetheism, of the kind endorsed 
by Priest, has a revenge problem, these arguments seem the most promising as 
an alternative motivation for the view. 
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Chapter 5: Metatheoretically Consistent Dialetheism 
5.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter is about dialetheism which takes as its metatheory classical ZF set 
theory. The primary focus will be the version of this view defended by JC Beall 
in his 2009 book, Spandrels of Truth. A number of authors have defended (or at 
least sympathetically characterised) variants of dialetheism in a number of 
areas, for example, Cogburn (2004), Garfield (2004), Kroon (2004), Mares (2004), 
Mortensen (in a number of works including his (1985), (1997), (2009)) and Ripley 
(2011). They have not, however, offered a comprehensive theory of dialetheism, 
specifically endorsing a particular metatheory and responding to potential 
revenge objections. Since Beall’s book is the only one I am aware of to do this 
explicitly, with a classical metatheory, it seems right to focus on this. 
It is worth mentioning two approaches to dialetheism which won’t receive 
significant discussion here. The first is dialetheism underpinned with a logic in 
which some structural meta-rule fails (these are known as sub-structural logics), 
such as cut, contraction or transitivity. A version of sub-structural dialetheism is 
defended, for example, by Ripley in his (2013) in which he rejects the 
transitivity of entailment. Another view which won’t be discussed is the co-
called detachment-free dialetheism, in which modus ponens is rejected as 
invalid, defended recently by Beall (2013). 
One reason these I don’t discuss these is lack of space: one can’t discuss 
everything and the views to which I devote most discussion, Priest’s and Beall’s 
(at least, the version defended in his 2009), are, at the moment, far more 
prominent in the literature. Secondly, these views are very new and their 
authors have not yet offered responses to the revenge problem on behalf of 
them. Relatedly, since these views have only recently developed, it is not, to my 
knowledge, known whether they can be given a metatheory which has the same 
logic as the object theory. This being the case, we should take the metatheory, 
for the present, to be classical. This fact, I think, means that these views should 
be subject to at least some of the revenge problems which I argue face 
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metatheoretically consistent dialetheism of a kind more similar to Beall’s (2009). 
It seems to me, for example, that the formal revenge problem outlined below 
will apply to these theories in much the same way as to the views I discuss 
explicitly below. If Ripley’s theory can be given an adequate metatheory in sub-
structural terms, things may be different, but we shall have to wait for this 
development before taking a view. Similarly, Beall may be able to give a 
detachment-free metatheory for his detachment-free object theory. Though this 
might depend on the details of the theory, we should note the similarity 
between this project and what Priest calls ‘The Material Strategy’ for a 
dialetheist metatheory (discussed in section 4.1 of Chapter 4), which also did not 
contain a detachable conditional, to its disadvantage. It’s difficult to see how 
Beall’s detachment-free theory would fare any better on this score, so perhaps 
there is reason to be sceptical of a revenge-free theory along detachment-free 
lines. 
I begin by giving Beall’s view in informal terms, giving his account of dialetheia 
as ‘spandrels of truth’ which he takes to be inevitable by-products of the logical 
role which constitutes the truth predicate’s sole purpose. I then present the 
formal semantics Beall gives for his view, including what he takes to be the 
correct conditional. Along the way, I offer some critical discussion of Beall’s 
version of metatheoretically consistent dialetheism and of the view more 
generally. 
5.1 Spandrels of Truth 
 
According to Beall, truth is a logical device constructed to overcome our 
expressive limitations as finite beings. This logical device gives rise to the truth 
of some contradictions but only, he thinks, in “a fairly mundane, ‘deflated’ 
sense.” (2009, p.1) 
God, because of his infinite capacities, says Beall, could use the truth-free 
fragment of English to completely describe our world. But because we are unlike 
God in respect of our capacities, we cannot do this. We must introduce a device 
which allows us to express generalisations we could not otherwise express. The 
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device in question is a transparent truth predicate, which is introduced via rules 
of substitution: Tr<α> and α are intersubstitutable in all non-opaque contexts. 
According to Beall’s picturesque story, before the truth predicate was 
introduced, we spoke only in a truth-free language. We could express a good 
number of things (taking his examples), that Max is a cat, say, or that Gödel and 
Tarski were independently ingenious and so on. But, because of our interests, 
especially, but not only, our theoretical interests, we must also be able to 
generalise in a way which is not possible for us without our logical generalising 
device. I may wish to agree with everything Bob says, for example. If he says 
only a couple of things, and I know what they are, I can do this by simply 
repeating them. But if Bob says a great many things, or I haven’t heard 
everything Bob has said (and I wish to agree with him on trust), for example, this 
may become difficult or impossible.  The difficulty is even clearer in theoretical 
cases: I may wish to agree with quantum mechanics, on the basis of the 
testimony of experts, despite not understanding the theory, or knowing all of its 
contents. I could not do this by repeating each of the sentences which make up 
quantum mechanics. A further problem is that many complex theories might 
contain infinitely many sentences, in which case it would be impossible for me 
to endorse them by uttering each of such sentences. Instead, Beall thinks, we 
introduce our transparent predicate, via its substitution rules, and say ‘Quantum 
mechanics is true’, or ‘Everything Bob says is true’.  
So, although God could agree with a theory containing infinitely many sentences 
by simply repeating every sentence in the theory, perhaps because he has an 
infinite amount of time to do it in, or perhaps because he can say each sentence 
twice as quickly as the last, we cannot. So we introduce a truth predicate to do 
our generalising for us. This, according to Beall, is the only job truth has in our 
language: it is not a substantive property which picks out some important 
feature about the world, but rather a logical tool for the purposes of 
generalisation. 
To illustrate the point, he says we could have achieved the same goal via the 
story of Aiehtela (pronounced, he says, ‘eye-ah-tell-ah’) and Aiehtelanu 
(pronounced ‘eye-ah-tell-ah-noo’), where ‘Aiehtela accepts x’ is everywhere 
(apart from opaque contexts) intersubstitutable with x and ‘Aiehtelanu accepts 
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x’ is equivalent to the negation of x. Whether we use ‘x is true’ or ‘Aiehtela 
accepts x’ doesn’t matter, according to Beall, so long as they have the correct, 
transparent properties; what matters is the logical, generalising job these 
predicates allow us to do.  
When we first learned of Aiehtela and Aiehtelanu, it would, according to Beall, 
have been natural to reify the characters and ask after their nature. Perhaps we 
might suppose Aiehtela accepts sentences on the basis of their coherence with 
other sentences, for example. But, Beall thinks, if we are right to think that the 
characters were invoked merely for their usefulness in allowing us to generalise, 
this reification is a mistake: Aiehtela has no essential nature, at least not in the 
sense that it picks out an important feature of the world. 
The moral of these stories given by Beall is, for the most part, the familiar view 
known variously as ‘deflationism’, as Beall points out, citing Field’s defence 
(1994) as one with which he is in broad, methodological agreement. 
Throughout his (2009), Beall distinguishes his minimal, deflated notion of truth 
from more substantial notions by calling it ‘ttruth’ (for ‘transparent truth’). To 
avoid multiplying terminology, I stick to the more usual ‘truth’, allowing context 
to make it clear when I am talking about Beall’s transparent notion and when 
more substantial notions are being considered. He doesn’t give any extended 
defence of the view against the well-known problems it faces, since his purpose 
is simply to give what he thinks is the best account of the paradoxes available to 
someone who holds this view of truth. Since my purpose is just to assess the 
extent to which his view (and other metatheoretically consistent forms of 
dialetheism) faces revenge problems, I follow him in not spending time on 
objections to deflationism. I am fairly sympathetic to the basic view anyway. 
One point worth making is that one might get the impression, from Beall’s claim 
that we could have done without a truth predicate, if we had been less 
ambitious in our desires to generalise, that we would thereby have done without 
contradiction. In other words, one might think, for Beall, that our dialetheism is 
contingent upon us actually adding a truth predicate to our language. That this 
is so is far from clear. Beall is committed, as are most dialetheists, to what I’ll 
call the ‘modal law of non-contradiction): 
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(MLNC) ¬⋄(P ∧ ¬P) 
The effect of this is, so long as a contradiction is merely possible, it generates a 
further, actual, contradiction, viz. that the contradiction in question is both 
possible and impossible. For example, suppose that there is some α for which 
⋄(α ∧ ¬α). By MLNC (and the introduction rule for conjunction), this gives us ⋄(α 
∧ ¬α) ∧ ¬⋄(α ∧ ¬α). So, for dialetheists, merely possible contradiction 
generates actual contradiction (this has been pointed out by Slater (1995, 
pp.451-454) and Restall (1997, pp.156-163)). So, even if we had not introduced 
our truth predicate, presumably we could have, and so there could be a 
sentence, α, such that α and ¬α. Since, by MLNC, there also could not have been 
such a sentence, we would seem to have actual contradiction whether we 
introduce the truth predicate or not. So, in fact, dialetheism is more deeply 
built-in to Beall’s view than one might suppose, from the remarks that we could, 
had our interests been different, done without the truth predicate, which Beall 
takes to be the source of dialetheia. 
The point that possible contradictions generate actual ones is very important for 
Beall’s view, and I will return to it. 
Two important logical principles are the law of excluded middle (LEM) and 
bivalence (BIV): 
(LEM) ⊨ α ∨ ¬α 
(BIV)   ⊨ T<α> ∨ T<¬α> 
Beall uses ‘⊢’ to record validity, but to keep my usage of symbolism consistent, I 
use ‘⊨’ for this, keeping ‘⊢’ for syntactic consequence. Assuming the 
equivalence of falsity with untruth (accepted by all participants in this debate, 
including Beall), BIV is equivalent to the, perhaps more familiar, form of 
bivalence ⊨ T<α> ∨ F<α>. Moreover, assuming truth behaves transparently, LEM 
and BIV are equivalent too. Beall accepts this and so accepts both. This means 
his account of negation is exhaustive (though, as will be clear when I present the 
semantics for his view, it fails to be exhaustive at some abnormal worlds). 
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Beall does not give any extensive arguments for this feature of negation against, 
for example, Field’s (2008), which achieves transparent truth without this. Beall 
admits this and says he does not know of any powerful arguments for preferring 
his own approach over Field’s. His own reason for preferring his view, he says, is 
a feeling that Field misses an important feature of negation (presumably 
exhaustion, though one can imagine Field responding that Beall misses an even 
more important feature, exclusion, when he allows α and ¬α), and that Field’s 
view is too complicated (2009, p.x). However, he says, he does not know how to 
develop these into arguments against Field (he does, however, devote all of 
Chapter 4 of his (2009) to discussion of such views). So, for the purposes of 
discussion, I simply grant, for the present, that LEM (and, equivalently BIV) 
holds. 
Beall employs the term ‘spandrels’ to describe the dialetheia (though he prefers 
the term ‘glut’) which he thinks arise from the semantic paradoxes. The term 
comes from architecture and is also used in evolutionary biology, and denotes an 
unintended, but inevitable, by-product of some intended thing. In architecture, 
archways, as curved figures, inevitably generate more-or-less triangular shapes 
at the corners of the rectangles in which they are set. These inevitable shapes 
are spandrels: unintended, but inevitable by-products of archways. Evolutionary 
spandrels are features of an organism which are not directly selected for, but 
which unavoidably come along with some feature which is selected for. Beall’s 
example is the male nipple, which is a spandrel of the female nipple. 
Dialetheia, Beall thinks, are spandrels of language. They are an unintended, but 
inevitable, by-product of our transparent truth predicate. We need to be able to 
make the sorts of generalisations described above, so we introduce our 
predicate, T<α>, as intersubstitutable with α, into our language (in this case, 
English) and, along with the other features of that language, we end up with 
sentences like L: 
L: The sentence L is not true 
Since truth is intersubstitutable, it supports the rules he calls ‘Capture’ and 
‘Release’: 
Capture: T<α> ⊨ α 
148 
 
Release: α ⊨ T<α> 
These rules, delivered by transparent truth (as well as the, presumably 
innocuous, assumption that α ⊨ α, as well as the standard structural rules), 
along with the assumption we’ve made that negation is exhaustive, deliver the 
existence of dialetheia7 i.e. they entail that the sentence L is such that T<L> and 
T<¬L>. 
So Beall is a dialetheist, but thinks of himself as such only in a mundane, 
deflated sense. One, perhaps small, issue arising here concerns Beall’s 
characterisation of his dialetheism as “mundane” and “deflated” (expressions he 
has used together at least twice in his book, once on p.1 and once on p.6). He 
says later that “[t]he position is dialetheic, but only in a modest, ‘deflated’ 
way; the ‘[true] falsehoods’ are merely transparently true and transparently 
false; they are [true] sentences whose negations are also [true].” (2009, p.17) 
This might give the impression that his deflationism about truth – that truth is 
some non-substantial logical tool, rather than a full-blooded property (in some 
sense to be specified) – has somehow ‘deflated’ his dialetheism and made this 
non-substantial. But it’s not clear that deflationary dialetheism, per se, is any 
less full-blooded a version of the view than one which takes truth to be a more 
substantial property. Both think that things of the form T<α> ∧ F<α> hold, and 
given the definition of falsity, T<α> ∧ T<¬α> would then hold, and given Beall’s 
views about the truth predicate’s transparency, these are equivalent to T<α> ∧ 
¬T<α>, and to α ∧ ¬α. We should note, as an aside, that, for example, a 
correspondence theorist is perfectly entitled to these equivalencies too. But why 
should this make Beall’s dialetheism any less robust, or radical, than that of any 
other dialetheist? Dialetheism is just the view that some contradictions are true, 
and Beall subscribes to this every bit as much as someone like Priest, who does 
not endorse deflationism about truth. 
It is true, as well shall see, that Beall’s dialetheism is less radical, or at least 
less thoroughgoing, in some ways, than other versions of the view (for example, 
Priest’s). But this is so because of the restricted domain in which he thinks 
dialetheia arise (an issue on which people accepting his minimalist account of 
                                                          
7
 This is not to say that each of these assumptions are required to demonstrate the existence of dialetheia, 
since we can prove a contradiction from the liar without the use of the law of excluded middle. 
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truth may differ), not because deflationism about truth somehow, on its own, 
makes the claim that contradictions are true any less substantive or radical. It 
may be that Beall does not intend to suggest this further claim, but the 
possibility of reading him this way seems plausible enough to point out the fault 
in it. 
The restricted domain in which dialetheia arise is, for Beall, that which contains 
semantic notions like truth. For him, then, dialetheia are a ‘merely semantic’ 
phenomenon, and his dialetheism is ‘merely semantic’ dialetheism. Making more 
precise this characterisation of his restricted version of dialetheism is the final 
part of his philosophical view which I will characterise, but I will follow Beall in 
giving a brief, formal interlude to specify some of the most basic features of the 
semantics he endorses. 
5.2  Basic Formal Picture 
 
Beall calls disjunction, conjunction and negation the ‘Boolean connectives’. He 
does not mean us to understand him as committing himself to the classical 
behaviour of these connectives, but he wishes to avoid the more usual term 
‘extensional connectives’ since negation, on his view, is not extensional. 
He gives the semantics for the Boolean connectives in terms of worlds, invoking 
the so-called ‘Routley star’, following the Routleys (1972). I follow Beall’s 
presentation (2009, pp.7-) closely in what follows, and so begin by giving the 
classical semantics for the Boolean semantics where classicality is ensured by 
adding a constraint which, when relaxed, gives us the more general view which 
Beall endorses. 
Interpretations are taken to be ordered quintuples <W, N,@, *, ⊩>, where W is 
the (non-empty) set of worlds, N is the (non-empty) set of normal worlds, and is 
a subset of W, ‘@’ denotes the actual world and we take the difference of W and 
N to be the set of abnormal worlds (which may or may not be empty). The star 
operator ‘*’ on W is such that w** = w. Beall uses ‘⊨’ to indicate that a sentence 
is true at a world, but to keep notation consistent with other chapters, I use ‘⊩’ 
instead, and so ‘w ⊩ α’ is read as ‘α is true at w’. 
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Beall gives the following conditions as specifying the classical models: 
S0 w = w* 
S1 w ⊩ α or w* ⊩ ¬α, for all w ∈ N 
S2 w ⊩ ¬α iff ¬(w*⊩ α) 
S3 w ⊩ α ∨ β iff w ⊩ α or w ⊩ β 
S4 w ⊩ α ∧ β iff w ⊩ α and w ⊩ β 
It is S0 which ensures classicality and, in this context, combines with S2 to make 
negation extensional. If S0 is dropped, then negation will cease to be 
extensional. But sticking with the current framework, and S0, we say that a 
sentence, α, is ‘verified in a model’ just if, in that model, @ ⊩ α and, for some 
set of sentences, Σ, w ⊩ Σ just if w ⊩ β, for all β ∈ Σ. Let Σ be a set of sentences 
and α any sentence, we can then define, what Beall calls ‘CPL* validity’ as 
follows: 
CPL* validity: Σ ⊨ α just if, for all classical models, if @ ⊩ Σ, then @ ⊩ α  
So, on this definition, validity is defined only in terms of the actual world, @, of 
each model. This picture is classical, and so Beall does not endorse it. In 
particular, he must give up the classicality constraint S0, since it does not allow 
for dialetheia. For example, suppose α is a dialetheia at a world, w, so we have 
w ⊩ α and w ⊩ ¬α, then by the clause for negation, S2, we have w ⊩ α and 
¬(w*⊩ α) (Beall call’s w* the ‘star mate’ of w). But then, by the classical 
constrain S0, we have w ⊩ α and ¬(w ⊩ α), which is impossible. One might 
wonder why this is impossible, since, for example, Priest has no problem with 
accepting contradictions of this kind. The reason is that Beall’s metatheory is 
classical, so although we can have, on Beall’s view w ⊩ α and w ⊩ ¬α (for some 
w and α), we cannot have w ⊩ α and ¬(w ⊩ α), since this would introduce 
inconsistency (and triviality) into the metatheory. In other words, sentences can 
be both true at a world and false at that world, but no sentence can be both 
true at a world and untrue at that world. This is a problematic feature of the 
semantics, it seems to me, and makes the picture undesirably artificial (I have 
also discussed this issue in the context of Priest view in Chapter 4, Section 
5.2.1). One way to put the issue is as follows: truth, for Beall, commutes with 
negation. That is, the negation of a sentence, α, is true, if, and only if, α is 
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untrue. This is an important feature of the relationship between truth and 
negation. On the other hand, truth-in-a-model and negation do not commute. 
That is, the following does not hold: 
w ⊩ ¬α iff ¬(w ⊩ α) 
So truth-in-a-model and ‘¬’ interact very differently to truth and negation, and 
so the plausibility of the former as truth-in-a-model, and the latter as negation 
come into question. I suspect Beall’s response to this would be to claim that this 
is only a problematic artificiality on the assumption that the semantics we’re 
giving for our model language are intended to model those of our real language. 
Beall rejects this assumption, and takes the semantics to be ‘merely heuristic’, 
intending to give a theory modelling the real semantics of natural language 
later. 
My counter to this is similar to the one made in Chapter 2 of this thesis in the 
context of defining revenge, and in Section 1.4 of the present chapter, 
discussing revenge on Beall’s theory in particular. We need to be given this 
further theory if this response from Beall is to be adequate, so that we can see 
that the same problem will not arise in this new context.  
The problem seems to be fairly general for dialetheist theories which take, as 
their metatheory, classical ZF. There can be sentences of the metatheory which 
say of an object theory sentence, α, that it is both true and false, but if we have 
a principle which takes us from the falsity of α to the negation of the 
metatheoretic sentence asserting the truth of α, then we have a contradiction in 
the metatheory. So we cannot have such principles, on pain of triviality, and this 
is apt to make the semantics artificial, assuming the view is committed to the 
transparency of the truth predicate (and so the equivalency of falsity with 
untruth) in the object language. It may be that Beall’s yet-to-be-provided model 
of the semantics of natural language avoids this issue, but he must actually 
provide the model if this is to be convincing. 
So, giving up S0 gives us the non-classical picture Beall wants. We keep each of 
S1-S4, taking them to give us the LP* models. We then redefine (only slightly) 
validity as follows, again where w ⊩ Σ iff w ⊩ β for all β ∈ Σ  
LP* validity: Σ ⊨ α just if, for all LP* models, if @ ⊩ Σ, then @ ⊩ α  
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This new, non-classical, logic allows for there to be dialetheia at a world, w, in 
cases where w’s star mate, w*, is such that ¬(w* ⊩ α) ∧ ¬(w* ⊩ ¬α). In other 
words, α can be a dialetheia at a normal world, w, just if w* is a world at which 
LEM fails. Given S1, this means w* must be abnormal.  
The resulting logic is LP, familiar from Chapters 3 and 4. One fact which Beall 
takes to be important is that, if α follows from Σ by the definition of validity LP*, 
then α follows from Σ by the definition CPL*. This follows because any classical 
model is an LP* model (since, if a model meets S0-S4, a fortiori, it meets S1-S4). 
It is also true, though Beall refers the reader to Priest’s (1979) for a proof, that 
LP and classical logic share the same logical truths. That classical logic is an 
extension, in the sense, of the ‘real’ logic LP is something which Beall takes to 
hold philosophical significance. 
Next Beall demonstrates how predicates and quantifiers are introduced. The 
exact details need not concern us here, so I refer the reader to Beall’s (2009, 
pp.11-12) for these. The truth predicate, T<x>, is introduced via the 
transparency principle: 
Transparency: Let β be any sentence in which α occurs. Then the result of 
substituting T<α> for any occurrence of α in β has the same semantic status as β. 
This is equivalent, on Beall’s view, to what he calls ‘Weak Transparency’: 
Weak Transparency: w ⊩ T<α> iff w ⊩ α, for all α and w ∈ W 
This is taken as a constraint on the admissible models of LP*, and so all LP* 
models, by definition, satisfy Weak Transparency and, therefore, Transparency. 
In the current set-up, where LP contains only the material conditional, various 
desirable principles, which one might take to be constitutive of the notion of 
conditional, such as modus ponens, fail. So, as things stand, the logic is 
inadequate: a suitable conditional must be added. When this is done, Beall says, 
Weak Transparency no longer entails Transparency. The present, conditional-
free, theory, which is essentially quantified LP with the addition of a 
transparent truth predicate, Beall calls LPTT. 18-24 
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Beall suggests two questions might arise about this set-up. The first asks whether 
there are any non-trivial models of the system. The second asks whether there 
are any ‘natural’ models of it, where ‘natural’ is understood to mean ‘has a 
consistent, indeed classical, base language’, where the base language is the 
truth-free fragment of the language. The answer to both questions is ‘yes’, and 
he lays-out, and discusses, these result in an appendix, (2009, pp.18-24). I 
follow Beall again in returning to the philosophical issues before finally giving 
Beall’s account of the conditional. 
5.3  Merely Semantic Dialetheism 
To return to Beall’s metaphorical story with which he motivates his view, we 
could, if we had the right capacities, describe the world entirely without truth. 
That is, the truth-free base language, ‘in principle’, suffices for a complete 
description of the world. The reason we invoke a transparent truth predicate is 
not that is picks out some feature of the world which is missed by the base 
language, but rather that it allows us to overcome, in a sense, our finitude. It 
doesn’t generate ‘new claims’ about the world, but, rather, ‘reveals’ claims 
about the world that we couldn’t otherwise express due to our various 
limitations. According to Beall, a being without such limitation could do without 
a truth predicate (2009, p.14). 
Even so, because of the grammatical features of languages like English, new 
claims arise anyway which are truth-ineliminable, such as the familiar liar 
sentences as well as truth-tellers like TT: 
(TT) The sentence TT is true. 
Because of the way this sentence is constructed, the occurrence of the truth 
predicate cannot be eliminated by the substitution rules for the truth predicate. 
TT differs from the liar, however, in not providing a direct argument to 
inconsistency, since it can quite consistently be either true or false; it’s just 
that nothing would seem to decide which. Beall opts for what he takes to be the 
simplest approach to such sentences, which is to treat all such truth-
ineliminable sentences as dialetheia, though he open to the possibility of 
treating such sentences asymmetrically (as either just true or just false). The 
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position is actually slightly awkward. Curry sentences, too, are truth-
ineliminable, but Beall cannot, if he is to avoid triviality, treat this as a 
dialetheia. Acknowledging this point, Beall restricts his claim, that all truth-
ineliminable sentences are dialetheia, to the conditional-free fragment of the 
language (2009, p.34). He does not give an account of how we are to decide 
which truth-ineliminable sentences are gluts in the language generally. But, 
even in the conditional-free part of the language, we can still construct 
sentences like “This sentence is true and JC Beall is a fried egg”. If this is 
treated as a dialetheia, then a base-language contradiction follows, that JC 
Beall both is and is not a fried egg. If all such sentences are treated as 
dialetheia, then triviality follows.8 So, in fact, it is unclear what is available to 
Beall in terms of a general account of which truth-ineliminable sentences are 
dialetheia, such that it vindicates the claim that the truth-teller is a dialetheia, 
without committing him to triviality via Curry (or Curry-like) paradoxes. 
So, on Beall’s view, the truth-free fragment of our language, the base language, 
is entirely consistent and classical. When we add our generalising expressive 
device, T<x>, it brings with it dialetheic spandrels: truth-ineliminable sentences 
which are both true and false. But this, according to Beall, is the only way 
dialetheia arise. In this sense, dialetheia are a ‘merely semantic’ phenomenon. 
The way to make this more precise, according to Beall, is to let ℒ be our base 
language and model the idea that dialetheia are ‘merely semantic’ by 
stipulatively restricting our class of LP* models to only those such that ¬(@ ⊩ α ∧ 
¬α), for any α ∈ ℒ. The effect of this is that there are no models containing 
base-language dialetheia. One advantage of this feature, which Beall highlights 
(2009, pp.16-17), is that, though they are not, of course, valid, both disjunctive 
syllogism and explosion are without counterexample in the base language. We 
might call this, using Priest’s terminology (2006, p.110) ‘quasi-valid’. The 
advantage is that one can safely use these inference principles in when 
reasoning in the base language. 
So this is Beall’s ‘merely semantic dialetheism’: our truth-free base language is 
perfectly consistent and classical, and were it not for our limitations, this 
                                                          
8
 This point was made by Ben Burgis to me in conversation, and in his unpublished manuscript, Does Beall’s 
Version of Dialetheism Avoid Triviality?. 
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language would have been sufficient. But because of our limitations, we had to 
introduce a transparent truth predicate, which brings with it inevitable 
dialetheic spandrels. But because this is how these spandrels are introduced, 
dialetheia are ‘merely semantic’ and contradiction does not ‘infect’ the rest of 
our (consistent) language. 
It seems to me a serious problem arises here for Beall’s view. One of the many 
models of LP* is the trivial model, in which every sentence is both true and 
untrue. Beall rejects this model of the logic. The reason he gives is its lack of 
usefulness, since the “trivial model cannot invalidate anything that isn’t already 
invalidated.” (2009, p.64 n.10). This is a peculiar reason to reject the legitimacy 
of a model. Even if we admit that the trivial model does no work on its own, it 
doesn’t follow that we ought to deny its very existence. Some appeal to 
parsimony might be made here, that we should accept the existence of as few 
models as we can get away with (in some sense of ‘get away with’), but this 
would be difficult to substantiate, given the loss of theoretical parsimony from 
adding restrictions ruling out what would otherwise be perfectly legitimate 
models of the logic. It also doesn’t follow from the fact that a model doesn’t 
invalidate anything that it does no theoretical work. Models of the logic give us a 
guide to what is logically possible, on that logic. The existence of the trivial 
model, then, tells us that the trivial situation is logically possible in LP*. So it is 
not theoretically inert: far from it, as we shall see in a moment. 
Perhaps the worst problem facing this reason for rejecting the existence of the 
trivial model is that it massively over-generalises. No counterexample to any 
inference principle, at least none of which I am aware, and none that Beall 
mentions, depends for its efficacy on the particular, identifying features of a 
single model. Simplifying to the single-premise case (and to the cases where 
counter-examples involve a single world – things are more complicated in some 
cases, as can be seen in the discussion of Beall’s conditional, below), a counter 
example to an inference principle A ⊨ B is a world, w, at which A holds but B 
fails to hold. For any such world, we can find a different one in which A and B 
take the same values, but which differs with regard to the truth value of some 
further sentence, C, which is not relevant to the inference principle in question. 
If this is right, then every model is such that it cannot invalidate anything which 
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is not already invalidated, since excising that model from the theory does not, 
on its own, affect which inference principles are invalid. 
On the other hand, it is extremely important for Beall that there be no trivial 
model. Recall from section 1.1.1 the modal law of non-contradiction, to which 
Beall is committed: 
(MLNC) ¬⋄(P ∧ ¬P) 
For any merely possible contradiction, α, we have ⋄(α ∧ ¬α) and, by MLNC, ¬⋄(α 
∧ ¬α). So any merely possible contradiction delivers the actual contradiction 
that it is both possible and impossible. Importantly, if the α is a sentence of the 
base language, then ⋄(α ∧ ¬α) ∧ ¬⋄(α ∧ ¬α), too, is base language, because 
whether a sentence is in the base language is a matter only of whether the 
sentence contains the transparent truth predicate T<x>. So, if Beall’s theory 
allows for a trivial model, then since every sentence, including every sentence 
of the base language, is both true and untrue there, then for every sentence β, 
of the base language, we have ⋄(β ∧ ¬β) and (by MLNC) ¬⋄(β ∧ ¬β). The 
existence of a trivial model, then, would (assuming its accessibility from the 
actual world) refute Beall’s merely semantic dialetheism, by swamping the base 
language with inconsistency. 
The point, moreover, extends well beyond the trivial model. If there is any 
model at all containing a base language contradiction, we can run the same 
argument to generate an actual base-language contradiction. The principle 
MLNC effectively says that no contradiction is logically possible. But since many 
contradictions are logically possible (indeed, actual), MLNC is a dialetheia: all 
contradictions are logically impossible, but some are possible too. However, the 
argument given above means that Beall is committed to every base language 
contradiction being logically impossible only. Since Beall is a dialetheist, it is 
difficult to see what could motivate this claim. 
As an aside, one might think that Beall cannot even express that certain things 
are logically impossible only, because of the just false problem, since for 
something to be impossible only is, presumably, for it to be just false in every 
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model (or world). So, unless Beall had some consistent notion of ‘just false’, 
‘just impossible’ could not be expressed without including some possible things 
too. This is not so. Since Beall’s metalanguage is classical, he can, in the 
metalanguage, restrict the admissible models of the logic to those free of base-
language contradiction. This is exactly the effect of the restriction above that, 
with ℒ the truth-free fragment of the language, we restrict the admissible 
models to those such that ¬(@ ⊩ α ∧ ¬α), for any α ∈ ℒ. The consistency of this 
restriction on the base language, then, is guaranteed by the consistency of the 
metatheory.  
So Beall is able, though only via the metatheory, to restrict the admissible 
models of the logic and so force consistency on the base language. The problem, 
then, is not with his ability to restrict the theory in this way, but in motivating 
the restriction. This, it seems to me, is the important upshot of the debate 
between Beall (2011) and Eldridge-Smith (2011, 2012) concerning the Pinocchio 
Paradox (though it is not made clear in the exchange itself). 
Eldridge-Smith (2011) tells a story about a puppet, Pinocchio, whose nose grows 
if and only if he speaks a falsehood. Pinocchio utters the sentence ‘My nose is 
growing’ and, according to the story, the world explodes in triviality. The 
problem this is supposed to pose for Beall arises from the fact that the 
contradictory sentence ‘My nose is growing’ is entirely base-language. It is true 
that the principle specifying the behaviour of Pinocchio’s nose contains the 
falsity predicate, but this doesn’t matter, since it doesn’t affect the status of 
‘My nose is growing’ as a sentence of the base language. 
Beall’s response (2011) invokes the more familiar Barber paradox for 
comparison. In the story of the Barber paradox (first described by Russell (1986) 
to describe the Russell Paradox), there is a barber who shaves all and only those 
people in his town who do not shave themselves, and we consider whether this 
barber shaves himself (he does if and only if he doesn’t). Beall asks why 
dialetheists are not committed to contradictions involving barbers, and answers 
that it’s because the story is a fiction: the correct conclusion to draw from the 
barber paradox is that there are no such barbers. This is, of course, correct, and 
no one without an antecedent commitment to a comprehension principle for 
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barbers is likely to disagree. He thinks the Pinocchio Paradox generates no 
further problem. 
For this response to be adequate, we would have to assume that, in order to 
cause problems for Beall’s view, Pinocchio (or the barber, for that matter) 
would have to actually exist. But, as we can see from the arguments above 
employing MLNC, this is not so. All that’s required for Pinocchio, or the barber, 
to cause inconsistency in Beall’s base language is that they be merely logically 
possible. We can agree with Beall that Pinocchio does not actually exist and, 
further, we could accept that he is physically impossible; perhaps (depending on 
the account) we might accept that he is metaphysically impossible, biologically 
impossible, or whatever. But so long as there is some sense of possibility on 
which Pinocchio is possible and for which we have a corresponding version of 
MLNC, the base language must be inconsistent. 
The same is so for the Barber. There are, presumably, no actual barbers of the 
kind described in the story. As with Pinocchio, such barbers may be physically, 
even metaphysically, impossible. But so long as there is a sense of possibility, no 
matter how weak, on which the barber is possible and MLNC holds, base 
language contradiction follows from that possible barber too. 
As an aside, we should be slightly careful about what exactly we mean when we 
say that Pinocchio is logically impossible. What is impossible is for there to be a 
puppet (or any other entity) which has a nose obeying the principle that it grows 
if and only if it speaks a falsehood, and which utters the sentence ‘My nose is 
growing’. So talking puppets called ‘Pinocchio’, including ones which utter ‘My 
nose is growing’ are, presumably, logically possible, so long as their noses don’t 
obey the principle above. Similarly, puppets whose respective noses obey the 
principle that they grow if and only if they speak falsehoods are also, 
presumably, logically possible, so long as they keep quiet. Or, at least, so long 
as they don’t utter the sentence ‘My nose is growing’. What’s impossible is the 
combination of the principle connecting nose growth to the speaking of 
falsehoods and the ‘liar sentence’ uttered. 
One difference between the two cases is that the Barber Paradox is structurally 
isomorphic to Russell’s paradox, whereas the Pinocchio Paradox is structurally 
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isomorphic to the Liar Paradox. Since Beall endorses a classical picture of set 
theory (2009, p.112), he endorses a non-existence solution to the Russell 
Paradox. But, of course, he endorses a dialetheic solution to the Liar Paradox. 
So the Pinocchio Paradox has the advantage that is shares a structure with a 
paradox for which Beall accepts the dialetheic conclusion. 
The Pinocchio Paradox involves a puppet with various features which we don’t 
think are realised in the actual world and which, as I have said, we can accept 
are impossible to realise in a number of senses (physically, perhaps 
metaphysically, perhaps others), but these do not speak to Pinocchio’s logical 
possibility. If we’re to accept as plausible the claim that Pinocchio is logically 
impossible (only), what we need is some logical asymmetry between the liar 
paradox and the Pinocchio paradox which would explain why one is necessarily 
dialetheic, but the other impossible only. But since they are structurally 
isomorphic, it is extremely unclear what this could be. Those endorsing a 
classical view of logic will think that Pinocchio is impossible, as they will the 
liar, on the basis of the more general claim that there are no contradictions. 
Since Beall does not endorse this more general claim, he can’t reject the 
possibility of Pinocchio on this basis. 
So the Pinocchio Paradox is just a concrete instance of a more general problem, 
which is that Beall needs to provide some motivation for taking the base 
language to be completely consistent, given the existence of principles like 
MLNC which deliver base language inconsistency from merely logically possible 
base language contradictions. The value of the Pinocchio paradox is simply in 
providing a particular case where it seems strikingly implausible that Beall, a 
dialetheist, should think it ruled-out as impossible only, on the grounds of logic. 
One asymmetry to which Beall might wish to appeal is that the putative 
contradiction in the Pinocchio case is base language, and so generates base 
language inconsistency, which Beall rejects. But in the present context, this is 
entirely question-begging. The very thing at issue is whether Beall has given us 
good reason for supposing the base language to be consistent. 
One might, instead, look for an asymmetry, or independent motivation for the 
consistency of the base language, in Beall’s picturesque story which motivates 
160 
 
his deflationism and his dialetheism, given in this chapter. But this doesn’t 
provide what we want either. Beall’s story is that we should see dialetheia as 
arising from our transparent truth device, which we introduce to escape our 
finitude and express certain generalisations which we otherwise couldn’t, and 
which comes with inevitable spandrels like the liar. But, given our capacity to 
introduce inconsistent predicates which generate dialetheia, we are stuck with 
inconsistency and we are thereby stuck (on the assumption that we wish to 
reject triviality) with paraconsistent logic. Along with this paraconsistent logic, 
which allows for inconsistency, comes a broader understanding of logical 
possibility than we get on the usual classical picture. There is nothing in this 
logic itself to preclude inconsistent entities like Pinocchio and so, via MLNC, the 
base language contains certain contradictions. We nonetheless think of our 
dialetheism as arising from our understanding of transparent truth, in exactly 
the way Beall describes, it’s just that the appropriate logic allows for the logical 
possibility of base language contradictions (there’s nothing logically wrong with 
them), and so the base language ends up, perhaps surprisingly, to allow in 
dialetheia through the back door. So Beall’s commitment to base-language-
consistency is not justified by the more general motivations he gives for his 
view. We can accept the basic story and still have plausible account of how base 
language inconsistency arises. 
 
The general problem, again, is that a part of Beall’s view on which he places 
special emphasis is the restriction of dialetheia to the semantic fragment of the 
language and the consistency (and classicality) of the base language. That 
Beall’s logic has a trivial model threatens this claim, in the ways described, so 
Beall shuns the existence of this model. His reasons for doing so, I have argued, 
are not good. But the problem is worse, since he must rule out the existence of 
every model containing base language contradiction: all such models (or worlds) 
are logically impossible only. He has not given a motivation for this, and it is 
difficult to see how he could. Pinocchio provides one intuitive case which seems 
like it clearly shouldn’t, in virtue of its similarity to the liar, be impossible only. 
Moreover, there seems a perfectly plausible story to tell, in complete accord 
with Beall’s basic motivational story for his view, of how the base language ends 
up inconsistent. 
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Beall might, perhaps, accept this and decide instead that the consistent 
fragment of our language is the truth-free non-modal part of our language; that 
is, the fragment not containing either a truth predicate or any modal notions. 
This is certainly one option and I know of no reason that inconsistency should 
spread here. It makes the view less interesting, however, in part because Beall’s 
conditional is, as we shall see, modal, and so this fragment of the language 
would be conditional-free. 
5.4 Beall’s Conditional 
As I have said, the theory previously sketched, LPTT (LP plus a transparent truth 
predicate), fails to support important inference principles concerning the 
conditional such as modus ponens. So the conditional (if this is not a misnomer) 
of LPTT is inadequate and must be extended with a suitable conditional 
supporting principles like modus ponens. 
As in the case of Priest’s view (see my discussion in Section 3.2.0 of Chapter 3) 
one of the crucial constraints on a conditional is that it avoid the threat of 
triviality from Curry’s paradox. Which, in the present context, is to say, it must 
avoid any form of contraction: 
(α ∧ (α → β)) → β 
(α → (α → β)) → (α → β) 
α → (α → β) ⊨ α → β 
If any of these hold for ‘→’, triviality follows via the curry paradox. It is 
therefore a constraint on a conditional being suitable that each of these fail. A 
further constraint is that the conditional satisfy identity. That is, we must have 
⊨ α → α. The reason, aside from its being independently compelling, is that it is 
from indentity, combined with the substitution rules by which we introduce our 
truth predicate, that we obtain the crucial principles for truth, capture and 
release: 
Capture: α → T<α> 
Release: T<α> → α 
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So Beall stipulates that a conditional is suitable just if it detaches, validates 
identity and avoids any triviality-inducing principles of contraction. Beall offers 
a bifurcated account of the conditional which gives it different truth 
conditionals depending on the sort of world in which it occurs. One principle is 
given for conditionals at normal worlds, and a separate one for abnormal worlds. 
We expand the structures already given with a ternary relation on worlds R , 
which we think of in terms of accessibility, such that Rw,w’,w’’ holds just if the 
pair <w’,w’’> is accessible under the relation from w (Beall calls the pair ‘w-
accessible’). The reader can consult Chapter 2 of Beall’s (2009) for a fuller 
treatment than I give here. 
Normal. Where w ∈ N and w’ ∈ W,  
w ⊩ α → β iff for or any w’ ∈ W, If w’ ⊩ α, then w’ ⊩ β  
Abnormal. Where w ∈ W – N and w’,w’’ ∈ W 
w ⊩ α → β iff, for any w-accessible <w’,w’’>, if w’ ⊩ α, then w’’ ⊩ β  
So, if a conditional, α → β, occurs at a normal world, it is true just if there is no 
world (normal or abnormal) at which α holds, but β doesn’t. But, if the 
conditional occurs at an abnormal world, then we are constrained by what is 
accessible from that world, so the conditional α → β will hold at an abnormal 
world just is there is no pair of worlds accessible from it where α holds at one, 
but β doesn’t at the other. 
The conditional has the advantage that modus ponens holds of it, as well as 
identity, and that contradiction fails. Beall calls the resulting logic BXTT (BX plus 
transparent truth), and gives an axiomatic system for it which can be shown to 
be complete (Beall presents the axiom system in his (2009, pp.31-32) and refers 
readers to (Priest and Sylvan, 1992) for the completeness proof). 
A final formal issue is how Beall treats validity. This is, ordinarily, as is intuitive, 
defined in terms of the preservation of truth. This is not how Beall defines 
validity. The reason is that, if we introduce a validity predicate, Val, into our 
language and define it in terms of necessary preservation of truth, this gives us: 
V1. Val(<α>,<β>) → (T<α> → T<β>) 
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Where ‘→’ is a detachable conditional, perhaps the one defined above, this 
gives us, along with principles about conjunction valid in BXTT: 
Val(<α ∧ (α → β)>,<β>) 
Which, gives us: 
(α ∧ (α → β)) → β 
This, being a form of contraction, gives us triviality by Curry’s paradox. So Beall 
must give up the connection between validity and truth preservation, at least in 
any form strong enough to deliver V1. 
Beall settles on the following principle (which he restricts to the single-premise 
case for simplicity) as a characterisation of the sense in which, on his view, 
validity relates to the preservation of truth: 
V2. Val(<α>,<β>) → (α ⊃ β) 
Where ‘⊃’ is a material ‘conditional’. This still delivers a form of contraction, 
namely: 
(α ∧ (α → β)) ⊃ β 
But, since ⊃ does not detach, we can’t derive triviality from Curry sentences, 
this form of contraction is benign. For the same reason that this principle is 
harmless (it does not detach) V2 is an extremely weak connection between 
validity and truth-preservation. In particular, it means that one cannot proceed 
from a valid argument and the truth of the argument’s premises to the truth of 
the argument’s conclusion. 
Beall’s response to this apparent problem is to downplay the importance of 
being able to detach the conclusion of a sound argument. The ‘utility’ of valid 
reasoning is to ensure that our reasoning has the right sort of ‘steps’ (2009, 
p.36), specifically that each step must go from truth to truth, from untruth to 
truth, or from untruth to untruth. This, that each step is of the proper kind, 
Beall think, is delivered by V2. That this is the point of reasoning is contentious 
and, on the face of it, wrong. Surely, one might think, the point of valid 
reasoning is that I can begin with true premises and deduce, by that reasoning, 
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the truth of the conclusion. If it is true that I am in Glasgow and that, if I am in 
Glasgow, I am in Scotland, the point of reasoning validly from these premises is, 
on the face of it, that I can obtain the truth of the conclusion that I am in 
Scotland. Beall’s claim that the point of valid reasoning is merely a matter of 
having the right ‘steps’ needs more argument than is given. One might think by 
emphasising the importance of the right steps, Beall is advocating a proof-
theoretic account of logical consequence. But he does not do this, so it is 
unclear what the ‘steps’ delivered by V2 really have to do with the utility of 
valid reasoning, especially given the fact that he admits the ‘proper steps’ may 
take one from true premises to an untrue conclusion (2009, p.36).  
In fact, things are worse for V2, because Beall’s conditional, ‘→’, contraposes 
(2009, p.32). So, from the contraposability of the conditional and the definition 
of ‘⊃’, V2 immediately gives us V2*: 
V2*. ¬(¬α ∨ β) → ¬Val(<α>,<β>) 
By the De Morgan equivalencies (and double negation elimination), this is 
equivalent to V2**: 
V2**. (α ∧ ¬β) → ¬Val(<α>,<β>) 
So, still restricted to the single-premise case, if we can show that α ∧ ¬β, then 
since V2 delivers V2** by principles which hold in BXTT, the inference from α to 
¬β is invalid. This makes Beall’s account of validity inconsistent, since we can 
show this for lots of valid inferences. To take the simplest example, take the 
inference principle reflexivity: R ⊨ R. Consider a simple liar sentence, L, which 
is such that T<L> ∧ ¬T<L> and, on Beall’s view, is also such that L ∧ ¬L. By V2**, 
we have ¬Val(<L>,<L>), and so a counterexample to reflexivity. Since, 
presumably, reflexivity is valid too, we have Val(<L>,<L>) ∧ ¬Val(<L>,<L>). So, 
on Beall’s account, just as on Priest’s, validity is inconsistent. The point extends 
to a great many other inferences, of course, beyond reflexivity. The reader can 
consult Chapter 4 of this thesis to see how this is done. 
The problem for Beall here is more serious than for Priest, in at least a couple of 
ways. The first is that dialetheic validity is a consequence (and cost) of Priest’s 
paraconsistent metatheory, which has other advantages, such as the lack of a 
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real object/metalanguage distinction. To accept the inconsistency of validity 
would be to end up with the costs of a dialetheic metatheory without the 
benefits. Another disadvantage is that, I take it, the reason that validity is 
generally understood as a semantic notion is that it is defined in terms of (the 
necessary preservation of) truth. Since Beall explicitly does not define validity 
this way (if it is defined at all, of which more below), there seems little reason 
to think the notion semantic. This being so, contradictions like Val(<L>,<L>) ∧ 
¬Val(<L>,<L>) are in real danger of being non-semantic contradictions. The 
existence of which would refute Beall’s ‘merely semantic’ brand of dialetheism, 
independent of their intrinsic implausibility. 
So Beall rejects that validity is definable in terms of the preservation of truth, 
accepting only the weak connection between these notions given by V2. But he 
can’t accept even this weakened principle, without making his account of 
validity inconsistent and, unless he can make plausible that his notion of validity 
is still semantic, giving up his merely semantic form of dialetheism. 
A further restriction on the addition of a validity predicate Val(<x>,<y>) to the 
object language is the validity Curry paradox, which Beall himself has discussed 
in his more recent work Two Flavors of Curry Paradox (2011). This paradox 
arises from a sentence which, in effect, says of itself that the argument from it 
to triviality is valid: 
C: Val(<C>,<⊥>) 
The argument to triviality exactly mirrors that of the more usual conditional 
Curry paradox. There are a number of principles governing Val which one might 
give up to avoid the problem. One is structural contraction, the rejection of 
which would mirror Beall’s rejection of the parallel contraction principle in the 
conditional Curry case. This would require a substructural logic, rather than the 
logic BXTT, which Beall endorses in his (2009). Other options are available, and 
the problem is not unique to Beall’s view. I mention it only as a further potential 
source of triviality, arising from the addition of Val to the language, and so as a 
further constraint on what principles Val may be taken to satisfy. 
Since he doesn’t take validity to be necessary preservation of truth, he 
immediately faces the question of what he does think validity is. He does not 
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take a firm view of the matter, but offers three potential options, each of 
which, despite problems, he would be happy to endorse. 
5.5 Accounts of Validity 
The first option is not to offer a definition of validity at all, but to take the 
notion as primitive. Though, strictly speaking, there is no definition of the 
notion, on this option, we may still give principles which it obeys. Presumably he 
intends V2 to be one of these, as well as, for example: 
Val(<α>,<β>) → (α → β) 
Since the ‘→’ here is Beall’s detachable conditional, which delivers contraction 
if accepted as full general, this could only hold in certain fragments of the 
language. A further constraint one might wish to put on validity is normative: 
One ought to reject the validity of a given argument if one accepts that it’s 
possible for the given premises to be true but the conclusion false.(2009, p.38) 
It is surprising that Beall suggests this principle, since he has just accepted that 
one can have valid arguments with true premises and an untrue (which is 
equivalent, for him, to false) conclusion. This would commit him to the view 
that one should reject some valid arguments as invalid. Since those arguments 
are valid, presumably, one also should not reject those arguments as invalid. So, 
it may be that this principle commits Beall to there being things such that some 
things ought to be rejected, though it’s not the case that they ought to be 
rejected (or, perhaps, just that they ought to be accepted and rejected). Priest 
accepts the possibility of this sort of contradiction (2006, p.274), so there is 
some precedent for the view, but things are more difficult in Beall’s case. If, 
and this may depend on details yet-to-be-filled-in, there is a genuine dialetheia 
here, it does not appear to be a semantic one, since acceptance and rejection 
are not, on the face of it, semantic notions. This sort of dialetheia would 
undermine Beall’s merely semantic account of dialetheia. Even if we do not have 
an explicit dialetheia involving rejection, i.e. there are no principles which we 
both reject and do not, rejecting the validity of a principle must commit us 
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(assuming excluded middle) to its invalidity. If so, then some valid principles are 
also invalid, and we are back with the same problems as with V2. 
A further problem which Beall highlights is epistemological. If validity is 
primitive, how do we know which arguments are valid and, relatedly, how do we 
know which relation in the language (if any), is the validity relation? Beall 
admits this is a serious problem, and says that he has no answer to it. The sting 
of the objection, as a particular problem for the view on which validity is 
primitive, however is lessened by the fact that, according to Beall, the problem 
is not peculiar to this account. Were we to define validity as necessary 
preservation of truth, we would still face questions such as “How do we know 
that is a ‘real counterexample’?” (2009, p.38) But the cases are not exactly 
parallel here. In Beall’s case, our notion, validity, is given no definition, and 
seemingly very few principles which govern its application. I have just suggested 
that the above principle, involving rejection, may well be unsuitable. We also, 
as I have argued, don’t have V2. This being so, we have very little to go on in 
identifying which are the valid arguments, on this primitive account. If, on the 
other hand, we define validity as preservation of necessary truth, then whether, 
for example, something is to count as a ‘real counterexample’ is simply a matter 
of the truth values of the sentences contained in the counterexamples. How easy 
it is to decide this matter will, of course, depend on the sentences in question, 
but it’s difficult to see how, without taking a position of fairly general 
epistemological scepticism, how this position could fail to be better-off, 
epistemologically speaking, than Beall’s primitive account of validity. 
The second option Beall calls a ‘two-step account’ of validity. On this strategy, 
one constructs a model language, using model theory, and defines validity for 
that language, in its metatheory, using the notion of truth-in-a-model. This is 
the first step. The second step is to ‘extract’ the valid argument forms so-
defined and take them to be a definition of validity for our real language. This 
strategy has in common with the primitive one that validity is not defined in 
terms of truth (though it is defined in terms of truth-in-a-model. Beall points to 
two problems for this view. Firstly, we face similar epistemological problems as 
in the case of the primitive approach: “Why that formal language versus that 
on[?]”(2009, p.40) Secondly, we require a precise account of ‘argument forms’, 
which is, he admits, not an easy matter. 
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Another problem for this account is that, presumably, our account of validity no 
longer involves the introduction of a validity predicate characterising validity in 
and for our object language. On this view, then, the model language cannot 
characterise its own validity relation. Natural language, on the other hand, 
(presumably) can. 
A final option is to offer a ‘partial definition’ of validity. On this account, we 
give only sufficient, rather than necessary, conditions for validity. For instance, 
we may give the following condition as sufficient for validity: 
V3. (α → β) → Val(<α>,<β>) 
Beall says “This might not be everything that one would want from an account of 
validity, but it may be all that we need.” (2009, p.41) The onus is on Beall, it 
seems to me, to give arguments for why we should expect this to give us all we 
want from an account of validity. One might wonder what the material 
difference is between this approach and the primitive one. In neither case do we 
give a full definition of validity, and in both cases it is in our interests to endorse 
as many and as strong principles as we can get away with, to give us the best 
grip possible on validity, despite the lack of a definition. Whether we count 
these principles as a partial definition of validity, or merely as constraints on the 
use of a primitive notion, seems like a distinction without a difference.  
5.6 Some General Considerations about Metatheoretically 
Consistent Dialetheism 
Though this thesis is about the revenge problem in particular, it will be helpful 
in comparing the relative strengths of different varieties of dialetheism to 
discuss some other of the issues these views face, before going on, in the final 
chapter to discuss revenge problems for the view. This chapter has characterised 
Beall’s particular version of metatheoretically consistent dialetheism, and has 
given some problems for the view thus characterised. But Beall’s view is not the 
only available, so this section discusses a couple of more general differences 
between metatheoretically consistent, and metatheoretically inconsistent, 
dialetheism. Since, again, my focus in this thesis is revenge, I do not mean the 
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discussion in this section to be definitive, by any means, but rather to help bring 
out the differences between the different kinds of dialetheism. 
I begin, though, with a final issue concerning Beall’s merely semantic 
dialetheism. Priest’s more thoroughgoing dialetheism allows for non-semantic 
dialetheia. Indeed, Priest defends dialetheic accounts of set theory, vagueness, 
change and motion, indefinite extensibility, inconsistent legal systems and 
others. One effect this has is to make his version of dialetheism, arguably, more 
radical. Another effect is that, on the assumption that these applications are 
successful, they provide further support for the view. If one accepts the 
existence of true contradictions, and, this done, discovers that accepting such 
things provides solutions, without further significant costs, to long-standing, 
intractable philosophical problems, it would seem reasonable to increase ones 
confidence in the existence of dialetheia. 
Since each of the applications of dialetheism mentioned (plausibly) involves 
accepting the existence of non-semantic dialetheia, none of them are available 
to someone, like Beall, who endorses merely semantic dialetheism. To take an 
example, Priest endorses a dialetheist account of vagueness, where the familiar 
Sorites paradoxes are taken to involve dialetheia at points of ‘overlap’ between 
the correct application of a predicate and its negation. The details of the 
account need not concern us here. If Priest can make plausible a dialetheist 
account of vagueness, without significant extra cost beyond the inconsistency 
already accepted, then his version of dialetheism has gained significant 
additional support by solving an extremely intractable philosophical problem. 
Paracomplete solutions to the paradoxes, like Field’s, can also gain this sort of 
further support by treating the vague, borderline cases as ‘gaps’. This sort of 
support is denied to a view like Beall’s. 
Perhaps the most significant objection to such non-classical solutions to puzzles 
of vagueness is that they are non-classical: they require one to give up classical 
logic. But this objection, obviously, has much less force against someone who 
endorses a non-classical logic for independent, in this case liar-paradoxical, 
reasons. On the other hand, defending a classical account of vagueness comes 
with its own costs. For instance, in Williamson’s epistemicist account of 
vagueness, every ‘vague’ predicate has a precise, but in-principle-unknowable 
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cut-off point; for example, there is a unique, decisive hair which, once lost, 
changes one from precisely non-bald to precisely bald. On Beall’s own, rough 
sketch of a classical account (2009, pp.107-110), complicated machinery is 
introduced appealing to ‘positive predicates’, ‘atomic predicates’ and ‘overline 
mates’. Vague predicates involve ‘gaps’ between positive atomic predicates and 
their overline mates, though sharp, classical cut-offs still exist between the 
correct application of any predicate and its negation. The proper philosophical 
interpretation of these notions is extremely opaque, and it does not avoid the 
implausible consequence that vague predicates admit of sharp, classical cut-
offs. This is not intended to be a definitive objection to these accounts, but a 
worry about them being endorsed by someone like Beall is that, by accepting 
non-classical logic on the basis of liar reasoning, one is already paying the 
central cost for non-classical solutions to the puzzles of vagueness, but 
additionally taking on the inevitable costs of preserving classical logic in those 
contexts. If it turns out that the costs to a non-classical logician of endorsing a 
classical account of puzzles like, for example, vagueness, are liable to outweigh 
the costs to that logician of simply extending the scope of their non-classicality, 
then views like Beall’s merely semantic dialetheism are likely to be unstable. 
Though it’s a commitment of Beall’s version of metatheoretically classical 
dialetheism that he not accept potential contradictions arising from vagueness, 
it is not a commitment of the view in general. Set theoretic dialetheia, on the 
other hand, are different. While it is not, strictly speaking, off-limits for a 
dialetheist to accept that there are set-theoretic dialetheia, but keep their 
metatheory classical, there is a tension in the view. If there are true 
contradictions in set theory, then (on the assumption that the theory isn’t 
trivial) the right theory of the sets is paraconsistent. But one of the crucial roles 
for set theory, in the present context, is as our metatheory which allows us to 
characterise the features of our model, object language.  The position, then, 
would be one in which the correct set theory is paraconsistent, but the best 
theory of sets for the (central) purpose of providing our metatheory, is classical, 
which, if not outright inconsistent, is bordering on incoherence. Supposing this 
position is not adopted, then this version of dialetheism cannot endorse the 
powerful argument’s given by Priest (and discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis) 
for (inconsistent) naïve set theory. This is a fairly significant loss, and a prima 
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facie disadvantage to this form of dialetheism, as compared with Priest’s more 
thoroughgoing kind. 
Another, related point, is that Priest’s dialetheism allows for the collapse of the 
distinction between object theory and metatheory. This gives Priest’s view the 
attractive feature that his object language is able to describe its own semantics, 
which, presumably, is something it shares with English and other natural 
languages. This is another bonus denied to dialetheists whose metatheory is 
classical. 
A further issue concerns the universality of logic. If one thinks logic is universal, 
which is to say, there is a single correct logic for reasoning about any subject 
matter, then an asymmetry in logic between one’s object theory and 
metatheory is problematic. The logic one takes to be correct, presumably, is the 
one which holds in the object theory. But if this logic is the correct one for 
reasoning about any subject matter, then it ought to be the correct one for 
reasoning about itself. In other words, if the logic of the object theory is the one 
true logic, it ought to be the logic of its own metatheory.  
So, if one has a paraconsistent logic in the object theory, but classical logic in 
the metatheory, there is some pressure to be a logical pluralist. This is the view 
that there is a general notion of logical consequence, which admits of many, 
equally good, precisifications. So, relevant logic, classical logic and intuitionistic 
logic are each, in some sense, equally good. This is the view defended in, for 
example, Logical Pluralism (2006), by Beall and Restall. But the view is 
controversial; Stephen Read (2006) has argued that it is incoherent, for 
example. If one can make a good case for this view, and in particular, the claim 
that classical logic is the right one for the metatheory, this may not be 
problematic, and I don’t take a view on whether it is or not here. But depending 
on one’s view of these matters, the pressure on defenders of this view to adopt 
a pluralistic view of logic may be unwelcome. 
One issue, in the other direction, is that dialetheists who have a paraconsistent 
metatheory are hostage to the fortunes of paraconsistent set theory, which is 
still in the early stages of development. It may yet turn out that paraconsistent 
set theory is too weak to give a proper account of the sets. If this is so, it will be 
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difficult to maintain it as the correct metatheory for a paraconsistent logic. On 
the other hand, whether this constitutes a reason, now, to prefer a classical 
metatheory is unclear. As I discussed in Chapter 3, some recent result by Zach 
Weber give us reason for tentative hope about the prospects of paraconsistent 
set theory. 
I have argued, in Chapter 4 of this thesis, that dialetheists whose metatheory is 
paraconsistent must treat validity inconsistently, and that, from this, a revenge 
problem arises. One might think that this can be avoided by endorsing a classical 
metatheory. The situation is not completely straightforward. If one wants to 
introduce a validity predicate to characterise validity in, and for, the object 
language, then the possibility of that predicate behaving inconsistently is a live 
one. As I have argued, Beall’s view, at least in the form presented, has this 
problem. Suitable restrictions could, of course, be placed on the predicate to 
stop this, but whether the resulting predicate would look anything like validity is 
a matter which can be reasonably disputed. One could also simply define validity 
in the metalanguage without including a validity predicate in the object 
language, and thus ensure the consistency of validity by the consistency of the 
metatheory. Whether this constitutes a serious advantage of this approach over 
metatheoretically paraconsistent dialetheism is unclear. The real problem 
arising from the inconsistency of validity, I argue (in Chapter 4), is that is gives 
rise to a revenge problem for the view. If, as I also argue in the next section, 
metatheoretically consistent dialetheism also has its revenge problems, then it’s 
not obvious they are at an advantage on this score. 
5.7 Chapter Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe metatheoretically consistent 
dialetheism, especially as defended by JC Beall in his (2009). Beall’s ‘merely 
semantic’ dialetheism was introduced and critically discussed, and more general 
remarks made about the differences between metatheoretically consistent 
dialetheism, on the one hand, and metatheoretically paraconsistent dialetheism, 
on the other. 
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Chapter 6: Getting Revenge on Metatheoretically 
Consistent Dialetheism 
6.0 Introduction 
I argued in the first chapter of this thesis that revenge comes in essentially to 
varieties. The first is formal revenge, which, roughly, involves the construction 
of a notion in a theory’s metalanguage which, were it expressible in the theory’s 
object language, would lead generate a liar paradox rendering some notion 
expressible in natural language inexpressible in the theory’s object language. 
The second is informal revenge, for which, again roughly, we bypass the 
theory’s metalanguage and find a notion expressible in natural language which, 
were it expressible in the theory’s object language, would generate a liar 
paradox, rendering some notion expressible in natural language inexpressible in 
the object language. Metatheoretically consistent dialetheism suffers from both 
sorts of revenge problem. I split this section into two subsections, the first 
concerning formal revenge, the second concerning informal revenge. 
6.1 Formal Revenge for Metatheoretically Consistent 
Dialetheism 
The recipe for formal revenge which was settled on in Chapter 1 was as follows: 
RvF. Recipe for Formal Revenge. 
We find some semantic notion, λ, constructed in (and, hence, expressible in) 
the metatheory of ℒM and demonstrate that, were λ expressible in ℒM, we could 
construct a sentence, β, equivalent to λ<β> ∨ ¬T<β>, from which we can derive 
the contradiction λ<β> ∧ ¬λ<β>. We demonstrate that this establishes the 
inexpressibility in ℒM of some notion, σ, which is expressible in ℒ, where it is 
permitted (indeed, it is common) that λ = σ. We conclude that ℒM is an 
inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has its target features. 
So, to get formal revenge on a theory, we construct a semantic notion in the 
theory’s metalanguage and show that it leads, via liar reasoning, to a 
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contradiction in the object language, and so to the inexpressibility of some 
notion in the object language which is expressible in natural language. This 
definition, as discussed in Chapter 2, is deliberately broadened to capture the 
putative revenge problems which it is argued afflict metatheoretically 
paraconsistent dialetheism (for example, in Chapter 4 of this thesis). In the case 
of metatheoretically consistent dialetheism, things are slightly simpler. If we 
can take a notion expressible in the metalanguage of such a theory and show 
that, in the object theory, it would lead to contradiction then, since this would 
generate inconsistency, and so triviality in the classical metalanguage, then that 
very notion is inexpressible in the object language on pain of triviality. In this 
particular case, then, the allowance in RvF that the contradiction arising from λ 
in the object language causes the inexpressibility of σ, where σ may not be 
identical to λ, is not required. If λ generates inconsistency, and so triviality, if 
it’s expressible in the object language, then λ itself is the inexpressible, on pain 
of triviality, notion. 
Beall argues that metatheoretically consistent dialetheism, or at least his 
version, does not suffer from revenge. His focus is on the notion ‘just true’. I 
focus on ‘just false’, though this makes little substantial difference to the 
discussion. He does not, as I do, distinguish formal from informal revenge. Since 
the just false problem comes in both varieties, I discuss the formal version of the 
problem here and the informal version in the next section, and try to point out 
as I go which of the versions each of his remarks about the problem are aimed 
at. 
Beall’s defence of his view draws on his characterisation on revenge given in his 
(2007) and discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. He begins with a discussion of 
incoherent operators, which he takes to establish what ‘just true’ (or ‘just 
false’) is not. There are certain features, Beall argues, which cannot be had by a 
notion of ‘just true’, if it is to be coherent in his object language. Having argued 
this, he goes on to outlines what he takes ‘just true’ to be, which is ‘true’ 
(similarly, ‘just false’ is simply ‘false’). 
If we are trying to get formal revenge on a theory, we can construct the revenge 
notion in the theory’s metalanguage in a completely precise, formal way. The 
features of this notion, then, are not up for grabs in the way that Beall’s 
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discussion of incoherent operators, or the identity of ‘just true’ with ‘true’, 
seems to assume. I take these remarks, instead, to be best aimed at an informal 
version of the just false problem. So I discuss them in the next section. 
Beall begins his discussion of revenge by reminding us that the point of 
theorising about truth in formal languages is that we wish to provide a model, in 
the informal sense, of natural language which, we hope, illuminates the features 
of natural language in which we are interested. One important feature which 
interests us, for example, is how it is that natural language avoids collapsing into 
triviality from a combination of liar paradoxes and the apparent correctness of 
an explosive logic (containing, for example, disjunctive syllogism). 
We construct a formal, model language, ℒM characterise a notion of truth in that 
language, ℒM-truth. If the model is a good one, ℒM-truth will tell us about ℒ-
truth, which is the behaviour of truth in our natural language, ℒ. The revenge 
problem arises, for metatheoretically consistent dialetheism, from notions which 
can be constructed in the classical metatheory, like true-in-ℒM or not-true-in-
ℒM. Since these notions are completely consistent in the metatheory, we can 
think of these notions, respectively, as just-true-in-ℒM and just-false-in-ℒM, since 
they are equivalent. 
If these notions were expressible in the object language, we could construct a 
sentence, λ, equivalent to just-false-in-ℒM<λ>. The familiar liar reasoning, 
applied to λ, generates a contradiction, not just in the object theory, but in the 
metatheory, since, in the metatheory, we will have that λ is both true-in-ℒM and 
not-true-in-ℒM. This delivers triviality, and so, on pain of triviality, ℒM cannot 
express just-false-in-ℒM. 
This, I would have thought, would be uncontroversial, even among dialetheists. 
In fact, Beall questions whether the result goes through (2009, p.56). If, as he 
supposes is the case, the model language not only has classical set theory as its 
metalanguage, but contains classical set theory as a proper part, then the 
revenge argument must fail. The reason is that, if just-false-in-ℒM is expressible 
in the metatheory, it is expressible in classical set theory (since this is what is 
used for the metatheory), but since the object language contains classical set 
theory, just-false-in-ℒM must be expressible in it. At most, what the argument 
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establishes is that notions like true-in-ℒM do not play the role in ℒM played by 
ℒM’s truth predicate (e.g. transparency). 
Exactly where Beall takes the argument to triviality from the expressibility in ℒM 
of true-in-ℒM to break down is slightly unclear. The reference to transparency 
suggests that it is in the assumption that a sentence being true in the actual 
model means it’s true-in-ℒM (and vice versa), though, in fact, we should not 
conflate this with the notion’s being transparent, which is something further. 
But this is guaranteed by our stipulation that the definition, in the 
metalanguage, of true-in-ℒM is such that α is true-in-ℒM if and only if α is true at 
the actual world (@ ⊩ α). Beall’s point may be that what the argument to 
triviality shows is not that true-in-ℒM fails to be expressible in ℒM, but rather 
that this equivalence cannot hold of it in ℒM in full generality. But, since we 
define true-in-ℒM in terms of this equivalence, then the demonstration that it 
cannot hold of a notion expressible in ℒM is a demonstration that true-in-ℒM can’t 
be expressed in ℒM. The fact that some other notion, differently defined, is 
expressible in ℒM is irrelevant. 
So, there are notions expressible in the metalanguage of ℒM, and hence 
expressible in natural language, but which are not expressible in ℒM. Beall 
accepts that this may be so, or at least that the notions in question cannot 
behave, in the object language, as one might expect. He doesn’t think this 
generates a revenge problem for his theory. His discussion of the issue is similar 
to the remarks in his (2007) about which putative revenge problems should be 
taken to be genuine revenge problems. I discussed this article in some detail in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, and disagreed with Beall about which problems are 
genuine revenge problems. In particular, Beall dismissed as ‘too easy’ putative 
revenge problems like the one given above for his view. The reasons why this 
problem is not ‘too easy’ are the same as in Chapter 2, but I will briefly rehearse 
them here, in the particular context of Beall’s view. 
The first issue is that Beall says that the relevance of the inexpressibility result, 
involving as it does ‘classically constructed’ notions of the metalanguage, is 
unclear. For a fuller discussion of this point, I refer the reading to Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2. Simply put, however, the relevance of the result is that ℒM avoids 
the threat of triviality only because of certain expressive limitations. There are 
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notions which, were they expressible, would trivialise the theory and which, 
therefore, the theory cannot express (assuming it’s not trivial). Natural language 
is not like this, since it can express the notions in question. So ℒM does not tell us 
how ℒ (our natural language) avoids the threat of triviality at the hands of the 
liar paradox, because, demonstrably, it does so differently from ℒ. 
One thing which, according to Beall, would turn the objection given above into a 
genuine, serious revenge problem, is the assumption that the semantics of ℒM 
are intended to provide a model for the semantics of natural language. Were this 
assumption made, says Beall, the absence of any notion in ℒM corresponding to 
true-in-ℒM, despite the latter notion playing an important role in giving the 
semantics of ℒM, would be a serious problem for ℒM as a model of our natural 
language, ℒ (2009, p.56). 
Beall, however, rejects this assumption: the semantics of ℒM are not intended, 
on his view, to reflect the semantics of ℒ. The semantics of ℒM are given truth-
conditionally in terms of truth-in-a-model. But, as a deflationist, Beall rejects 
that giving a proper account of the semantics of natural language is a matter of 
giving truth conditions, since this would require, he thinks, truth to play some 
more full-blooded, explanatory role than he is willing to accept. The deflationist 
still faces questions about the logical behaviour of the truth predicate in light of 
paradoxes like the liar. The deflationist is at liberty, in Beall’s view, to answer 
these questions by describing a language, ℒM, truth-conditionally, using model 
theory. But since the real semantics of ℒ are not to be understood in this way, 
the truth conditional semantics are provided in a purely instrumentalist way as 
giving an account of the logical behaviour of the truth predicate. So the logical 
behaviour of the truth predicate in ℒM is supposed to model the logical behaviour 
of the truth predicate in ℒ, but the semantics of ℒM more generally, are not 
supposed to reflect those of natural language. Beall admits that this 
instrumentalist account is, at best, promissory, and we still await a model 
language which does accurately capture the semantics of natural language. Beall 
is not prepared to give such a theory, but cites the use-theoretic account given 
by Field (2001) as a promising start. In the meantime, he thinks describing a 
model language, ℒM, truth-conditionally, with the intention of capturing only the 
logical behaviour of the truth predicate, is innocuous. 
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As I argued in Chapter 2 of this thesis, especially in Section 2.2, this 
instrumentalist response to the problem of revenge is, as it stands, inadequate. 
As Beall admits, we need to be given some model language, say, ℒU, whose 
semantics are given use-theoretically in such a way as to give a model of the 
semantics of natural language. Moreover, this account of the semantics of 
natural language cannot be wholly divorced from the features of language 
intended to be modelled by ℒM, such as the veracity of the T-scheme, and the 
logic which the language obeys. If Beall thinks truth is transparent, and the 
correct logic is BXTT, then we should, if it is to be a model of natural language, 
be able to describe ℒU, with its use-theoretic semantics, in such a way that it 
has these features too. So the logic of ℒU ought to be BXTT, and it should contain 
a transparent truth predicate (which is, in fact, guaranteed by BXTT, it being BX 
with transparent truth). Nothing less than this would satisfy us that Beall’s 
account of the features of the semantics of natural language (given use-
theoretically) is compatible with his account of the logical behaviour of the 
truth predicate. 
I see no reason to think, and indeed, it seems extremely unlikely, that ℒU, 
constructed in this way, would avoid the problems ℒM is now facing. That is, it 
seems very likely that there will be notions, perhaps not-true-in-ℒU, which would 
be expressible in ℒU’s metalanguage, and hence in natural language, but which 
would be inexpressible in ℒU. So even if we granted that the instrumentalist 
response got metatheoretically consistent dialetheists off-the-hook as regards 
revenge for ℒM (though, I have argued, it doesn’t), it would have done so only 
because the theory is problematically incomplete. Beall has given us no reason 
to think that the completed theory, given by ℒU, will avoid the same problem. If 
it does not, then Beall is committed to this being a genuine revenge problem, 
since the semantics of ℒU, unlike those of ℒM, are intended to model those of 
natural language. 
So, I have argued, metatheoretically consistent dialetheism is subject to the 
problem of formal revenge. There are notions expressible in the metalanguage, 
and thereby expressible in natural language, which cannot be expressed in the 
object language of the theory. One such notion is not-true-in-ℒM, which, given 
the consistency of the metatheory in which it is defined, we can think of as just-
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false-in-ℒM (since none of the things which are not-true-in-ℒM will also be true-
in-ℒM). So we can think of the revenge problem given in this chapter as a formal 
version of the just false problem. As I argue in the next section, 
metatheoretically consistent dialetheism also faces an informal just false 
problem. Indeed, this is probably the more familiar way of thinking of the just 
false problem. I turn to this issue next. 
6.2 Informal Revenge for Metatheoretically Consistent 
Dialetheism 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis (Section 2.3), I gave a recipe for informal revenge: 
RvI. Recipe for Informal Revenge. 
We find some semantic notion, λ, which is not constructed in the metatheory of 
ℒM, but which is expressible in ℒ and demonstrate that, were λ expressible in 
ℒM, we could construct a sentence, β, equivalent to λ<β> ∨ ¬T<β>, from which 
we can derive the contradiction λ<β> ∧ ¬λ<β>. We demonstrate that this 
establishes the inexpressibility in ℒM of some notion, σ, which is expressible in 
ℒ, where it is permitted (indeed, it is common) that λ = σ. We conclude ℒM is an 
inadequate model of ℒ, since it fails to explain how ℒ has its target features. 
As in the case of formal revenge, the consistency of the metatheory, on the sort 
of view under discussion, makes things slightly simpler than RvI suggests, since 
the latter was complicated so as to capture revenge problems for 
metatheoretically paraconsistent dialetheism. In problems of formal revenge, we 
construct a notion in the metalanguage and show that it cannot be expressed in 
the object language. Since anything expressible in the metalanguage is 
expressible in natural language, there are problematic expressive asymmetries 
between the object language and the natural language it is supposed to model. 
With informal revenge, we omit appeal to the metalanguage, and appeal 
directly to the expressibility of a notion in natural language which, via liar 
reasoning, we can show to be inexpressible in the object language. So the 
problematic expressive asymmetries are demonstrated without any intermediate 
appeal to the metalanguage. 
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In some ways, it is more difficult to press an informal revenge objection against 
a theory than a formal one. The main reason is that, in the latter case, we can 
precisely define a notion in the metalanguage and show that the very same 
notion is inexpressible in the object language. With informal revenge, things are 
slightly more difficult. What, exactly, the features of a notion found in natural 
language should be taken to be can, and often are, a matter of dispute. If 
certain features of a notion lead to it being inexpressible in a dialetheist’s 
object theory, they may simply deny that the notion, properly understood, has 
those features. If this is implausible, they may simply reject the notion as 
incoherent. One way to avoid this situation, for those wishing to press the 
revenge problem, is to look to the dialetheist’s own informal remarks about 
their theory and find there some notion which they cannot properly express in 
their object language. Especially if the notion appears importantly, and often, 
the response that it should be discarded as incoherent is likely to seem 
implausible, and would result in our discarding as incoherent some number of 
their own remarks about their theory. This is the reason we call this sort of 
revenge ‘informal revenge’, because the notion we wish to show is inexpressible 
is found in the dialetheists informal characterisation of their view. One 
important notion of this kind is ‘just false’, as well as related notions like ‘just 
true’, ‘non-dialetheia’ and so on. I focus here, for simplicity, and consistency 
with the rest of the thesis, on ‘just false’. As I have said, Beall focuses, for the 
most part, on ‘just true’, but the differences are fairly unimportant in this 
context. 
Beall’s discussion of the issue begins with what he takes ‘just true’ (and ‘just 
false’) not to be, and with some remarks about incoherent operators, which also 
draws on some material from his (2007), and which I discussed in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.4). Here are some conditions which, according to Beall (2009, p.49), 
cannot be coherently satisfied by any language: 
F1. The language contains a truth predicate, T<x>, which obeys, unrestrictedly, 
the T-scheme (at least in its rule form) 
F2. Reasoning by cases is valid 
E1. ⊨ α ∨ φα  
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E2. α, φα ⊨ ⊥   
Since Beall endorses each of F1, F2 and E1, he must, he says, reject the 
existence of any operator (at least unrestrictedly) satisfying E2. We might be 
tempted to introduce some notion, defining ‘just true’ (or ‘just false’) such that 
it is both exclusive (that is, it satisfies E1) and exhaustive (it satisfies E2). But, 
Beall says, this would lead to triviality via a liar paradox constructed for the 
notion (and the assumption that F1 and F2 hold). So, Beall says, whatever ‘just 
true’ or ‘just false’ are, they cannot be such as to be both exclusive and 
exhaustive. 
This is a little quick. Firstly, as I have pointed out (2.4), the argument that 
triviality follows from the above conditions assumes that the standard structural 
rules are present in the logic. But one might give this up, as do Weir (2013), 
Ripley (2013) and Zardini (2014). Secondly, it does not follow from the fact that 
Beall accepts F1 and F2 that ‘just true’ and ‘just false’ are neither exclusive nor 
exhaustive. It may instead be the case that they are, but, because he endorses 
F1 and F2, plus the standard structural rules, Beall’s theory can’t express the 
notions. His discussion presumes the notion to be expressible in his theory, and 
then subsequently works out, on this assumption, what the notion must be. But 
whether ‘just true’ and ‘just false’ are, for Beall, expressible, is exactly what is 
at issue. 
The obvious understanding of the notion ‘just false’ is that it be defined as ‘false 
and not true’. Similarly, the obvious understanding of ‘just true’ is as ‘true and 
not false’. Given Beall’s transparent truth predicate, these are equivalent to 
‘false’ and ‘true’, respectively. So, on Beall’s view ‘just false’ is just ‘false’ and 
‘just true’ is just ‘true’. The problems with this sort of position were discussed 
in Chapter 4. One obvious way of characterising dialetheism (of the non-trivialist 
variety) is as the view according to which some things are both true and false, 
some just true and some just false. But on Beall’s account of ‘just true’ and 
‘just false’, this is equivalent to ‘some things are both true and false, some true 
and some false’. But these sentences are obviously not equivalent. The whole 
point of uttering the first sentence is to draw a distinction between the 
dialetheia, on the one hand, and the true non-dialetheia, and false non-
dialetheia on the other. If Beall’s view cannot capture ‘just false’ so that it 
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allows for distinctions of this kind, then his view cannot express the notion of 
sole falsehood. 
Beall seems to accept that there must be some distinction between a sentence’s 
being false and its being just false and invokes a pragmatic device to try to 
capture it. If one says that a sentence is just false, then this is exactly 
equivalent so saying that it is false, but carries the pragmatic implicature that 
one also rejects the sentence. For Beall, then, the ‘just’ in ‘just false’ carries an 
‘autobiographical implicature’ which the mere utterance of ‘false’ does not 
(2009, p.52). 
This response does not solve the just false problem for the reasons given by 
Shapiro in his (2004). The notion ‘just false’ can be embedded in conditionals, or 
into hypotheses and negated, but pragmatic devices cannot (or at least, we have 
no account of how they could).  I may be considering endorsing dialetheism and, 
in my deliberations about the view, wish to entertain the hypothesis that it is 
just false. How I could do this without Beall’s ‘autobiographical’ account of the 
notion is unclear. 
A further difficulty is that the pragmatic implicature is tied to the speakers own 
rejection behaviour9. On the face of it, the notion ‘just false’ is one of semantic 
classification. There are some sentences, on dialetheism, which fall into the 
‘dialetheia’ category, some others fall into the ‘just true’ category, and some 
further sentences which fall into the ‘just false’ category. But Beall’s suggested 
pragmatic device is not like this: it appeals to the subjective mental attitudes of 
the speaker, not the objective semantic features of the theory itself. If ‘just 
false’ is an important classificatory notion employed in the articulation of the 
theory, as it seems to be, and one thinks a theory ought to be, in some sense, 
detachable from its proponents, then one might think this problematic. It is an 
unattractive feature of a theory of the paradoxes that an articulation of it makes 
essential reference to the mental states of its proponents. One might try to 
avoid this by making the rejection involved normative. Perhaps, one might think, 
the pragmatic device points to the fact that the ‘just false’ sentence ought to 
                                                          
9
 One might wish to make a distinction between acceptance/rejection, on the one hand, and 
assertion/denial, on the other. Acceptance and rejection are mental attitudes one can take towards some 
content. Assertion and denial are the speech acts which express them. The differences, however, are not 
crucial in this context. 
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be rejected. The problem with this is that it immediately invites further 
paradoxes: for example, the sentence, β, equivalent to ‘β ought to be rejected’. 
Assuming a few plausible principles governing correct rejection, this sentence 
ought to be both rejected and accepted. 
Priest has accepted this sort of rational dilemma (2006, p.274), and a 
metatheoretically consistent dialetheist is equally entitled to this view. In the 
present circumstances, however, this would have the effect of making ‘just 
false’ behave inconsistently again, defeating the purpose of introducing the 
pragmatic device in the first place.  
A final attempt Beall makes to assuage potential worries about the equivalence 
of ‘false’ with ‘just false’ appeals, again, to his deflationism. The truth 
predicate was not introduced to name an important feature of the world, but as 
a logical tool to overcome our expressive limitations. Before recognising 
dialetheia, Beall says, we took it to be obvious that ‘false’ and ‘just false’ are 
equivalent, and after recognising dialetheia, the equivalence remains.  
According to Beall, if we thought that truth was some genuine property of things 
in the world, one might expect notions like ‘just true’ or ‘just false’ to be 
similar and so to be distinct from true or false, respectively. Since he is a 
deflationist, he does not think this, and so takes ‘just true’ to be ‘true’ and ‘just 
false’ to be ‘false’. 
It doesn’t seem to me that these considerations help much. It may be that those 
who do not accept dialetheia think it obvious that ‘false’ and ‘just false’ 
(defined as ‘false and not true’) are equivalent. On the other hand, since they 
don’t accept dialetheia, they have no need of the notion of sole falsity. It was 
only when discussion of dialetheism began that the notion became worthy of 
discussion, largely because dialetheists must make use of it in characterising 
their view. If dialetheia are not accepted, there is no plausible sense in which 
there is a distinction between being false and being just false, so it is to be 
expected that no one attempts to draw such a distinction. Once dialetheia are 
accepted (and so long as one doesn’t accept trivialism), there is a very plausible 
sense in which being false and being just false and distinct. So appealing to the 
fact that, without dialetheia, there is no distinction between falsity and sole 
falsity, gives no support whatever to the claim that, once dialetheia are 
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recognised, there should be no distinction. It is precisely the introduction of 
dialetheia which makes sense of, and requires, a distinction between ‘false’ and 
‘just false’. 
The appeal to deflationism does not seem to help either. Some sentences, for 
Beall, are both true and false, some are just true and some are just false. This 
claim captures a central claim of his view and, to make sense of it, there must 
be distinction between being false and being just false (or being true and being 
just true). This is so no matter how deflated the notion of truth involved in the 
claim is taken to be. So, it seems to me, the invocation of deflationism here is a 
red herring. 
The metatheoretically consistent dialetheist may attempt to avoid this result by 
denying one of the principles which lead to the equivalency between ‘false’ and 
‘just false’, perhaps the exclusion principle that F<α> → ¬T<α>, which is 
rejected by Priest, and discussed in Chapter 4. Matters are much the same in the 
context of metatheoretically inconsistent dialetheism, so I refer the reader 
there for more details. The upshot of the discussion is that, if one rejects 
exclusion, one can keep ‘false’ and ‘just false’ distinct, though the latter is still 
inconsistent (infinitely many sentences which are just false are also true). The 
problems with this approach are that it is still unclear whether the resulting 
notion still, despite its inconsistency, counts as a genuine notion of sole falsity, 
and that one is forced to give up the transparency of the T-scheme and the 
plausible principle that falsity entails untruth. Other problems, too, are 
mentioned in the sections cited. 
Beall’s settled view is that a proper treatment of sole falsity should be as 
equivalent to falsity. I have argued that this is unsatisfactory.  He does, 
however, offer two further suggestions available to merely semantic 
dialetheism, and they are equally available to any metatheoretically consistent 
dialetheist (2009, pp.58-62). He admits that the suggestions are ‘speculative’ 
and it seems to me that they are inadequate in fairly straightforward ways, so I 
discuss them only briefly. 
The first involves a hierarchy of partial ‘just false’ predicates. The first, which 
we might call JF0 applies to sentences of the (truth-free) base language. We then 
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add a further predicate, JF1, which we can predicate of the sentences in the 
fragment containing the base language and any sentences obtained by 
substituting T<β> for any β in α where α and β are sentences of the base 
language. We call this fragment ℒ1 and construct further languages (or 
fragments), ℒi, and corresponding ‘just false’ predicates JFi, for each i, in a 
similar way. The effect is a hierarchy of ‘just false’ predicates, each applied to 
an increasingly large fragment of the language. There are two problems with this 
approach. The first is that invoking hierarchies of semantic predicates decreases 
the attractiveness of dialetheism, part of the promise of which is an advance on 
hierarchical theories. If we are going to invoke a hierarchy of ‘just false’ (as well 
as ‘just true’) predicates into the language, one might think, we might as well 
introduce a hierarchy of truth predicates and endorse Tarski’s view, without the 
bother of dialetheism. The second is, as with all hierarchical views, we 
immediately encounter revenge problems. We can express in natural language, 
for example, the idea of a sentence being just false at every level, i, in the 
hierarchy. This can’t be expressed in Beall’s hierarchy. So this response to the 
just false problem simply moves the problem elsewhere. 
Beall second suggestion is to introduce a notion of ‘negation’ which has only a 
partial definition. In particular, it has only a sufficient condition for its 
application. I don’t discuss the details of the suggested operator here, since the 
problem with the notion doesn’t depend on them (they can be found in his 
(2009, p.59-62)). Setting aside the theoretical unattractiveness of such partially 
defined operators, the central problem with the suggestion is that the notion of 
negation he employs is inconsistent. That is, letting ‘#’ stand for Beall’s 
‘negation’, there are sentence, such as some liar sentence, α, equivalent to 
#T<α> such that both α and #T<α> hold. So, invoking # to define ‘just false’, 
does not prevent the inconsistency of the latter: there will still be infinitely 
many sentences which are both just false and true. 
One option a dialetheist like Beall might wish to consider is simply rejecting the 
notion of just false as incoherent. Beall suggests this in his discussion of 
potential revenge objections in his (2007). He says that whoever wishes to 
demonstrate that a view is subject to revenge must demonstrate that the 
inexpressible notion really is an intelligible notion of natural language, and that 
186 
 
it may be perfectly reasonable for those subject to the potential problem to 
simply deny this (2007, p.13). 
Unfortunately for Beall, this option is not available. He often uses expressions 
like ‘just true’ and ‘just false’ and even more frequent use of notions which 
seem to depend on notions like ‘just false’, ‘just true’ or ‘non-dialetheia’ for 
their meaning. To pick some arbitrary examples, he says: 
“Rational dialetheists maintain that some (actually, many) [truths] are just true; 
they reject that all or even most claims are [dialetheia]. Indeed, on my account, 
it is only the spandrels of [truth] (or related notions) that are [dialetheia]; the 
rest are ‘just true’ (2009, 48). 
He says this in the introduction to his chapter addressing the just false (or, just 
true) problem. The notion of sole truth is explicitly mentioned twice, and his 
claim that it is only the spandrels of truth which are dialetheia would seem to 
rely on the notion as well since, presumably, we should understand the ‘only’ to 
mean that the other sentences are non-dialetheia. 
Elsewhere, he says that, on his view “it’s just the [truth]-ineliminable spandrels 
that wind up [as dialetheia]” (2009, p.24). He also says “the [dialetheia] – the 
[true falsehoods] – are essentially tied to our given see-through device [truth] 
(or related notions).” (2009, p.6) Similarly, he claims, when giving the formal 
semantics for his view that “the [dialetheia] in the theory arise only in (the 
weird parts) of the semantic fragment.” (2009, p.13) There are many other such 
examples in his writing, as there are in the writing of all dialetheists. 
Though these last three examples do not explicitly use the expression ‘just 
false’, ‘just true’ or ‘non-dialetheia’, it’s difficult to see how they could be 
understood without them. After all, what does it mean to say that it is just the 
spandrels that are dialetheia, or that dialetheia are essentially tied to truth, or 
that dialetheia only arise in the semantic fragment, if not that the spandrels are 
dialetheia, but the non-spandrel, non-semantic sentences which are not 
essentially tied to truth are non-dialetheia? 
Given the pervasive use of notions of this kind in the literature on dialetheism, it 
is simply not plausible for a dialetheist to claim that the notions in question are 
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incoherent. Dialetheists of the sensible variety think that, though there are true 
contradictions, these are a rarity: most sentences we encounter in the course of 
a normal day are not like this. So long as this is the case, it behoves dialetheists 
to say things about these other, normal sentences, and this requires notions 
which categorise them like ‘just true’, ‘just false’ and ‘non-dialetheia’. 
6.2.1 Shrieking Just False 
In some recent papers JC Beall has articulated what he calls ‘The Shrieking 
Method’, employing so-called ‘Shriek Rules’ to do various jobs for dialetheists. In 
two of these, he uses Shriek Rules to obtain ‘classical recapture’ results 
((2013a), (2013b)). In a third, which is my concern here, he attempts to use 
Shriek Rules to solve the ‘just true’ and ‘just false’ problems (2013c). I argue in 
this section that shriek rules do not help the dialetheist avoid the ‘just false’ 
problem. One thing which will help make this clear is a more careful account of 
the distinct-but-related problems of ‘just false’ and ‘exclusion’. These are often 
conflated in the literature, and they are importantly conflated in Beall’s paper. 
The just false problem is, essentially, one of semantic categorisation. There are 
lots of sentences which are false and not, in addition, true but, it is alleged, 
dialetheists have no notion which captures these sentences. One simply way to 
capture dialetheism of the more sensible, non-trivialist variety, is as the view 
according to which some sentences are both true and false, some are just true 
and some are just false. Dialetheists ought to be able to express this claim and, 
focusing on the part concerning ‘just false’, they ought to be able to express 
claims like 
(JF) Some sentences are false, but some are just false. 
As I have pointed out, sentences of this kind are extremely common in 
discussions of dialetheism, and are uttered frequently both by dialetheists are 
their opponents. The just false problem arises when we consider how ‘just false’ 
behaves, given its obvious definition as ‘false but not true’, on dialetheism. 
Assuming, as Beall does, that a sentence is false if and only if it is untrue, ‘just 
false’ ends up equivalent to false and, for all the distinction the notion draws, 
the dialetheist might as well have said 
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(JF*) Some sentences are false, but some are false. 
JF and JF* are obviously inequivalent: the second misses something crucial about 
the first, which is that the ‘just’ adds something important to the first sentence. 
Any view which treats JF as completely equivalent to JF* cannot express the 
notion ‘just false’. 
If one doesn’t take falsity to be equivalent to untruth and, in particular, if one 
denies that a sentence’s being false entails its untruth (that is, if one denies 
exclusion), then things are slightly different. On this view, falsity and just falsity 
are inequivalent notions, since a sentence can be false without being untrue 
and, therefore, without being just false. However, if the converse, that a 
sentence’s being untrue entails that it is false, holds, then any untruth is 
thereby false and, hence, just false. So any sentence which is untrue, including 
a great many (indeed, infinitely many) dialetheia, is also just false. Though 
dropping exclusion restores the inequivalency between JF and JF*, it’s not clear 
that this solves the problem. If one rereads JF with the understanding that ‘just 
false’, and it occurs there, applies to infinitely many true sentences, it’s not 
implausible to think that something has still been missed. What we wanted was 
to say something about the sentences which are just false, not the dialetheic 
ones which are also true. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, one response which is available here, 
and the one endorsed by Graham Priest, is to deny that the inconsistency of the 
notion prevents it from meaning ‘just false’. I think this is wrong, but as I said in 
the cited section, it is difficult to present arguments to this effect beginning 
with premises the dialetheist is likely to accept. It seems to me that it is built-in 
to the meaning of ‘just false’ that it behave consistently. Priest thinks 
otherwise. Perhaps some empirical work, which checked speakers’ patterns of 
assent/dissent to various uses of the term in various contexts, might make 
progress on the issue. But this work has not been carried out, and, in the 
meantime, it seems likely that dialetheists will simply deny that it is part of the 
meaning of the term that is behave consistently, leaving us with an, at least 
temporary, stalemate. 
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On the other hand, dialetheists are in the business of trying to convert other 
philosophers to their view, and, without having done a careful survey, I suspect 
that most philosophers’ intuitions will side with mine. This being so, it would be 
dialectically advantageous for dialetheist to have a consistent notion of ‘just 
false’, should they want it. It’s difficult to see how this could be a bad thing, at 
any rate. So there is some reason for dialetheists to try to characterise a 
consistent notion of just false. 
However, Priest’s response to the problem, to accept the inconsistency of just 
falsity, is only available to him because he denies the exclusion principle. This 
has some unattractive features, one of which being that one cannot have 
transparent truth, as Beall does. If one accepts that a sentence is false if and 
only if it is untrue, this collapses the distinction between falsity and just falsity, 
and, therefore, the distinction between JF and JF*. Such views, then, cannot, if 
‘just false’ is defined as above, express sole falsity. 
So the ‘just false’ problem is that dialetheists, on the face of it, cannot have a 
notion of semantic categorisation which respects the difference between 
sentences like JF and sentences like JF*. 
While the ‘just false’ problem is concerns dialetheism’s ability to classify 
sentences by semantic value, the exclusion problem concerns their ability, as 
the name suggests, to exclude or rule-out certain sentences. Exactly what this 
should amount to is not always ideally clear, but one way of getting at the 
problem is through considerations of disagreement. In his (2004, p.338), Shapiro 
argues (citing Parsons (1990) as the original source of the objection) that 
dialetheists cannot express disagreement. Suppose I am a dialetheist, and 
someone makes a claim, α, with which I wish to disagree. I might try to express 
my disagreement by saying ‘¬α’ but, though ¬α is inconsistent with α, it is not, 
by my dialetheist lights, incompatible with α. But I cannot disagree with 
something by asserting something else with which it is compatible. What I need, 
one might think, is some way of excluding or ruling-out the truth of α, in such a 
way that what I say is genuinely incompatible with α. Only if this can be done, 
the thought goes, can I express my disagreement with α. The challenge, then, is 
for the dialetheist to find some device which allows us to exclude, and which 
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behaves consistently, so that when I use the device to exclude α this is not 
compatible with α. 
One response on behalf of dialetheism, made by Graham Priest, is to point out 
that there is a sense in which, say, a classicist is no better off: 
“A dialetheist can express the claim that something, α, is not true – in those 
very words, ¬T<α>. What she cannot do is ensure that the words she utters 
behave consistently: even if ¬T<α> holds, α ∧ ¬T<α> may yet hold. But in fact, a 
classical logician can do no better. He can endorse ¬T<α>, but this does not 
prevent his endorsing α as well. . . . [C]lassical logic, as such, is no guard against 
this. . . [A]ll the classical logician can do by way of saying something to indicate 
that α is not to be accepted is to assert something that will collapse things into 
triviality if he does accept α. But the dialetheist can do this too. She can assert 
α → ⊥.” (2006: 291) 
 
Suppose, now, that I am a classicist, and I wish to disagree with an assertion 
that α. I do so by asserting that ¬α. According to Priest, it’s not clear that I’ve 
really ruled-out α, since I might yet accept both α and ¬α. It’s a consequence of 
the explosiveness of classical logic that this would commit me to triviality, but 
classical logic, one might think, is not guard against this per se. 
 
To take an example, Paul Kabay’s (2010) book ‘On the Plenitude of Truth’ is a 
defence of trivialism, on the basis that dialetheism is true, and classical logic is 
correct. So whilst trivialism strikes most as, to say the least, theoretically 
unpalatable, it doesn’t look like classical logic itself precludes it. 
Nonetheless, perhaps the fact that classical logic delivers triviality in the 
presence of contradictions is, for most, a form of exclusion. If I, as a classicist, 
respond to someone’s assertion that α with ‘it is not the case that α’, then to 
the extent that trivialism is theoretically ‘off the table’ (as it is for everyone 
apart from Paul Kabay, so far as I am aware),  α is ‘off the table’ too (at least 
for me). In Beall’s words, I’ve ruled-out α ‘up to triviality’ (2013c, p.440). 
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Ruling-out ‘up to triviality’ is something that classicists get for free, since 
explosion is valid in the logic they endorse. Dialetheists don’t get it for free 
(assuming they’re of the more conservative, paraconsistent variety), at least in 
most cases. If a dialetheist accepted ‘Everything is true’, even they would be 
committed to triviality. So perhaps if a dialetheist were to say ‘It’s not the case 
that everything is true’, we would take them to have ruled-out ‘Everything is 
true’, up to triviality. But for the most part, this will not be possible. 
Priest’s suggestion is that this feature can simply be added to dialetheism by 
saying of the thing, α, we wish to exclude, α → ⊥. In later work, Priest rejects 
this strategy, and I discuss the reasons for this presently. He revises his view to 
invoke a sui generis speech act of denial. This, it seems to me, is a slightly 
different sort of exclusion to that which rules out ‘up to triviality’, so I’ll give a 
rough distinction between two senses in which we might wish to exclude. The 
first, I’ll call ‘disagreement exclusion’. As the name suggests, this is the sort of 
exclusion one wishes to use purely for the purposes of expressing conversational 
disagreement of the kind mentioned above: someone asserts α and if one 
disagrees, one wants a speech act of some kind which allows one to express this 
disagreement. This is the sort of disagreement for which one might invoke a 
speech act like denial. But some philosophers want something more than this. 
For example, Franz Berto (2014) characterises a notion of primitive, 
metaphysical exclusion which holds between properties. Two properties can 
exclude one another irrespective of whether any speaker utters a sentence 
expressing the fact, and independent of any person’s mental attitudes towards 
the properties. I call this sort of exclusion ‘theoretical exclusion’, since it allows 
us to have a theory which gives an account of what excludes what, whether or 
not this is put to work by speakers actually expressing disagreement. Beall’s 
account, which I will characterise shortly, is also, plausibly, of this kind, since it 
calls for the addition to a theory of non-logical shriek rules characterising what 
excludes what ‘up to triviality’, on that theory. 
Having some notion of theoretical exclusion, plausibly, gives one a notion of 
disagreement exclusion, since one can simply assert a sentence including the 
theoretical exclusion device to express disagreement with the sentence, α, with 
which we wish to disagree. The converse is not obviously true. One might have a 
notion of disagreement exclusion, such as denial, but not think that this builds-
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in to one’s theory an account of which things are excluded, independent of 
individual speakers’ actual acts of denial. 
For each of the two forms of exclusion, either disagreement or theoretical, 
there are corresponding exclusion problems to the effect that a dialetheist 
cannot express that form of exclusion. Though, again, it may be that any 
reasonable solution to the theoretical exclusion problem also provides a solution 
to the disagreement exclusion problem (the converse is less plausible). One way 
to put the difference between the problems is that a theorist faces the 
disagreement exclusion problem if there is no speech act available to them with 
which they can exclude for the purposes expressing disagreement. On the other 
hand, a theorist faces the theoretical exclusion problem if there is no notion in 
their theory which, independently of any particular speech acts, gives an 
account of what is ruled-out by the theory. 
These exclusion problems are importantly distinct, however, from the just false 
problem. Again, the just false problem is one of semantic categorisation. 
Dialetheists, it is alleged, cannot adequately categorise sentences by semantic 
value: they frequently, as they must, categorise sentences as ‘just false’, ‘just 
true’, ‘non-dialetheia’ and so on, but they lack an account of how these notions 
are expressible on their view. The exclusion problems, however, are different. 
On these objections, it is argued that dialetheists cannot adequately express 
that certain things are excluded or ruled-out. 
To take an example, suppose, as Beall does, that exclusion is a matter of ruling-
out ‘up to triviality’. Consider someone who endorses a paraconsistent logic, but 
not dialetheism. Perhaps they are motivated by the thought that relevance is 
important to logical consequence, but not convinced by a dialetheist account of 
the paradoxes. There is no reason, it seems to me, to charge such a person with 
the ‘just false’ problem, because their view is consistent. They do, however, 
face the theoretical exclusion problem, since it is not a feature of their logic 
that contradictions entail triviality. So they, just as much as dialetheists, (at 
least prima facie) lack the ability to rule out ‘up to triviality’. 
I don’t wish to rule-out in advance, by mere stipulation, that someone might use 
the same machinery to address each of these problems and so treat the just 
false problem and the exclusion problems, essentially, the same. This may well 
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be possible. On the other hand, since it is certainly not guaranteed that a 
solution to one will deliver a solution to the others, it’s important, at least for 
the purposes of discussion, to keep the just false problem separate from issues 
of exclusion. 
A final consideration is exactly which things we should expect, in either sense, a 
dialetheist to be able to exclude. One suggestion, which seems sensible enough, 
is that they ought to be able to exclude all those things which are just false; this 
is one point of contact between the just false problem and exclusion.  
6.2.1 Priest on Just False and Exclusion 
 
Priest does not conflate the just false problem with exclusion. In the passage 
quoted above, he says that dialetheists can express that something, α, is not 
true (by which he means, as is clear from the context, ‘just false’) using those 
very words ‘¬T<α>’. This, as is discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis (Section 
5.1.1), is Priest’s response to the ‘just false’ problem: the dialetheist simply 
uses the expression ‘just false’ (or, equivalently, for Priest, ‘not true’) and 
accepts that the notion behaves inconsistently. He has a separate response to 
the exclusion problem, which is that we can rule-out ‘up to triviality’, α, by 
asserting α → ⊥ (which I will call the ‘arrow-falsum’ strategy). Plausibly, this is 
a sort of theoretical exclusion: for any α such that α → ⊥ holds, α is ruled-out 
‘up to triviality’ by the theory. We can then express disagreement exclusion, as 
Priest says, for any such α by simply asserting α → ⊥. 
It’s even clearer in another passage from Priest that he treats the problems 
separately: 
“[M]any people have argued that a dialetheic solution to the paradoxes can be 
maintained only by expressive incompleteness, particularly with respect to the 
notion of being false only…[Dialetheists] cannot assert that something is false-
only if this is required to exclude things that are true as well. For both of us 
[Field and Priest], though, there is a way of obtaining this effect with a different 
kind of speech act, namely denial: both of us can deny that A is true. In some 
contexts there are things that can be asserted which have the same force as a 
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denial. Thus, both of us can assert A → ⊥, in the face of which one can maintain 
A only on pain of triviality, which would normally be taken as a denial. As Field 
points out, though, this cannot be used to reject in all cases. The Curry 
sentence, K, for example, is itself of the form K → ⊥, and so cannot be asserted 
by way of rejecting K. With all of this I agree. There is nothing that can be 
asserted which will, in general, have the same force as 
denial. The speech act is sui generis.  
 
So far, our lines are parallel. However, on further projection, they diverge. The 
crucial difference concerns what can be said in propositional contexts. Field has 
literally no way of expressing the notion of indeterminacy…The dialetheist about 
the paradoxes does have a way of expressing that something is false only – in the 
very words ‘false and not true’. It is just that these cannot be guaranteed to 
behave consistently.” (2010a, pp.136-137) 
 
So Priest endorses, again, the view that the correct solution to the ‘just false’ 
problem is to define it in the usual way, and accept its (in Priest’s case, more 
limited) inconsistency.  He clearly has a different solution in mind for exclusion. 
In certain cases, we can exclude by asserting α → ⊥, but more generally, we 
exclude using denial. 
 
The reason Priest cites for abandoning the arrow-falsum strategy is that there 
are certain sentences which cannot be excluded in this way. The example he 
gives, due to Field (2008, pp.388-390) is of a Curry sentence, K, equivalent to K 
→ ⊥. This sentence must be false only, and so must be excludable but, if the 
only available way of excluding is arrow-falsum, then the only way to exclude K 
is to assert K → ⊥. But if this is asserted, then triviality follows by the 
substitutivity of equivalents and modus ponens. So there are some sentences 
which cannot be excluded using arrow-falsum. 
 
In fact, things are slightly worse than this, as Beall points out (2013c, pp.440-
441). The most significant problem with the arrow-falsum strategy, is the 
strength of ‘→’ which, for Priest, (as is discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.0) is 
a logical strength connective, requiring for α → β that β follow logically from α. 
In the context of the arrow-falsum strategy, this means that, for α → ⊥ to be 
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true, α must logically entail triviality. In other words, it must be the case that 
there is no non-trivial world at which α holds. To take an example, it may be 
just false that I am in the park, and so, in that case, a dialetheist ought to be 
able to exclude my being in the park. But unless my aversion to the park is of a 
very extreme kind, it won’t be the case that my being in the park entails that 
everything is true. So, on Priest’s account of the conditional, since it will almost 
never be the case that the thing we wish to exclude would, if true, entail 
triviality, the arrow-falsum strategy can almost never be used to exclude. 
 
As Beall says, one way to respond to this situation would be to weaken the 
conditional to make it more easily satisfiable. The difficulty with this strategy is 
that it is easy to weaken the conditional too much. For example, if we 
interpreted the conditional materially, and so, to rule out α we assert α ⊃ ⊥, 
then, since this is equivalent to ¬α ∨ ⊥, it will be true of every α such that ¬α 
holds that α is excluded. This would have the effect of ‘excluding’ every 
dialetheia there is, which is obviously unsatisfactory. So this strategy would face 
the task of weakening the conditional such that α → ⊥ holds for all and only 
those sentences which are just false. This may be possible, but it will not be 
easy. According to Beall, a simpler, and better, response is to take the core idea 
of the arrow-falsum strategy, and implement it using ‘shriek rules’ instead. 
 
6.2.2 Shrieking, Just False and Exclusion 
 
In Beall’s notation, we let ‘α!’ (read ‘α shriek’) be ‘α ∧ ¬α’ and then let α! ⊨ ⊥ 
be α’s shriek rule. I use ‘⊨’ rather than Beall’s ‘⊢’, here, to make clear that 
semantic entailment is involved (as Beall spells out in the more precise, formal 
accounts of shrieking in his (2013a) and (2013b)). I also, in what follows, drop 
the ‘shriek’ notation, and simply use ‘α ∧ ¬α ⊨ ⊥’ as the shriek rule for α, since 
this seems to me simpler. Though I focus here, for simplicity of presentation, on 
the sort of simple shriek rule just given, Beall focuses mainly on more 
complicated shriek rules for predicates, with a view to ‘shrieking’ whole 
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theories. The details of these more complicated rules are not required for the 
points I wish to make, and would distract unnecessarily from them. My focus on 
simple shriek rules for single sentences is innocuous for two reasons: firstly, we 
need to be able to say of sentences that they are just false, and to be able to 
exclude them. If the shrieking strategy cannot be applied to sentences so as to 
achieve this, it fails to solve either the exclusion problem or the ‘just false’ 
problem. Secondly, since theories are simply sets of sentences, we can take 
single sentences to be perfectly legitimate limiting cases. 
Shriek rules are, according to Beall, non-logical rules, which are added to our 
theory in much the same way an epistemologist might add a factivity principle, 
Kφ ⊨ φ, to a formal theory of knowledge. They are added to our theory for all 
those things we take to be consistent. The effect of adding a shriek rule for α, α 
∧ ¬α ⊨ ⊥, is to enforce consistency ‘up to triviality’ on α. If we wish to rule-out 
α up to triviality, then once the shriek rule has been added, we can simply assert 
‘¬α’. The assertion of ¬α, combined with the shriek rule, has ruled-out α ‘up to 
triviality’, since, were α to hold too, triviality would follow. 
As should be clear from the above discussion (in which I distinguished the ‘just 
false’ problem from issues of exclusion), that this helps at all with the ‘just 
false’ problem is not obvious. Recall that the challenge of the just false problem 
was to find some notion which allowed us to express ‘just false’ in such a way as 
to capture the difference between sentences like those I called ‘JF’ and ‘JF*’, 
respectively: 
(JF) Some sentences are false, but some are just false. 
(JF*) Some sentences are false, but some are false. 
But, on Beall’s shrieking strategy, we add shriek rules to our theory, forcing 
consistency ‘up to triviality’ on those things we take to be consistent, then, we 
can assert, of some α we take to be ruled-out, ‘¬α’, or, equivalently, ‘F<α>’ (or 
¬T<α>, or T<¬α>). So shriek rules do nothing to distinguish JF from JF*: they are 
both, on Beall’s shrieking strategy, exactly equivalent. So Beall’s claim that 
shriek rules solve the ‘just false’ problem seems to rest on the conflation of that 
problem with the problem of exclusion. 
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One might respond to this that Beall’s view can be modified to address the ‘just 
false’ problem, most obviously by taking the ‘just’ in sentences like JF to be 
somehow indicating the existence of a shriek rule. There are two ways one might 
try to implement this suggestion. The first is the simplest: we just insert the 
shriek rule into our utterance and express ‘α is just false’ by ‘F<α> ∧ (α ∧ ¬α ⊨ 
⊥)’. If the sentence expressing the shriek rule ‘α ∧ ¬α ⊨ ⊥’ is, as one would 
assume, a sentence of the metatheory, this does not help. We already have a 
consistent notion of sole falsity in the metatheory, and this does not solve the 
problem. We must, instead, be able to express ‘just false’ in the object 
language. To make this point clear, we can introduce a validity predicate, Val, 
into the object language and express shriek rules using this. So α’s shriek rule 
will be Val(α ∧ ¬α, ⊥). We can then express, in the object language, that α is 
just false by ‘F<α> ∧ Val(α ∧ ¬α, ⊥)’. 
 
This, one might think, would allow Beall’s shriek rules to express ‘just false’, as 
well as to exclude ‘up to triviality’. Unfortunately, introducing the shriek rule 
into our utterance invites revenge paradox. Consider the sentence, β, equivalent 
to F<β> ∧ Val(β ∧ ¬β, ⊥). This sentence must be just false since, if it is true (or 
both true and false), we can derive triviality as follows: 
 
(1) T<β>    (assumption) 
(2)  β     (1, T-scheme) 
(3)  F<β> ∧ Val(β ∧ ¬β, ⊥) (2, substituting identicals) 
(4) F<β>    (3, ∧-elimination) 
(5) T<¬β>    (4, F-scheme) 
(6) ¬β    (5, T-scheme) 
(7) Val(β ∧ ¬β, ⊥)  (3, ∧-elimination) 
(8)  β ∧ ¬β   (2, 6, ∧-introduction) 
(9) ⊥    (7, 8, Val-detachment) 
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So β must be just false, but, on the present way of expressing this, we assert 
F<β> ∧ Val(β ∧ ¬β, ⊥) which, by substituting identicals, applying the T-scheme 
and ∧-introduction, this gives us T<β> ∧ (F<β> ∧ Val(β ∧ ¬β, ⊥)). In other words, 
β is both just false and true. So, if we attempt to express sole falsity by adding a 
shriek rule to our utterances, the notion ends up inconsistent, defeating the 
purpose of introducing shriek rules in the first place. This, of course, is a 
revenge problem for this strategy. 
 
The second strategy makes the familiar appeal to a pragmatic implicature. So, 
although, strictly speaking the content of JF is the same as that of JF*, the ‘just’ 
in the former generates a pragmatic difference, by pointing to the existence of a 
shriek rule.  
 
This suggestion fails for the, also familiar, reason that it is expressively 
impoverished: one cannot embed pragmatic implicatures in, for example, 
hypotheses or conditionals. A second worry about this strategy is that we can 
assert shriek rules; this being so, we can assert that a sentence is false and that 
a shriek rule holds of it. If the falsity of a sentence, in combination with a shriek 
rule, is what makes something ‘just false’, why should we be forced to invoke a 
pragmatic device, rather than simply having an expression whose content 
expresses ‘just false’ directly? This, presumably, would be preferable. If the only 
reason for invoking the pragmatic device is to avoid the revenge paradox, 
involving β, which I have just sketched, then it is ad hoc. 
 
So Beall’s shriek rules do not help with the ‘just false’ problem. Indeed, they are 
not aimed at that problem, but at the exclusion problem. If we attempt to 
modify Beall’s shrieking account to address the just false problem, then, again, 
we are faced with a dilemma: either we have an expression whose content 
contains the notion ‘just false’, in which case, revenge paradox delivers its 
inconsistency; or, we introduce a pragmatic device which is both lacking in 
motivation and expressively limited. 
 
This still leaves the exclusion problem, at which shriek rules seem better aimed. 
Unfortunately for Beall, shriek rules do not address this problem either, and for 
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the same reason that Priest’s arrow-falsum strategy fails: they are too strong. 
On Priest’s arrow-falsum strategy, to exclude some sentence, α, we assert α → 
⊥. The problem with this, given the strength of Priest’s ‘→’ is that it amounts to 
the claim that there is no non-trivial world at which α holds. But this is almost 
never true. All we need to find is a sentence which is false only, and so which 
requires excluding, but which is true in some other, non-trivial situation. 
 
Beall’s shriek rule for some α to be excluded, which says α ∧ ¬α ⊨ ⊥, does not 
require that there be no non-trivial situation at which α holds, but it does 
require that there be no non-trivial world at which α ∧ ¬α holds. So all we need 
to do is find a sentence which is just false, but which is both true and false in 
some non-trivial situation. This will be something which Beall ought to be able to 
exclude, but which he can’t using shriek rules. 
 
Where we find such sentences depends on the variety of dialetheism in question. 
Some dialetheists, like Graham Priest, think there are dialetheia in lots of 
places: they arise from the law, from puzzles concerning vagueness, from 
puzzles concerning the borders of objects, the paradoxes of change and so on. It 
seems likely that all the dialetheia which are supposed to arise in such cases are 
going to be contingent. For example, suppose I am well-inside a room with a hall 
outside. At the moment, it is just false that I am in the hall. But, if Priest is right 
about borders, then at the instant at which my location precisely lies on the 
boundary between the room and the hall, I am both in the hall and not in the 
hall. This situation, of course (assuming, again that Priest is right), is also non-
trivial. So although it is just false that I am in the hall, and so Beall ought to be 
able to exclude my being in the hall, he cannot do so using shriek rules, for 
there are non-trivial situations in which I am both in the hall and not. 
 
I suspect that if we endorse any metaphysical dialetheia whatsoever (arising in 
the law, from vague predicates, etc.), we’re going to end up with sentences 
which are just false, but which could have been both true and false (non-
trivially), and so with counter-examples to the shrieking strategy, since these 
are things we ought to be able to exclude, but which we can’t shriek. 
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Beall, of course, does not accept the existence of such dialetheia, restricting his 
inconsistency to the semantic realm. But this doesn’t prevent the problem, since 
there is a well-known class of contingent semantic paradoxes: the empirical 
liars. These are sentences which have the potential to become genuine liar 
sentences and so, for Beall, genuine dialetheia, but which require some other, 
empirical facts to obtain for this to be the case. If these facts do not obtain, the 
sentences may be just true, or just false. Some examples of such sentences are 
as follows: 
 
a) (*) The sentence marked (*) is false 
b) The third sentence from the bottom of the page is false 
c) There is a sentence on the page which is false 
d) Either this sentence is false, or it’s raining 
e) Everything Nixon said is true 
Depending purely on contingent, empirical matters (like which other sentences 
are on the page, how they’re marked, what their truth-values are, whether it’s 
raining, what Nixon said), these sentences might be dialetheia, or they might be 
true only or false only. If they’re false only, say, we ought to be able to exclude 
them (if they’re true only, we might want to exclude their negation). But we 
can’t do so on the shrieking strategy, because there are non-trivial cases such 
that they both hold and don’t. 
So Beall’s shrieking strategy, like Priest’s arrow-falsum strategy, fails because it 
is too strong. There are sentences we ought to be able to exclude, but which we 
cannot. Importantly, these counterexamples count just as much against shriek 
rules as a solution to the ‘just false’ problem as they do against them as a 
solution to exclusion. So even if Beall was able to negotiate the dilemma given 
above for the shrieking response to ‘just false’, it would still fail, because these 
counterexamples are just false, but can’t be expressed as such using shriek 
rules. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that versions of dialetheism which take a consistent 
metatheory suffer from the problem of revenge. My particular focus has been on 
Beall’s theory, offered in his Spandrels of Truth, as the most thorough 
articulation of the view. The revenge problems his theory faces are more 
general, however. By taking a classical metatheory, the dialetheist gives rise to 
notions expressible in that metatheory which cannot be expressed in the object 
theory. The object theory is, therefore, an inadequate model of natural 
language, since the former avoids triviality differently from the latter. This is 
what I have called ‘formal revenge’. Beall has argued that this sort of revenge is 
‘too easy’ but, as I have argued, this is not the case. The theory also faces 
informal revenge at the hands of the ‘just false’ problem. Dialetheists must 
treat this notion inconsistently, and attempts to remedy the situation by 
introducing a consistent notion of sole falsity face a dilemma: either the notion 
can be contained in an expression, in which case revenge paradox delivers its 
inconsistency; or appeal is made to a pragmatic device, in which case we are 
back with expressive limitation. 
Though, I have argued, metatheoretically paraconsistent dialetheism also faces 
the problem of revenge, that theory has some prima facie advantages over its 
metatheoretically consistent counterpart. I sketched a few of these in above. 
Perhaps the most important of these is that metatheoretically consistent forms 
of dialetheism are denied Priest’s arguments for naïve set theory; for example, 
that a proper understanding of absolutely general quantification requires a 
universal set. These arguments are powerful, and, if dialetheism cannot, as I 
have argued, be motivated by appeal to its immunity from the problem of 
revenge, these seem the most promising avenue for an alternative motivation 
for the view. It is a cost to metatheoretically consistent dialetheism that it 
cannot endorse these. 
 
 
 
202 
 
Bibliography 
 
Emil Badici (2008). The liar paradox and the inclosure schema. Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):583 – 596. 
 
Diderik Batens (1990). Against global paraconsistency. Studies in Soviet Thought 
39 (3-4):209-229. 
 
J. C. Beall (2009). Spandrels of Truth. Oxford University Press. 
 
J. C. Beall (2007). Prolegomenon to future revenge. In , Revenge of the Liar: 
New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press. 
 
Jc Beall (2013a). Free of Detachment: Logic, Rationality, and Gluts. Noûs 48 (3). 
 
Jc Beall (2013b). Lp+, k3+, fde+, and their 'classical collapse'. Review of 
Symbolic Logic 6 (4):742-754. 
 
Jc Beall (2013c). Shrieking against gluts: the solution to the 'just true' problem. 
Analysis 73 (3):438-445. 
 
Jc Beall (2011). Dialetheists against Pinocchio. Analysis 71 (4):689-691. 
 
Jc Beall , Thomas Forster & Jeremy Seligman (2013). A Note on Freedom from 
Detachment in the Logic of Paradox. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 
(1):15-20. 
 
Jc Beall & Julien Murzi (2011). Two Flavors of Curry Paradox. Journal of 
Philosophy 110 (3):143-165. 
203 
 
 
Jc Beall & Greg Restall (2006). Logical Pluralism. Oxford University Press. 
Francesco Berto (2014). Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge. 
Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207. 
 
Francesco Berto & Graham Priest (2008). Dialetheism. Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2008). 
 
George Boolos (1998). Reply to Charles Parsons' ``sets and classes''. In Richard 
Jeffrey (ed.), Logic, Logic, and Logic. Harvard University Press. 30-36. 
 
Ross T. Brady (1989). The non-triviality of dialectical set theory. In G. Priest, R. 
Routley & J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. 
Philosophia Verlag. 437--470. 
 
Lewis Carroll (1895). What the tortoise said to Achilles. Mind 4 (14):278-280. 
 
Jon Cogburn (2004). The Philosophical Basis of What? The Anti-Realist Route to 
Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The 
Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press. 
 
Donald Davidson (1967). Truth and meaning. Synthese 17 (1):304-323. 
K. Devlin (1980). Fundamentals of Contemporary Set Theory. Springer-Verlag 
Michael Dummett (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Duckworth. 
Michael A. E. Dummett (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University 
Press. 
P. Eldridge-Smith (2012). Pinocchio beards the Barber. Analysis 72 (4):749-752. 
P. Eldridge-Smith (2011). Pinocchio against the dialetheists. Analysis 71 (2):306-
308. 
204 
 
Hartry Field (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press. 
Hartry H. Field (2008). Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford University Press. 
Jay Garfield (2004). To Pee and not to Pee? Could That Be the Question? (Further 
Reflections of the Dog). In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb 
(eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press. 
I. Grattan-Guinness (1998). Discussion. Structural similarity of structuralism? 
Comments on Priest's analysis of the paradoxes of self-reference. Mind 107 
(428):823-834. 
Anil Gupta (1982). Truth and paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):1-60. 
Richard Heck (2007). Self-reference and the languages of arithmetic. Philosophia 
Mathematica 15 (1):1-29. 
Hans G. Herzberger (1982). Notes on naive semantics. Journal of Philosophical 
Logic 11 (1):61 - 102. 
Paul Horwich (2005). Reflections on Meaning. Oxford University Press,Clarendon 
Press ;. 
Paul Kabay (2010). On the Plenitude of Truth: A Defense of Trivialism. LAP 
Lambert Academic Publishing 
Saul A. Kripke (1975). Outline of a theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy 72 
(19):690-716. 
Frederick Kroon (2004). Realism and Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & 
Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press. 
David Lewis (1991). Parts of Classes. Blackwell. 
David Lewis (1970). General semantics. Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67. 
Greg Littman & Keith Simmons (2004). A critique of dialetheism. In G. Priest, J. 
C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Oxford 
University Press. 
Edwin D. Mares (2004). Semantic Dialetheism. In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & 
Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press. 
205 
 
John Mayberry (1977). On the consistency problem for set theory: An essay on 
the Cantorian foundations of classical mathematics (I). British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 28 (1):1-34. 
Alexius Meinong (1960). On the theory of objects (translation of `Über 
Gegenstandstheorie', 1904). In Roderick Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the 
Background of Phenomenology. Free Press. 76-117. 
Richard Montague (1974). Formal Philosophy; Selected Papers of Richard 
Montague. New Haven,Yale University Press. 
Chris Mortensen (2013). Motion perception as inconsistent. Philosophical 
Psychology 26 (6):913-924. 
Chris Mortensen (1997). The Leibniz continuity condition, inconsistency and 
quantum dynamics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):377-389. 
Chris Mortensen (1985). The limits of change. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
63 (1):1 – 10. 
Terence Parsons (1990). True Contradictions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 
(3):335 - 353. 
Graham Priest (2014). One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and 
of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness. Oxford 
University Press 
Graham Priest (2013). Indefinite Extensibility—Dialetheic Style. Studia Logica 
101 (6):1263-1275. 
Graham Priest (2012). Definition Inclosed: A Reply to Zhong. Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):789 - 795. 
Graham Priest (2010a). Hopes fade for saving truth. Philosophy 85 (1):109-140. 
Graham Priest (2010b). Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference. Notre Dame 
Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):69-84. 
Graham Priest (2008). Logical pluralism hollandaise. Australasian Journal of 
Logic 6:210-214. 
206 
 
Graham Priest (2006). Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. Oxford University Press. 
Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. Oxford 
University Press. 
Graham Priest (2005). Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of 
Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 
Graham Priest (2002). Beyond the Limits of Thought. Oxford University Press. 
Graham Priest (2001). Introduction to Non-Classical Logic. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Graham Priest (2000). On the principle of uniform solution: A reply to Smith. 
Mind 109 (433):123-126. 
Graham Priest (1998). The import of inclosure: Some comments on Grattan-
guinness. Mind 107 (428):835-840. 
Graham Priest (1994). The structure of the paradoxes of self-reference. Mind 
103 (409):25-34. 
Graham Priest (1987) 'Unstable Solutions to the Liar Paradox' in Self Reference: 
Reflections and Reflexivity, S.J. Bartlett and P. Suber (eds.), Nijhoff 
Graham Priest (1979). Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219-
241. 
F. P. Ramsey (1990). F.P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.) (2006). Absolute Generality. Oxford 
University Press. 
Stephen Read (2006). Monism: The One True Logic. In D. de Vidi & T. Kenyon 
(eds.), A Logical Approach to Philosophy: Essays in Memory of Graham Solomon. 
Springer. 
Greg Restall (1997). Paraconsistent logics! Bulletin of the Section of Logic 26 
(3):156-163. 
207 
 
Greg Restall (1992). A note on naive set theory in ${rm LP}$. Notre Dame 
Journal of Formal Logic 33 (3):422-432. 
David Ripley (2013). Paradoxes and Failures of Cut. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 91 (1):139 - 164. 
David Ripley (2011). Negation, Denial, and Rejection. Philosophy Compass 6 
(9):622-629. 
R. Routley & V. Routley (1972). The semantics of first degree entailment. Noûs 6 
(4):335-359. 
Richard Routley , Val Plumwood , Robert K. Meyer & Ross T. Brady (1982). 
Relevant Logics and Their Rivals. Ridgeview. 
Bertrand Russell (1986). The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays, 
1914-19. Allen & Unwin. 
Kevin Scharp (2013). Replacing Truth. Oxford University Press. 
Stewart Shapiro (2007). Burali-Forti's revenge. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of 
the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press. 
Stewart Shapiro (2004). Simple truth, contradiction, and consistency. In G. 
Priest, J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. 
Oxford University Press. 
B. H. Slater (1995). Paraconsistent logics? Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 
(4):451 - 454. 
Nicholas J. J. Smith (2000). The principle of uniform solution (of the paradoxes 
of self-reference). Mind 109 (433):117-122. 
Richard Sylvan (1980). Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond: An Investigation 
of Noneism and the Theory of Items. Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University. 
Alfred Tarski (1936). The concept of truth in formalized languages. In A. Tarski 
(ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford University Press. 152--278. 
208 
 
Zach Weber (2013). Notes on inconsistent set theory. In. In Francesco Berto, 
Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and 
Applications. Springer. 315--328. 
Zach Weber (2012). Transfinite cardinals in paraconsistent set theory. Review of 
Symbolic Logic 5 (2):269-293. 
Zach Weber (2010a). Transfinite numbers in paraconsistent set theory. Review of 
Symbolic Logic 3 (1):71-92. 
Zach Weber (2010b). Extensionality and restriction in naive set theory. Studia 
Logica 94 (1):87 - 104. 
Zach Weber (2010c). Explanation and Solution in the Inclosure Argument. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):353-357 
A. Weir (1998). Naïve set theory is innocent! Mind 107 (428):763-798. 
Alan Weir (2013). A Robust Non-transitive Logic. Topoi:1-9. 
Alan Weir (2004). There Are No True Contradictions. In Graham Priest, J. C. 
Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon 
Press. 
Elia Zardini (2014). Naive truth and naive logical properties. Review of Symbolic 
Logic 7 (2):351-384. 
Haixia Zhong (2012). Definability and the Structure of Logical Paradoxes. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):779 - 788. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
